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Choreographing thought: movement as an image of thought, seen through the Deleuzian
Pure Optical and Sound Image.

By

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Thesis submitted to the Edinburgh College of Art, The University of Edinburgh in
fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

(Dance/Philosophy)

2012

Abstract

To assume that dance as an art form is about creating and displaying sequences of movement in space is to undermine choreography's potential as a way of thinking through movement. The interdisciplinary relations between philosophy and dance explored in this research introduce a framework for exploring new possibilities of thinking through choreographic practice. How can dance be perceived as thought, considered as an experimental process, where the articulation between practice and theory becomes fundamental?

The cinematic reversal of the subordination of time to movement proposed by French philosopher Gilles Deleuze in his time-image concept offers a paradigmatic shift which has the potential to find profound resonance in the perception of movement in dance.

This research explores how this shift informs a new perspective on choreography by discussing the implications of approaching choreographic composition through the lenses of Deleuze's Pure Optical and Sound Image.

As part of the practical choreographic investigation undertaken in this research, I have sought to challenge the conditions of the act of 'seeing' dance and to create an 'opening condition' for the use of choreography. To maintain an 'open condition' within the practice of choreography, it is necessary to acknowledge the constant becoming of its materials that depend on non-hierarchical relations and on duration itself. My approach is improvisational and my compositional strategies, which are manifestly dependent on interdisciplinary collaborative processes, emphasise ways of thinking through both movement and the image.

Acknowledgments

This thesis was made possible by the Foundation for Science and Technology – Ministry of Education and Science of Portugal Scholarship. I am thankful to this institution for enabling me to undertake a PhD programme at Edinburgh College of Art, University of Edinburgh, and conduct archive research as part of the Visiting Scholar Program at the departments of Cinema Studies and Performance Studies at New York University, to whom I am also grateful. I am also thankful to the Gulbenkian Foundation for the first year scholarship that made the commencement of the present research possible.

I would like to express my thanks to my first supervisor Dr. Sophia Lycouris for her support, encouragement and constructive criticism, and for maintaining an open and enthusiastic attitude towards a multi-modal research project that combines theory and practice, extensive collaborations and different outcomes. I am indebted to my second supervisor, Dr. Kevin Love, for his support, rigueur and stimulating advice on my interconnections between philosophy and dance. I am also thankful to Dr. André Lepecki for accepting me as a Visiting Scholar to the Performance Studies department at New York University, providing me with a state-of-the-art insight into the most prominent work done today in renowned fields. Sincere thanks goes to Ana Gouveia for initiating the studio work with me in its very early stages, for her constantly valuable insight, criticism and friendship and for never doubting its potential. A special thanks goes also to my close collaborator and friend, Ricardo Jacinto, who has shared artistic and production responsibilities with me and accompanied me throughout the practice with his unstoppable creativity, hard work, clairvoyance and friendship. I would like to address my heartfelt gratitude to all the people that have collaborated with me and helped me to carry out a piece of work that would not have been possible without them; Nuno Torres, Madalena Xavier, Marlene Freitas, Shiori Usui, Vangelis Ilympouridis,

André Castro, Elysabeth Remelgado, Tomás Viana, Vasco Viana, Francesca Bertozzi, Filipe Jacôme, Pedro Magalhães, Mariana Sá Nogueira, Daniel Malhão, João Lemos, Maria Ana Freitas, Sara Morais, Luis Quirino, Alexandre Costa, Vasco Saltão, Nuno da Silva, Jose Pedro, C Spencer Yeah, Matilde Meireles.

I am truly grateful to Cathleen Tseng for her friendship and patience with the tedious task of proofreading the early drafts of this thesis and to Mariza Dima for all the caring, help and insightful discussions throughout the years of this research.

I wish to thank all my friends and family who along the years have given me all the love and support fundamental to this journey. My deepest thanks to my son Gustavo, this work is for you

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, that the work contained herein is my own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text, and that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.

Beatriz Cantinho



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I do not know what the spirit of a philosopher could more wish to be than a good dancer. For the dance is his ideal.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche

INTRODUCTION

The present research approaches the Deleuzian *time-image* as a way to question choreographic practices and to conduct research into the potential reconfiguration of these practices opened up by the application of Deleuzian theory. In *Cinema 2*, Deleuze affirms, ‘A theory of cinema is not “about cinema”, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to, and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices’ (Deleuze, 1997, p. 280). In this thesis I apply this motto to interdisciplinary research between dance and philosophy. The resonance and juxtaposition of both concepts and artistic materials is characterised by a two-way relationship, where concepts inform practice as much as the practice itself assists in the reconceptualization of the given aesthetic framework.

Tomlinson and Galeta, in their introduction to Deleuze’s *Cinema 2*, reiterate the idea that the cinema books¹ repeat a ‘philosophical revolution, which took place over several centuries’; that is, they constitute a novel re-creation of the concepts of modern philosophy, notably the cinematic reversal of the subordination of time to movement (Deleuze, 1997, p. xvi).

Contrary to the movement-image, the time-image or the ‘new regime of the image’, disrupts the empirical succession of images and the psychological creation of connections between them, and instead grows into more complex modes of composition through the interplay of elements of reality, imagination and memory. Time becomes the

¹ Deleuze’s cinema books comprise two volumes; *Cinema 1: the movement-image* (1983) and *Cinema 2: the time-image* (1985).

‘essence’ of the image. Time is what we see in the image: duration and flow; the signs of time become equivalent to the signs of thought.

Deleuze contends that the organised systems re-created by the movement-image, and our belief in the world has been shattered by the events of the Second World War (Deleuze, 1997, p. preface). Mullarkey asserts that what is at stake in Deleuze’s time-image is a need to restore our belief in the world, which is done by ‘inventing new relationships between sound and vision, new types of space, and even new kinds of body’ (Mullarkey, 2009, p. 94). Rodowick argues that this ‘falsifying’ narration of the new image, Nietzschean in aspiration, breaks away from the opposition between true and false, creating instead ‘truth positively’ (Rodowick, 1997, p. 85). The primary concern is to understand how thought can be kept moving towards the new and unforeseen, in other words towards Bergson’s ‘creative evolution’ (1907). Contrary to the movement-image, which answers the question ‘What is thinking?’ through negation, repetition and identity, in the new-image (time-image), concepts are formed through difference and non-identity in a continually open becoming (Rodowick, 1997, p. 85). Deleuze’s cinema books reveal his attempt to overcome the previous sensory-motor schemata of the movement-image in order to go beyond cliché and metaphor, in other words, to go beyond representation. Deleuze’s new image and the non-correspondence between the sound and the visual, complexify the role of the viewer. The image is no longer just to be understood, but rather it is to be felt and sensed instead.

The specific connection between Deleuze’s time-image and dance relates to the need to accord dance a greater role than the simple perception of it as ‘flow or continuum movement’ (Lepecki, 2006, p. 5). There is more to dance, and to choreography, than the

simple production of movement. Badiou argues that dance corresponds to the Nietzschean idea of thought as becoming, as an active power (Badiou, 2005, p. 59). Badiou affirms that Nietzsche's most significant insight with respect to dance is his assertion that 'Beyond the exhibition of movements or the quirkiness of their external designs, dance is what testifies to the force of restraint at the heart of these movements' (Badiou, 2005, p. 60).

Serving as a theoretical framework for the development of this research project, the first chapter of this thesis offers an insight into the compositional aspects of the Deleuzian 'pure optical and sound image', thus contextualising the conceptual parameters of my artistic practice. The dance composition seen through the lens of the Deleuzian 'pure optical and sound image' allows the experience of time within movement, or the feeling of moving within time. The steps of the dancer are no longer perceived as being exclusively dependent upon a sequential, chronological time and a quantitative extensive space (actual) approach.

As a choreographer, I received most of my dance training in Portugal during a particular historical context within dance², and some of the choreographers referred by Lepecki in *Exhausting Dance* (2006), have been either my teachers, or important references through viewing their performances. For a significant period of time, Portugal was a privileged place with respect to the presentation of both European and American contemporary dance. One might argue though, that Lepecki's critical discourse manifests a 'preference' for a particular generation of choreographers to which Lepecki himself,

² The eighties/nineties were a very productive time for the arts in general, due to the greater focus given to cultural policies, and the abundance of funding, and in particular due to the impulse given by the EXPO (1998). See Maria José Fazenda, *Movimentos Presentes — Aspectos da Dança Independente em Portugal* (Fazenda, 1997), André Lepecki, *Skin, Body, and Presence in Contemporary European Choreography* (Lepecki, 1999b)

both as a critic and as a dramaturgist, belongs³. Although I consider these choreographers to have been the main influences on my choreographic work, I do not feel constrained by what one may identify in their work as a politicised imposition of the absence of movement within choreography, which followed the previous imposition on dance of an imperative to consist of a continuous display of movement. By observing dance performances today, and conducting research on its related disciplines, I am confident that neither the first imposition, nor the latter, would constitute an issue in dance analysis today. The panoply of renowned choreographers and dances being performed today allows us to conclude that each choreographer chooses as many different materials, formats and aesthetic preferences as they deem necessary to convey the exploration of their movement or thematic to the audience (e.g. some of the most prominent contemporary choreographers, each with their own distinct approach to movement such as: William Forsythe, Anne Therese de Keersmaeker, Sidi Larbi Charkaoui, Jonathan Burrows, Akram khan, Boris Charmatz, Marie Chouinard, Jerome Bel, Xavier le Roy, Meg Stuart, Vera Mantero, La Ribot, Karine Saporta, to name but a few).

In the present thesis, I aim to make clear how movement can be perceived as thought, and how choreography can contribute to that. In order to align one's thought with that of Deleuze's concept of movement, one should try to look at dance's evolution through the same strategy that Deleuze used in his critical analysis of cinema. In other words, it is important to identify the point of transition in dance that corresponds, to use Deleuze's words, to a 'break with the previous sensor-motor schema' in dance. Following Lepecki's rationale, this might be identified through dance's reaction against its

³ See André Lepecki's *Crystallization — Unmaking American dance by tradition* (1999a).

obligation to deliver constant and unstoppable flow, or to the submission of the body to a pure kinetic and technical display, such as the one Lepecki refers to.

Deleuze's analysis of the fundamental premises that stimulated the transformation from the movement-image to the time-image helped me to rethink the role of choreography itself. The philosophical paradigmatic shift with respect to the perception of movement and time initiated by Bergson, and taken up by Deleuze, provided me with a wealth of valuable research material. The cinematic reversal of the subordination of time to movement in the time-image has a profound resonance with the changes in the perception of movement in dance history. Deleuze's main question in his cinema books, 'How do we grasp an image of thought in and as movement?' (Rodowick, 1997, p. 39) needs to be asked choreographically. The latter relates to Lepecki's suggestion as to the urgency for dance to create an ontology of its own (Lepecki, 2006, p. 4).

The first chapter seeks to identify the aspects of the time-image that stimulated the change in the cinematic image. Here I discuss Deleuze's ideas on the shifting relationship between time and movement; time is no longer subordinated to movement but rather movement has become a consequence of a direct presentation of time by inverting the relationship between movement and time in its composition. The Deleuzian 'irrational cut' of the time-image or of the *pure optical and sound image* constitutes a more sophisticated and complex mode of composition. It affirms a new aesthetics and consequently a new ethics that implies the coalescence of the actual (visible) and the virtual (invisible) and it is heavily indebted to Bergson's concept of '*la durée pure*' (Bergson, 1910). In this chapter I seek to clarify what constituted Bergson's 'revolution' in relation to its predecessors and the phenomenologists of his time. The fact that

Deleuze recognises the significant influence of Bergson's theories regarding perception and movement on his own philosophical thought required me to conduct an in-depth investigation into the 'paradigm shift' heralded by Bergson's ideas on movement and time.

The second chapter identifies Deleuze's departure from Bergson's thought through their different perspectives on the cinematic image. In contrast to Bergson, Deleuze believes that the cinematic image, and in particular neo-realist cinema, is the concretisation of immanence between movement and thought. According to Deleuze, the cinematic image is not a representation of reality as in immediate perception, as argued by Bergson, but is instead a more sophisticated way of perceiving reality through 'the depths of time' (duration), realised through movement, through repetition. For Deleuze 'true repetition' is what produces difference (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 68). In Deleuze's philosophy this represents a 'fight' against representation, and thus the emancipation of movement from representation, from an exclusive succession of movements in space. The Deleuzian pure optical and sound image gives us the perception of the 'whole' through its continuous becoming. We experience time itself, because time has become immanent to thought. The sound and the visual elements enter into 'internal relations' that produce a continuous transformation in the image, corresponding to Deleuze's 'deterritorializations', those which trigger the processes of becoming in the image and in thought, which have been rendered indiscernible.

In the third chapter I address Lepecki's analysis of the exhaustion of dance (*Exhausting Dance*, 2006), comparing it with Sloterdijk's commentary on modernity's kinetic program as an obligation to unstoppable movement in *Planes of Composition*

(Sloterdijk, 2010, p. 3). My critical analysis consists of the identification of the equivalent paradigm shift in dance, revealed through the choreographic resistance to its perception as a ‘simple’ producer of movement. Thus, the creation of new forms of narrative in dance, that reveal a political resistance to an obligation to move, imposed from outside. Improvisational forms in choreography become a means of embracing the ambiguity and unpredictability of life and to raise awareness of the urgent need for a greater correspondence between an exterior velocity and an interior one.

Sabisch’s question, ‘What can choreography do?’, profoundly inspired by Spinoza’s *Ethics* and the philosopher’s question, ‘What can a body do?’, corresponds to the potential of choreography to increase the body’s power and to explore the ‘limits of what we can do’ (Sabisch, 2011, p. 8). The above question, which Sabisch identifies as being an ethical one, becomes essential if one wishes to affirm the power of choreography to continually produce new relations and, at the same time, seize the opportunity to ‘explain the conditions of the new’ (ibid.), which is of a philosophical nature.

The last three chapters reflect my aesthetic choices in movement composition and what might be regarded as the ethics expressed in my choreographic practice. My compositional strategies translate a way of thinking through movement and the image, and are strongly dependent on interdisciplinary collaborative processes. This is because I consider them to be essential for a reconfiguration of choreography and see them as the way to take experimental artistic practices further. Finally, the consistent interconnection between artistic and academic contexts throughout my practice is informed by my desire

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to contribute towards the reconfiguration of the relationship between academic research and artistic experimentation.

1. THE TIME-IMAGE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The *time-image* concept introduced in Deleuze's *Cinema 2* (1985) extends from that of the *movement-image* presented in *Cinema 1* (1983). In his cinema books Deleuze argues that the change in the characteristics of the image reflected the difference between the pre-Second World War and post-Second World War human experience. The Second World War is taken as a break because, as Deleuze affirms, we are no longer capable of reacting to its devastating effects:

... the post-war period has greatly increased the situations which we no longer know how to react to, in spaces which we no longer know how to describe ... deserted but inhabited, disused warehouses, waste ground, cities in the course of demolition or reconstruction. And in these any-spaces-whatever a new race of characters was stirring, kind of mutant: they saw rather than acted, they were seers. (Deleuze, 1997, p. Preface)

Luchino Visconti's *Obsession* (1943) is in Deleuze's opinion the film that 'stands as the forerunner of neo-realism' (Deleuze, 1997, p. 3). For Deleuze, before neo-realism, cinema was subject to the regime of the *movement-image*, an image essentially characterised by sensory-motor situations where time is subordinated to action, to space, or, one might say, action plays the main role, and is the central focus of the narrative (Deleuze uses Buster Keaton's films as a paradigmatic example of this sort of image). For Deleuze, neo-realist cinema represents the birth of a new image, even though he

recognises in Ozu, Mankiewicz and in the musical comedy an anticipation of this image. The neo-realist image evolves from the previous sensorial-motor situations into pure optical and sound situations, where the subordination is inverted: instead of time being an indirect representation of movement, movement now becomes a consequence of a direct presentation of time (Deleuze, 1997, p. 22).

In *Cinema 2* Deleuze undertakes the task of analysing and presenting this ‘new image’. The appearance of a new type of image does not imply the disappearance of the previous one, the *movement-image*. The movement-image remains as a first dimension of the time-image, an image that is constantly growing in dimensions: ‘We are not talking about dimensions of space, since the image may be flat, without depth, and through this very fact assumes all the more dimensions or powers which go beyond space’ (Deleuze, 1997, p. 22).

Deleuze affirms that these growing powers can be described as follows: while the first image, the movement-image, and its sensory-motor signs were in a relationship with an indirect image of time, dependent on montage, the pure optical and sound image, its *opsigns* and *sonsigns* (optical and sound signs), directly connect to a time-image. Time is no longer the measure of movement, but movement is the perspective of time; time has subordinated movement. Movement is no longer perceived in time, but what we see instead is the unfolding of time within movement (ibid.). The time-image disrupts the empirical succession and the psychological way of connecting images, and grows into more complex modes of composition through the interplay of elements of reality, imagination and memory. Time becomes the ‘essence’ of the image. Time is what we

see in the image: duration and flow; the signs of time become equivalent to the signs of thought.

... the cinematic image becomes a direct presentation of time, according to non-commensurable relations and irrational cuts ... this time-image puts thought into contact with an unthought, the unsummonable, the inexplicable, the undecidable, the incommensurable. The outside or the obverse of the images has replaced the whole, at the same time the interstice or the cut has replaced association. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 214)

In the English edition of *Cinema 2* (1989), the translators underline the importance of the cinema books as a recreation of the concepts of modern philosophy but in a new way, especially the cinematic reversal of the subordination of time to movement. For Tomlinson and Galeta, Deleuze's cinema books repeat a 'philosophical revolution, which took place over several centuries' (Deleuze, 1997, p. xvi).

Mullarkey affirms that for Deleuze, the neo-realist image regime is no longer considered within the same philosophical conception of 'truth' as the previous movement-image. The cinematic 'clichés', identified by Deleuze in the movement-image, have lost their utility with the events of the Second World War. Faith in reality and its organised systems has been shattered. The 'post-war European anomie and exhaustion, class upheaval, social reorganisation, physical and spiritual dislocation, moral re-evaluation, vast economic migrations' (Mullarkey, 2009, p. 93) destroyed the possibility of the construction of the same forms of narrative. Neo-realist cinema reflects the

unpredictability of life, meaning from now on anything is possible, and the unexpected is the ‘fuel’ of creation. Rodowick also asserts that for Deleuze the main question is to understand how thought can be ‘kept moving’:

... not toward a predetermined end, but toward the new and unforeseen in terms of what Bergson calls the open or ‘creative evolution’ thus the organic and crystalline regimes are qualitatively different with respect to how they answer the question ‘what is thinking’? For the former it is the discovery of concepts through negation, repetition, and identity, toward ever more self-identical beings, for the latter it is the creation of concepts through difference and nonidentity in a continually open becoming. (Rodowick, 1997, p. 85)

The rational cuts, the sensory-motor linkages, the organised spaces are substituted by what Deleuze identifies as *any-space-whatever* (*espace quelconque*) (Mullarkey, 2009, p. 93). The consequence of this is that the new image carries a potentiality within it — the possibility to be read or thought — which is done through its signs (the opsigns and the sonsigns). ‘We *see* the actor seeing his seeing, hearing his hearing — it is an image *of* an image, a thematised image’ (ibid.)⁴. The constant interchange between the acoustic and the optical, between the thematic references and its false fidelities (sound and the image), make us, seers, confused and lost within the image. One can no longer ‘understand’ the image one can only ‘sense’ it.

⁴ Mullarkey refers to the films of Jacques Tati, among which, I consider *Playtime* to be the best example of a particular use of sound and optical images with these characteristics. The different performance formats and installation developed in my practical work were created with the intention to provide a similar experience to the viewer. The Eye Height Performance and installation is where this specific relationship between the sound and the image becomes clearer. See Appendices: 3. Visual material, Fundação de Oeiras/Performance and *Eye Height Installation*/Eye Height Installation (disc. 3).

... cinema tries to restore our belief in the world by creating reasons to believe in this world: 'we need an ethic or a faith ... a need to believe in this world'. How is this done? By inventing new relationships between sound and vision, new types of space, and even new kinds of body (that correspond to a 'genesis of bodies' rather than fixed organic coordinates). (Mullarkey, 2009, p. 94)

1.2 THE TIME-IMAGE AS THE PRESENTATION OF TIME ITSELF

In introducing a new way of perceiving and construing images, Deleuze's cinema books introduce a new aesthetics⁵, or what one may call a virtual aesthetics where the virtual (the invisible) prevails as one of the dimensions of the real, indiscernible to the actual (the visible). The virtual is translatable into force and intensity that operate through excess, and, because of that, has the potential to extend the actual, to extend the conditions of our existence.

‘VIRTUAL’ is without any doubt the principal name of being in Deleuze's work. Or rather, the nominal pair virtual/actual exhausts the deployment of univocal Being ... We require the couple virtual/actual to test that an actual being univocally possesses its being as a function of its virtuality. In this sense, the virtual is the ground of the actual. (Badiou, 2000, p. 42)

The virtual is, in Deleuze's philosophy, clearly inspired by Bergson's thought, that which grants human experience the possibility of freedom, allowing experimentation, and as such, art itself. Freedom, for both philosophers, corresponds to the capacity that humans have to live beyond mere survival needs, or to the emotional/subjective facet of experience, and consequently to aesthetic experience. However, in respect to art and experimentation, Deleuze does step away from Bergson's thought, and stands in opposition to Bergson, when he acknowledges the importance of the cinematic image as

⁵ Reference to the etymological sense of the word *aisthetikos*, (sensitive, perceptive), from *aisthanesthai*, to perceive (by the senses or by the mind).

thought. The differences between Deleuze and Bergson concern mainly their different perspectives regarding the immanence of thought, and particularly Deleuze's considerations of the cinematic image as a potential 'image of thought'⁶.

The time-image operative mode corresponds to the disruption of empirical succession, and the psychological way of connecting images that characterised the movement-image. The time-image reflects the power of the virtual, which has the capacity to disrupt the actual, in other words, to extend it. Rodowick recalls Bergson's words: 'perception is the master of space in the measure to which action is the master of time'. So what happens in neo-realism, 'when actions no longer "master" time in the image', or 'when duration is no longer measured by the translation of movements into actions? What does movement become, and what kinds of images are formed?' (Rodowick, 1997, p. 79). As Rodowick explains, for Deleuze the time-image needs to go beyond movement in the same way that it needs to go beyond the 'real'. It needs to turn from mere representation in space (exteriority or extensiveness) 'toward a genesis in mental relations or time' (Rodowick, 1997, p. 79). Rodowick identifies this as the basis 'of the second pure film semiotic'. Once perception is no longer exclusively dependent on action it enters by necessity into contact with thought, and gradually, the image is 'subordinate to the demands of new signs which would take it beyond movement?' (Deleuze, cit in Rodowick, 1997, p. 80).

The image had to free itself from sensory-motor links; it had to stop being action-image in order to become a pure optical, sound (and tactile) image. But the latter was not enough: it had to enter into relations with yet other forces, so that it could itself escape

⁶ I identify their different perspectives on cinema later (chapter 2, section 2.3) in the text.

from a world of clichés. It had to open to powerful and direct revelations, those of the time-image, of the readable image and the thinking image. It is in this way that opsigns and sonsigns refer back to ‘chronosigns’⁷, ‘lectosigns’⁸ and ‘noosigns’⁹. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 23)

Our ‘affections’ are now perceived as ‘intensities’ and ‘force’. Deleuze’s concept of force possesses a more intensified and disruptive power, inspired by Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’: ‘The will to power is both the genetic element of force and the principle of synthesis of forces’ (Deleuze, 1997, p. 51).

Beyond Bergson’s ‘revolutionary becoming’, Deleuze’s ambition is to grant philosophical thought a ‘place’ ‘beyond good and evil’¹⁰. And in this sense, Deleuze’s cinema books seem to testify to a desire to propose a disruptive ‘territory’ (plane) within which art is perceived beyond representation.

As Moulard discusses, this idea of a thought ‘beyond good and evil’ is profoundly informed by Nietzsche’s work. It does not necessarily translate Nietzsche’s idea of ‘going beyond or transcending slave morality as in the sense of indicating or signifying the other, excessive side of the real’ (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 110). From Moulard’s

⁷ Chronosign (point and sheet): an image where time ceases to be subordinate to movement and appears for itself (see the term *time-image* in the glossary).

⁸ Lectosign: a visual image which must be ‘read’ as much as seen (ibid.).

⁹ Noosign: an image which goes beyond itself towards something which can only be thought (ibid.).

¹⁰ See Deleuze’s ‘Power of the false’, in *Cinema 2*, Chapter VI.

perspective, this idea in Deleuze's philosophy relates to what can be found on the other side of 'the excessive side of the real', which for Deleuze is 'pure powers'. These 'pure powers' (*puissances*) of expansion represent the forces of becoming. Moulard adds that these 'immanent forces' are simultaneously perceived as mental relations (*ibid.*). For this reason, it is imperative that the time-image has the capacity to break with the previous sensorial-motor schemata in order to go beyond cliché and metaphor, in other words, to go beyond representation.

A cliché is a sensory-motor image of the thing ... We therefore normally perceive only clichés. But, if our sensory-motor schemata jam or break, a different type of image can appear: a pure optical-sound-image, the whole image without metaphor, brings out the thing in itself, literally, in its excess of horror or beauty, in its radical or unjustifiable character, because it no longer has to be 'justified', for better or for worse. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 20)

This aspect reveals a profound rupture with philosophical tradition, thus aiming towards the creation of an entirely new ethics. The metaphysical is no longer considered, as it was before¹¹, inaccessible or transcendental to human experience. The metaphysical is, in fact, in Deleuze's thought, immanent to experience, since the virtual acquires some form of 'material' dimension through its multiple actualisations. The virtual is seen as 'material' because it is constantly being 'actualised' through experience. This is a fundamental trace in both Bergson's as well as in Deleuze's thought. If Bergson calls it *metaphysical pragmatism* Deleuze names it *transcendental empiricism*. In the work of

¹¹ Transcendental Materialism refers to the Kantian critique of metaphysics.

both philosophers, both names refer to a particular methodology of their own.

... Empiricism truly becomes transcendental and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible ... (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 68).

Moulard argues that both philosophers share a concern about what she describes as a 'revaluation of the transcendental conditions informing the Kantian and phenomenological image of experience' (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 2) This relates to the idea that transcendental philosophy implies that the formal conditions of experience constitute the ground of *sensible intuition* and have to be 'there in the first place'. Moulard introduces the term 'virtual empiricism' to translate both Bergson's 'metaphysical pragmatism' and Deleuze's 'transcendental (or 'superior') empiricism', and to underline the significance of the 'virtual' in their philosophical thought (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, pp. 2-3).

The transcendental is no longer considered as something external to human experience, as something 'outside', but as immanent to it. As Deleuze states: 'The transcendent is not the transcendental, as a flaw of consciousness, the transcendental field is defined as a pure plane of immanence, as it escapes all transcendence of the subject and the object'¹² (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 3-4).

¹² Free translation from the original: 'Le transcendant n'est pas le transcendental. A défaut de conscience, le champ transcendental se définirait comme un pur plan d'immanence, puisqu'il échape à toute transcendance du sujet comme de l'objet'.

Deleuze's stance in his cinema books reveals his need to overcome the previous sensory-motor schemata, to break away from the dualistic philosophical paradigms that accentuated the rupture between the material and spiritual world¹³. What Deleuze ultimately seemed to be looking to do here is to achieve a philosophy of 'pure immanence' as testified to in his last-published essay, *L'immanence: une vie*. 'One would say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but in no way is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is power, complete bliss' (Deleuze, 1995, p. 4)¹⁴. The time-image translates the application of a force (or forces) that by excess expand the spatial dimensions qua virtualities that can no longer be quantified or spatialised, and for that reason, can no longer be perceived as movement-image. Rodowick stresses the fact that, for Deleuze, cinema is particularly interesting, as opposed to photography or the still image, because in cinema, movement is immanent to the image and this immanence is the quality which, for Deleuze, is shared between cinema and Bergsonian *duration*. Rodowick affirms that this 'sharing' is understood in two ways:

... on the one hand, the universal variation of matter; on the other, movement of thought in time. By the same token, Deleuze presents not one but two 'pure semiotics of film', one for the movement-image and one for the time-image, one for the indirect and one for the direct presentation of time. In either case, the main question is the same: how do we grasp an image of thought in and as movement? For Deleuze, cinema is the one

¹³ Bergson had already previously undertaken this fight against materialism and idealism.

¹⁴ Free translation from the original: 'On dira de la pure immanence qu'elle est UNE VIE, et rien d'autre. Elle n'est pas immanence à la vie, mais qui n'est en rien est elle-même une vie. Une vie est l'immanence de l'immanence, l'immanence absolue: elle est puissance, béatitude complètes'.

twentieth-century art form that comes closest to producing automatically a Bergsonian intuition of movement in this sense. (Rodowick, 1997, p. 39)

From Deleuze's perspective, the movement-image remains subordinated to what he identifies as the *cliché*. The cliché is dependent on exclusive 'sensory-motor linkages', which induce a specific organisation of the image and do not allow for a 'full' perception of it, in other words, it is as if the image is hiding something from us (see Deleuze, 1997, p. 21). As Deleuze affirms, the time-image suppresses all the things that made us believe that we were seeing everything; it creates 'holes', voids and white spaces that rarify the image. Contrary to the movement-image, the time-image is not preoccupied with making the image 'interesting'. Deleuze affirms that what is necessary is to 'make a division or make emptiness in order to find the whole again' (ibid.).

Deleuze stresses that is not enough to disturb the sensory-motor connections, but that it is also necessary to combine the optical-sound image with what he identifies as 'enormous forces' that go beyond mere intellectual processes, and beyond social contexts. These 'forces' or 'powers' correspond to a 'profound vital intuition' where real thought is produced (Deleuze, 1997, p. 22). Deleuze adds that in this sense, the pure optical and sound images, the fixed shot and the montage-cut, are, in cinema, the aspects of composition that imply a beyond movement. These compositional elements do not necessarily stop the movement either in the camera or in the characters, but what they do is produce an image that is no longer perceived as a sensory-motor image (a simple action/reaction), rather they are necessarily grasped and thought of within a different type of image, a time-image (ibid.). Once liberated from the sensory-motor linkages, movement ceases to be exclusively dependent on space. In other words, movement stops

being regularised and ordered sequentially and instead it is fluidised into time; it becomes immanent to time.

Time will no longer be the measure of movement, but movement has become the perspective of time: it constitutes a whole cinema of time, with a new conception and new forms of montage (Welles, Resnais). In the second place, at the same time as the eye takes up a clairvoyant function, the sound as well as visual elements of the image enter into internal relations which means that the whole image has to be 'read', no less than seen, readable as well as visible. (Ibid.)

The internal relations triggered by the time-image constantly destabilise the image itself, making it grow into more complex relations, which would be the same as saying that these relations constantly displace the objects of representation, making the image grow beyond the simple cliché.

Even when it is mobile, the camera is no longer content sometimes to follow the characters' movement, sometimes itself to undertake movements of which they are merely the object, but in every case it subordinates description of a space to the functions of thought. This is not the simple distinction between the subjective and the objective, the real and the imaginary, it is on the contrary their indiscernibility ... (Deleuze, 1997, p. 23) ¹⁵

¹⁵ This aspect was profusely explored in the *Eye Height* Film through the camera movements and pace. The dancers' movement is not the exclusive focus of the camera, as the camera 'wonders' through the space (sculpture/stage) at an extreme slow pace, creating different framings, depths of field, etc. See Appendices: 3. Visual material. *Eye Height/ Installation/ Multi-screen sample final sequence.*

Time is now the essence of the image, meaning, time is felt as a ‘whole’, duration and flow as opposed to sequential time perceived through visible movements in space. This paradigm shift started with Bergson in his idea of *la durée pure*. It is therefore important at this stage to consider what constituted the philosophical revolution operated by Bergson’s thought. Understanding Bergson’s philosophy of perception and how images are construed, helps us grasp the urgency in both philosophers (Bergson and Deleuze) to distance themselves from not only the philosophical heritage of their predecessors but also from the phenomenological perspectives of their contemporaries. Moulard contends that Bergson and Deleuze’s preference for the virtual triggered the paradigmatic shift in philosophy of perception, thus calling into question previous conceptions of the self and its relation to the ‘real’. In both philosophers, the virtual coincides ‘with an immanent plane of self-alteration that subtends and traverses all beings, thereby constantly informing and deforming the real’, thus challenging all concepts of identity:

The virtual thus necessarily carries us away from consciousness-centered accounts of time and subjectivity, as it is indissociably linked to the unconscious, which is to say to the impotence (impuissance) that lies at the core of thought, at once grounding and ungrounding it. As such, it not only problematizes transcendental idealism but also any philosophy that situates itself within the Cartesian dualistic problematic, be it in its idealist, materialist, existentialist, or phenomenological shape. (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 4)

Moulard argues that the image is the ‘nexus’ of the difference between Bergsonism and phenomenology and that Deleuze’s ambition is also to provide an alternative to the phenomenological thinking that dominates the philosophical landscape of the twentieth century. In Deleuze this is expressed by his constant drive for pure immanence (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 145). From Moulard’s perspective, even if perception plays a fundamental role in Bergson’s ontology of memory, his philosophy is not ultimately based on a ‘primacy of perception’ as in Merleau-Ponty. Bergson’s philosophy is in fact grounded in the primacy of memory, rather than in an intentional consciousness. Moulard reiterates the idea that Bergson’s philosophy is a philosophy of the unconscious; in other words, it is not intentionality which forms perception but memory (ibid).

The passage from the movement-image to the time-image and Deleuze’s analysis of the fundamental premises that operated this transformation, resonate with my own questionings concerning the role of choreographic composition. The relation between the image, movement and thought expressed in the cinema books allowed me to understand in my own work, the nature of my discomfort toward predominant notions of representation, narrative, identity, form, and the body in dance. Only recently, have these notions been brought to light by authors like José Gil, André Lepecki and Erin Manning, through their articulation between philosophy and dance theory. The analysis of the paradigmatic shift between the first regime of the image and the second finds resonance in the changes in the movement composition throughout dance history. The fact that the transformation in the image is mainly grasped through changes in movement itself consequently triggers the will to rethink movement in dance. Likewise, the fact that dance no longer corresponds to an exclusive execution of steps in space necessitates new considerations for choreography with respect to the introduction of new elements or the transformation of existent ones. These ‘new elements’ require an in-

depth aesthetic questioning of what is implied, something that I develop further in the third chapter of this thesis. As suggested by Lepecki, dance requires an ontology of its own (Lepecki, 2006, p. 4). Deleuze's question throughout his cinema books: 'how do we grasp an image of thought in and as movement?' (Rodowick, 1997, p. 39) needs to be asked with respect to choreography.

1.3 THE MAIN TRACES OF BERGSON'S THOUGHT, IN DELEUZE'S TIME-IMAGE

1.3.1 THE RUPTURE OPERATED BY BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY

In his work, *The Creative Mind* (1946), Bergson expresses his discomfort towards existent philosophical systems, which he suggests do not 'cut to the measure of the reality in which we live' (Bergson, 1946, p. 9). From Bergson's perspective, those systems are too wide and for that matter, not applicable to concrete reality. Nevertheless, one philosophical system, among others, seemed to have caught Bergson's attention when the author was still young: that of Herbert Spencer¹⁶. Spencer's ideas on evolution seemed to have seduced Bergson, not because he considered them to be accurate, but because they manifested a will to take 'the impression of things and [model] itself on the facts in every detail' (Bergson, 1946, p. 10). However, from Bergson's point of view, Spencer fell into the same 'trap' as the other philosophers, which was not to consider time as being in essence different from space, attributing this general fault to a problem within language itself (Bergson, 1946, pp. 11-13).

The theories of space and time thus become counterparts of one another. To pass from one to the other one had only to change a single word: 'juxtaposition' was replaced by 'succession'. Real duration was systematically avoided. Why? Science has its own reasons for avoiding it, but metaphysics, which preceded science, was already doing so without having the same excuses. (Bergson, 1946, p. 13)

¹⁶ Herbert Spencer, English philosopher and biologist 1820–1903.

Scott Ferguson argues in his article ‘The Face of Time between Haeckel and Bergson; or, Toward an Ethics of Impure Vision’ (Ferguson, 2010, pp. 107-151) that Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* (1907) contradicted and challenged Darwin’s evolutionary science, when Bergson affirmed that evolutionists, such as Spencer, failed to recognise what Bergson called the ‘radical becoming’ of time, in other words, *creativity*, ‘as they relied on perceptual and intellectual schemas that were fundamentally spatial’ (cited in Ferguson, 2010, p. 111). For Bergson, creativity or *élan vital* (vital impetus) (see Bergson, 1911, pp. 92-97), despite the drive to organise being a human condition, there is more of a tendency to improvise than to control through spatialisation or quantification. Bergson notes that, although difficult, one should perceive manufacturing (improvising) as different from organising. Hence, to manufacture corresponds to our capacity to assemble parts of matter that we have extracted from reality, and then to reassemble them in order to be able to act upon them. Therefore, to manufacture is ‘to work from the periphery to the centre, or, as the philosophers say, from the many to the one’ (Bergson, 1911, p. 97). For Bergson, to organise is exactly the opposite of manufacturing. As, in order to organise, one has to consider a ‘starting point’, which from the philosopher’s perspective is a quantitative, ‘mathematical point’, and only from there would one be able to spread ‘around this point by concentric waves which go on enlarging’ (ibid.). Bergson’s *élan vital* operates within a continuous motion, *duration*, and its tendency is to endure as a *multiplicity*, rather than as a way of unifying or organising. Bergson’s position on this aspect, expresses the philosopher’s belief in two different forms of time: pure time and mathematical time. Therefore, for Bergson, pure time corresponds to pure duration and mathematical time corresponds to measurable duration. Bergson does consider mathematical time to be dependent on the division of

real time into units or intervals, which makes it insufficient to comprehend the continuous and the indivisible flow of real time.¹⁷

As Ferguson states in relation to Bergson's understanding of Spencer's theory, the way Spencer's evolutionism 'proceeds by casting the past, into an image of a great ladder' (Ferguson, 2010, p. 112) is not only arbitrary, but also makes the assumption of a homogeneous spatial background, which distances them from the very same duration they were seeking. Presuming space to be homogeneous, and isolating static views from the 'flux of the real' would, from Bergson's perspective, withdraw 'those views from the evolving *'whole'*' (ibid.), the 'periphery'. Ferguson argues that, although 'Spencer tries to rearrange these views in sequence *a posteriori* according to resemblances from the outside', from Bergson's perspective, what inevitably happened is that Spencer missed the original flow, meaning duration itself. As a result, this rearrangement no longer is the 'thing' in itself but a mere imitation of the flow in the form of a 'mosaic', in other words, a mimetic vision (reconstruction) of time, not time itself (ibid.). '.

This is what Bergson calls 'Spencer's illusion', a mosaic illegitimately passing itself off as time. Such illusions, however, are not merely the epistemological conceits of high-minded philosophers. They also constitute the very design of natural perception and intellection. (Ferguson, 2010, p. 112)

¹⁷ This aspect of Bergson's thought, as we shall see later, is exactly the reason why the author does not consider cinema to be able to reflect real time. This is one aspect that opposes Bergson to Deleuze.

Although humans have to spatialise time in order for their sensory-motor schema and intellect to work, in other words, in order to ‘draw’ imaginary maps onto which to act, those maps, or ‘visions’, represent only partial views of reality (Bergson’s mosaics). Thus, from Bergson’s perspective, those partial views are insufficient to understand the ‘whole’ and are illusory. Those images represent only fragmentary parts of reality and their choice/construction is entirely dependent upon their utility towards survival.

Once in possession of the form of space, the mind uses it like a net with meshes that can be made and unmade at will, which, thrown over matter, divides it as the needs of our action demand (...) Neither is space so foreign to our nature as we imagine, nor is matter as completely extended in space as our senses and intellect represent it. (Bergson, 1911, pp. 213-214)

Bergson’s creativity or *élan vital* is fundamental to grasping what marked the transition from extensive movement (visible/actual) to intensive movement (invisible/virtual). In Deleuze this transition is one of the main aspects that nourished the passage from the movement-image to the time-image in cinema. As far as the present research is concerned, the difference between the Bergsonian term ‘manufacturing’, which he also designates as ‘improvisation’, from that of ‘organising’ has a profound resonance with my own preference for, and understanding of, a specific kind of improvisation-based movement, which I discuss further in the fourth chapter. Bergson’s distinction between two different forms of time, mathematical time and pure time, resonates with the different ways movement is perceived in dance. If mathematical time is more easily associated with the execution of pre-determined choreographed steps in space (visible and divisible into units), pure time is more easily identified with improvisation-based

movement. In improvised movement, time is no longer measurable into distinct units of time and the different performative elements with which the performer interacts (space, other performers, sound, etc.) intervene at the exact instant of the creation of the movement itself. The creation of movement and its execution become immanent to each other, and the actual and the virtual movements become indiscernible from one another¹⁸.

To understand the revolution operated by Bergson's thought, one needs also to understand what Bergson perceived as 'epistemological conceits of high-minded philosophers' (Ferguson, 2010, p. 112). The latter implies that he no longer considered either the Kantian or the phenomenological perspectives on the human conditions of experience viable. Bergson's philosophy strives for a thought connected to life itself, to action, in other words, for the creation of concepts that come from, or are applicable to, experience. John Mullarkey and Stephen Linstead in 'Time, Creativity and Culture: Introducing Bergson' (2003) claim that Bergson's philosophy should be considered as anti-intellectualist without being anti-intellectual, which means that it is a philosophy that attains to the real, to the concrete of experience. The authors suggest that Bergson's philosophical goal is to 'argue for the irreducible reality of action, process and movement' (see Mullarkey & Linstead, 2003, p. 2), as for Bergson the conditions of experience are no longer perceived as being exclusively external to it. This meaning that Bergson perceives experience as integral, where the realm of knowledge opens up to include the dimension of spirit (l'esprit), and, as such, for the redefinition of philosophy

¹⁸ The different scores, created along the choreographic compositional process, throughout the different performance formats, manifest this attempt to avoid linear and imposed fixed time structures. Although they obey to a specific time, corresponding to the duration of the performance, their internal distribution of time depends on the articulation between the performers and their relation with the different materials. See scores of the different formats in the Appendices: 3. Visual material.

as *methodological intuition*. For Moulard, this represents in Bergson's thought, an 'effort to reach beyond (*dépasser*) the human condition' (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. Introduction). Bergson's metaphysics is indeed a new one, as he questions Kant's division between phenomenal and noumenal. Bergson believes that there is no possibility of knowledge beyond experience, which does not mean, as it meant for Kant, that the human condition is never capable of attaining true knowledge. For Bergson the phenomenal and the noumenal are both contingent and embedded in the experience. Therefore, for this to be perceived in this way, duration itself has to correspond to experience and, as such, the differences and relations between matter and perception, consciousness and memory, were to be completely redefined by Bergson (*ibid.*).

Bergson's duration is a *creativity* that continually allows for the appearance of the new and the unpredictable in each instant¹⁹. The components of duration, our memories, perceptions and affections, which are all different, cannot be distinguished, quantified or homogenised. As Mullarkey and Linstead argue, Bergson's 'Duration is history, experience and anticipation — past, present and future, real and virtual' (Mullarkey & Linstead, 2003, p. 6). As for the spatialised time, the philosopher refers to it as an artifice that is incapable of preserving the past, thus constituting an abstract succession of juxtaposed segments, the only purpose of which is to make action and the manipulation of the world possible (*ibid.*).

The idea that knowledge necessarily derives from experience constitutes in Bergson and Deleuze a fundamental element informing their philosophy. As previously mentioned,

¹⁹ The choreographic composition strategies of the present thesis aim for the same, and this aspect clearly manifests the empathy between the present thesis and the chosen philosophical thought.

Bergson calls it *metaphysical pragmatism* and Deleuze *transcendental empiricism*. This aspect is, in the present thesis, one of the reasons that makes their philosophy so extraordinarily productive when one is thinking about artistic practice, especially their preference for the ‘virtual’ which in art prevails as the main force of creation itself. The Deleuzian philosophical framework contributed to my understanding and questioning of the artistic objects, not only through a simple juxtaposition of concepts, but also through understanding the particularities of its technical/material aspects. Deleuze has written extensively about art (e.g. cinema, painting, literature), thus creating a profusion of artistic examples by describing its objects and processes. The examples of the materialisation of the philosophical concepts into the artistic practices helped me to trace back the testimonies of the artists themselves and their artistic strategies, thus contributing to a more profound theoretical/practical articulation in my own artistic research. Deleuze’s philosophy in particular, strives for a philosophy that connects directly to life. A philosophy that is immanent to life, and by the same token for an art not representative of life but one facet of life itself.

Deleuze in *Cinema I* refers to the time when Bergson elaborated on his new ideas on perception, as a time where one could identify a crisis in psychology²⁰, which made it impossible for philosophy ‘to hold to a certain position’ (1992, p. 56). It is clear that the ‘position’ Deleuze is referring to, was either the position of the idealist that posited images as belonging to consciousness, or, in contrast, that of the materialist that placed movements in space. Thus, for the former, in consciousness there were only images that were qualitative and without extension (actual). As for the latter, there would only be

²⁰ Reference to ‘psychological determinism’ that is ruled by cause-effect and by appropriation of theoretical physics, which proposes from the beginning a spatialised reality. (Mullarkey & Linstead, 2003, p. 3)

movements in space and those were extended and quantitative. This aspect relates to Bergson's 'first thesis' on movement and Deleuze discusses it in detail in *Cinema 1* in his first comment on Bergson.

According to the first thesis, movement is distinct from the space covered. Space covered is past, movement is present, the act of covering. The space covered is divisible, indeed indefinitely divisible, whilst movement is indivisible, or cannot be divided without changing qualitatively each time it is divided. (Deleuze, 1992, p. 1)

Deleuze affirms that what this idea implies in terms of movement is in fact a more complex idea of movement, which is that the spaces covered are identified as being single, identical and homogenous (actual), which contrasts with the fact that movements are necessarily heterogeneous and 'irreducible among themselves' (ibid.). Movement can only be perceived as a duration, and as such rather than being quantitative is qualitative, and instead of being extensive is in fact intensive, constituted by multiplicities (virtual), in other words, heterogeneous. Deleuze questions the materialist and idealist positions, because they perpetuated a duality between movement and image, of consciousness and thing.

This position involved placing images in consciousness and movements in space. In consciousness there would only be images – these were qualitative and without extension. In space there would only be movements- these were extensive and quantitative. But how is it possible to pass from one order to the other? How is it possible to explain that movements, all of a sudden, produce an image – as in perception – or that the image produces a movement as in voluntary action. (Deleuze, 1992, p. 56)

Deleuze argues, in the case of the idealist position one would have to 'endow the brain with a miraculous power' (ibid.), in the case of the materialist position, there would be

no way of explaining how to prevent movement from being an already virtual image, and the image from being at least potential movement. As Deleuze states, it had then become obvious that neither of these two philosophical perspectives were able to overcome the duality, which they have wrapped themselves in: consciousness/thing, image/movement. Hence, as Deleuze argues, both idealism and materialism and their unproductive confrontation represented a dead end in philosophical thought (ibid.) with materialists trying to reconstitute the order of consciousness with pure material movements and idealists trying to reconstitute the order of the universe with pure images in consciousness.

It was necessary, at any cost, to overcome this duality of image and movement, of consciousness and thing. Two very different authors were to undertake this task at about the same time; Bergson and Husserl. Each had his own war cry: all consciousness is consciousness of something (Husserl), or more strongly, all consciousness is something (Bergson). (Deleuze, 1992, p. 56)

Bergson's duration steps away from Kant's consciousness (circumscription) to coincide with the movement of life itself, thus the understanding that external things do endure outside our psychological experience, being duration itself immanent to the universe. As Deleuze continuously remarks, we do not become *in* the world but we do become *with* the world. 'We are not in the world; we become with the world; we become by contemplating it. Everything is vision, becoming. We become universes. Becoming animal, plant, molecular, becoming zero' (Deleuze & Guatarri, 1994, p. 169). Therefore, when confronted with, or in, duration, we should deduce the pre-existence of a 'whole' 'which is changing, and which is open somewhere' (Deleuze, cit in Rodowick, 1997, p.

25). Rodowick underlines that, this ‘whole’ must be perceived as being open, as it ‘relates back to time, or even to spirit, rather than to content or to space’ (ibid.).

Bergson’s *intuition* (memory) is then that which occupies the interval between perception and motor response, maintaining though an indeterminacy and freedom that feeds itself up in what Bergson coins as ‘pure memory’ (the virtual), something beyond a material practical existence, and as such, corresponds to what the author identifies as inhuman, that which continuously fills human experience. Therefore, a duration (*durée*) that belongs to the ‘whole’ in which we participate and ‘with’ which we become, exceeds all practical quantifiable and spatialising ends. Thus, intuition is what liberates us from life contingency and allows us to experiment within the multiplicity and heterogeneity of its different rhythms and durations (Ferguson, 2010, p. 112). In this sense, *intuition* and at the outset of it, *pure memory*²¹ itself is what grants human experience the possibility of freedom.

Moulard remarks that, in Bergson’s philosophy of perception, one is considered to give to matter as much as one receives from it, in other words, the transcendental corresponds to the evolution of life and consciousness to duration itself (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 13). Psychological duration (consciousness, memory or the unconscious) is the point of contact, and constitutes the ‘immanent opening to ontological duration’ (ibid.). It is because we have memory that we are capable of reintegrating what Moulard refers to as closed systems (individual, species, or political societies) into that ever-evolving whole (ibid.). As Moulard further argues, duration represents for Bergson a disinterested point

²¹ I will develop this concept in depth in the next section, 1.3.2 ‘Multiplicities and the split self’.

of view, in the sense that it does not only obey to what I have previously identified as ‘first dimension’ (survival) of reality. Bergson’s duration, does go beyond ‘the kind of phenomenological experience that has defined the conditions and the limits of our possible knowledge’ (ibid.). Phenomenology represents for Bergson only one aspect of the real. Bergson’s intuition relates to the understanding of a different kind of experience, where becoming and duration itself are immanent to each other. This is because he considers intelligence to be a practical faculty instead of a speculative one, meaning, it is only concerned with survival habits. As the author states, only by ‘turning intelligence against itself’ (ibid.), in other words, only through intuition can one ‘force’ experience to follow duration and make becoming immanent to it. Moulard argues that for Bergson, knowledge is no longer considered relative (as in Kant). It is through intuition that thought can become absolute, in the sense that it can coincide with the real, with the duration of the ‘whole’. Nevertheless, it is incomplete, partial, because the real never ceases to move (ibid.)²².

Deleuze remarks in *Cinema 1* that movement is ‘a mobile section of duration, that is, of the whole, or of a whole’ (Deleuze, 1992, p. 8). Consequently, movement expresses something more profound, which is the change in the whole, a change in duration. As Bergson claims, ‘philosophy introduces us thus into spiritual life. And it shows us at the same time the relation of the life of the spirit to that of the body’ (Bergson, 1911, p. 283). Therefore *creativity*, in Bergson’s thought, is that which unifies the life of the spirit with the diversity of matter. Only through the creative impulse (intuition) are

²² This aspect enters into a direct correlation with the experience of the dance improviser while moving, i.e., while improvising, the dancer has to keep an awareness not only of her own movement but also of the movements surrounding her (the other dancers, the space, the sound etc.), both in the *actual* (kinetic) sense of it, as well as in the *virtual* (synesthetic). This aspect is crucial in all the performance formats belonging to the practice. See videos of the performances: 3. Visual material.

humans capable of attaining absoluteness of knowledge, which is defined by its coincidence with absolute becoming.

Let us try to see, no longer with the eyes of the intellect alone, which grasps the already made and which looks from the out-side, but with the spirit, I mean with that faculty of seeing which is immanent in the faculty of acting and which springs up, some-how, by the twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into knowledge, like heat, so to say, into light. To movement, then, everything will be restored and into movement everything will be resolved. (Bergson, 1911, p. 264)

1.3.2 MULTIPLICITIES AND THE SPLIT SELF

As previously mentioned, because it is continuous, Bergson's duration is necessarily heterogeneous and as such constituted by multiplicities. This particular aspect is fundamental, as it helps one to grasp what it is that distances Bergson's theories on perception from those of phenomenology²³. When talking about heterogeneity, one is necessarily talking about what it is that constitutes the virtual in Bergson's understanding of reality. The virtual, though not visible, constitutes one of the sides of reality (which is actual/virtual simultaneously). The virtual is that which grants duration²⁴ with its qualitative, heterogeneous and temporal qualities. When one speaks of duration in the experience of the individual/self in Bergson's thought, one is always considering the experience of the individual to be of a psychological duration, that which is impossible to be perceived through juxtaposition in movement, or in other words, it is that which opposes a mechanist²⁵ strata of existence.

Bergson identifies two major tendencies in life, instinct — *élan vital* — and intelligence. The author describes them as simultaneously complementary and mutually antagonistic.

²³ In phenomenology, multiplicity of phenomena relates to a unified consciousness. This contrasts with Bergson, for whom consciousness or the immediate data of consciousness are considered within a multiplicity.

²⁴ Being the components of *duration* virtual; our memories, perceptions and affections (Mullarkey & Linstead, 2003, p. 6)

²⁵ Meaning, to be dependent on causality and determinism, both considered within a spatialised time.

Consciousness, in man, is pre-eminently intellect. It might have been, it ought, so it seems, to have been also intuition. Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter. (Bergson, 1911, p. 281)

Being tendencies and not ‘things’, they manifest themselves in such a way, depending on what one must obtain from the material world. Hence, these tendencies correspond to the author’s distinction between the qualitative and quantitative multiplicities. Therefore, the quantitative multiplicities are those that correspond to the actual, the discrete and the homogeneous, in other words, the ones that can be spatialised and are measurable²⁶. The qualitative multiplicities are those that correspond to the heterogeneous (or singularised), the continuous (or interpenetrating), oppositional (or dualistic) and progressive (or temporal, irreversible flow), thereby corresponding to Bergson’s psychological duration (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 11).

In *Time and Free Will* (1910), Bergson refers to the connection between the concepts of psychological duration, perceived as a multiplicity, and that of intensity (Bergson, 1910, pp. 73-74). Bergson explains the idea of intensity as something situated in the junction of two streams: one corresponds to the ‘extensive magnitude from without’ (ibid.), while the other to another extensive magnitude coming from within, meaning, from the depths of consciousness. Consequently, we are confronted with two multiplicities, an outer multiplicity and an inner one. The inner ones, being virtual, cannot be spatialised nor quantified, they consist of states of consciousness, which cannot be isolated, and as such,

²⁶ See Bergson’s famous example of the flock of sheep in *Time and free will* (Bergson, 1910, pp. 76-77).

unfold in pure duration (ibid.). The idea beyond these two aspects of the self is that Bergson perceives the self as a split self²⁷. Bergson's idea of a split self is fundamental to understanding, both in Bergson and even more so in Deleuze, the capacity that we have to deal with all the different multiplicities with which we are constantly being confronted. The self, perceived as a split one, is also the only one capable of enduring the flow of intensities and forces that run through our perceptive activity, as I will be exploring later²⁸.

Therefore, one can conclude that Bergson identifies two tendencies in life, two different kinds of multiplicities that coincide with the two sides of the self (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 14). Bergson distinguishes them as, the superficial self, (the social self) and the deep self (the unconscious). The first one corresponds to all that is homogeneous and quantitative in our experience, and as such, possible to be spatialised. The second to the fundamental self, lived duration, which corresponds to the heterogeneous qualitative multiplicity and should be considered independently of its symbolic representation (ibid.), e.g. not even language is capable of grasping it (see Bergson, 1910, p. 129).

Moulard argues that, because the self is dual in Bergson, it endures both a superficial world (where the experience unfolds in a homogeneous milieu) as well as a deeper level of existence (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 14). Hence, the latter, the virtual self, is the one

²⁷ Note that this aspect relates to the difference between Bergson's idea of self, from that of phenomenology, i.e. the self in phenomenology is considered to be a unified self. Hence, and regarding Deleuze's philosophy, this particular characteristic of the self is fundamental, in order to more easily situate and understand, Deleuze's concept of *the body without organs*, first introduced by the philosopher in (*The Logic of Sense*, 1969).

²⁸ In section 1.3.3, 'Three different modes of perception in Bergson'.

that ‘senses and loves, deliberates and decides’ (ibid.). Both selves interpenetrate each other within experience, meaning the virtual self transforms itself in the process of its actualisation. For Moulard this is a crucial aspect of Bergson’s new metaphysics (ibid.), as the self is always in a constant state of becoming. Bergson claims that consciousness tends to forget the deeper self, as the social self seems to be better ‘equipped’ for life (Bergson, 1910, pp. 137-139).

... An inner life with well distinguished moments and with clearly characterized states will answer better the requirements of social life. Indeed, a superficial psychology may be content with describing it without thereby falling into error, on condition, however, that it restricts itself to the study of what has taken place and leaves out what is going on. (Bergson, 1910, pp. 138-139)

The above quote implies that something is needed to overcome what Bergson refers to as the ‘symbolic substitute’ of the self (ibid.), the social self. Therefore, it is only through Bergson’s intuition, applied as a method of inquiry into experience, that one is capable of grasping the true flow of time. As Moulard remarks, it is because the fundamental self is constantly being ‘forgotten’ that a constant effort of introspection and analysis is indeed necessary (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 14). This is why, only by ‘turning intelligence against itself’, in other words, through intuition, is one capable of attaining absolute knowledge. In Bergson’s philosophy, absolute knowledge is directly dependent on becoming, and as such, dependent on movement.

1.3.3 THREE DIFFERENT MODES OF PERCEPTION IN BERGSON

Bergson proposes in his work, *Matter and Memory* (1896) a new philosophy of matter based on the image. Therefore, for this research it is necessary to identify Bergson's theory of how perception works, and by extension, how images are constructed. This will enable a subsequent understanding of how and where Deleuze departs from Bergson.

Bergson introduces us to psychological duration by claiming that experience is not only dependent on space, but also on time. This aspect relates to the role of memory in our experience of the world. For this reason, it is important now to summarise the different modes of perception where the different kinds of memory operate, thus resulting in different kind of images.

Bergson perceives Idealism and Realism to be two excessive theories. This is because, from his perspective, it is equally erroneous to reduce matter to a representation of it, as it is to ignore the fact that matter itself has some intrinsic quality that allows us to make a representation from it. This aspect implies a completely different perspective from those of the previous philosophical theories, and as such, requires a re-evaluation of the nature of representation itself. For Bergson, matter is a gathering of images²⁹ and by images one is to understand more than just a representation of things (idealist), but less than the thing itself (realist) — a half way existence between the thing and its

²⁹ To clarify, I would like to say that for both Bergson and Deleuze everything is an image; all things are extracted from reality. Images, for both philosophers, are like pieces and slices of the world.

representation. If one considers reality from a common sense perspective, one can observe that images appear to us when our eyes are open, and disappear when our eyes are closed, but no one would dare to think that the existence of things depends upon the blinking of one's eyes. For Bergson, things have an existence of their own, independent of our perception. In other words, images do exist and interact with each other by the laws of nature. Nevertheless, for Bergson, there is an image that he considers to be different from the others, an image that he claims to be both perceived from without (by perceptions) as well as from within (by affects). This image is the body (Bergson, 2004, p. 1). For Bergson the body is the image that in perception corresponds to the operations of freedom, it corresponds to choice itself. He argues that in perception, each affection carries within it an invitation to act, to wait, or even to do nothing: 'I look closer: I find movements begun, but not executed, the indication of a more or less useful decision, but not that constraint which precludes choice' (Bergson, 2004, p. 2). Therefore, even though the body, the brain, the nerves, are to be considered as material, and consequently images³⁰, there is something that differentiates the body from the other images, the fact that the body is a centripetal image in perception. This is because the body is capable of deciding/acting in relation to the other objects. Consequently, the body occupies a 'privileged' position in relation to the other images. Bergson considers matter to be an aggregate of images, and the perception of matter to be also images, which is dependent on an eventual action of a particular image, which is the body. 'Change the objects, or modify the relation to my body, and everything is changed in the interior movements of my perceptive centres' (Bergson, 2004, p. 8).

³⁰ 'The brain is the material world; the material world is not part of the brain.' (Bergson, 2004, p. 4)

For Bergson, the production of images in us is dependent on a constant movement between affects and actions, and because of that, Bergson calls them *movement-images*. In the movement-image an action is always preceded by an affect, in other words movement is always a reaction. Bergson considers two different systems of images, one where images vary in themselves and in relation to each other, and the other, where everything changes in relation to a single image, a privileged one, the body. The first system relates to science and the second to consciousness.

The question to be asked in Bergson's philosophy of perception is not so much how consciousness³¹ of the material world appears, but rather how consciousness limits itself in order to be able to extract from the material world that which is essential to our survival. Bergson affirms that conscious perception endures in this way, meaning, it is conscious of the 'whole' of duration and because of that, it is capable of obtaining an image of the 'whole'. Nevertheless, it does operate through selection, meaning that it selects from those images only that which interests the body and in fact depends upon this to be able to act upon the world. The latter differentiates the body from the other images; it represents its degree of independence. Thus, what surrounds the body choices corresponds to Bergson's 'zone of indetermination'. Bergson affirms that we relate to what surrounds us, based on the number and the distance (time) of the things around us. Consequently, time and memory (which in Bergson's philosophy are the same thing) grant human activity freedom. 'So that we can formulate this law: perception is master of space in the exact measure in which action is master of time' (Bergson, 2004, p. 23). This aspect relates to the idea that experience itself is dependent on the capacity that we

³¹ There are other images which are not material, that also belong to consciousness, i.e. they are virtual images (dreams, hallucinations, imagination, memories).

have in our survival habits to accumulate experience, in other words, to remember our previous experiences and to store them as memories.

In fact, there is no perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and present data of our senses we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience. In most cases these memories supplant our actual perceptions, of which we then retain only a few hints, thus using them merely as ‘signs’ that recall to us former images. (Bergson, 2004, p. 24)

This is true though for immediate experience, for our day-to-day experience, but aesthetic experience and the introduction of the ‘new’ into our existence thus necessitate another kind of perception. Bergson’s creativity or *élan vital* thus requires another type of memory, in other words it requires the ‘intervention’ of the virtual.

For Bergson, reality exists whether it is perceived or not. It might be present without being represented, and the distance between these two terms, presence and representation, is the equivalent to the difference between matter and our conscious perception of it (Bergson, 2004, p. 27). Pearson notes that Bergson perceives matter as having no ‘underneath’ (Pearson, 2002b, p. 146), in other words, for Bergson, matter has no content, it does not hide anything and in this sense has no virtual power (no past), spreading itself out as a mere surface, which would be the same as saying that matter on its own occupies only a plane of presentation.

For Bergson, representation corresponds to the introduction of the *virtual* into the real/actual, the introduction of the past, of memory, through perception. As Pearson argues, the virtual in Bergson should not be understood as something abstract or mysterious (Pearson, 2002b, p. 142), nor as everything that is not actual and outside the field of perception. Pearson reinforces this idea by quoting Sartre, affirming that consciousness operates ‘from the whole that is real a part that is Virtual’ (ibid.).

In *Matter and Memory* (2004, chapter II) Bergson presents us with two hypotheses. According to Bergson’s first hypothesis, one has to consider two kinds of memory in relation to the different ways that the past survives within them: one, where the past survives as a bodily habit, and the other where the past survives as an independent recollection. The latter is the memory that frees us from habit, the memory that allows us to go beyond life contingency (Bergson, 2004, p. 86).

The second hypothesis concerns the preoccupation with how representations are preserved, and what their relations to the motor mechanisms are, meaning that ‘the recognition of a present object is effected by movements when it proceeds from the object, by representations when it issues from the subject’ (Bergson, 2004, p. 87).

Bergson affirms that memory permits us to construct images once we are in contact with reality, in other words, when we are in contact with matter. This does not mean though, as it meant before, that matter is or can be, independent from spirit or vice-versa. Pearson notes that, for Bergson, memory-images are not stored in the brain. Bergson makes a clear distinction between psychological memory, the memory of habit-

formation (a body memory), and an ontological memory (memory of pure recollection) (Pearson, 2002b, p. 142).

In Bergson's philosophy, there are two modes of perception where the image is subject to different constructions, according to the perception mode that solicits it.

- Actual perception.
- Pure perception.

As Moulard argues, the theory of pure perception made it possible for Bergson to isolate 'an order of objective reality constituted by discontinuous successive vibrations' (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 31). Bergson's *memory* aligns with duration: memory alone, qua condensation, is able to create an order of continuity. Moulard continues that, if Bergson sees a 'mere difference in degree between matter and conscious perception', there is no doubt that he establishes a 'difference in kind' between perception and memory. As Bergson asserts, if a mere difference in degree is considered between perception and memory, this makes it impossible to create a distinction between past, '*that which acts no longer*', and the present, '*that which is acting*' (Bergson, 2004, p. 74). On the contrary, Bergson's suggestion is to recognise in pure perception a 'system of nascent acts' (independent from matter), which penetrate deep into the real and allow perception to be understood differently from recollection.

... the reality of things is no more constructed or reconstructed, but touched, penetrated, lived; and the problem at issue between realism and idealism, instead of giving rise to interminable metaphysical discussions, is solved, or rather dissolved by intuition. (Bergson, 2004, p. 75)

As Moulard stresses, this is clearly a position against Kant's notion of *Intuition*, or as memory being considered within a rational construction. Hence, for Bergson intuition is necessarily immediate and consequently subjective. Moulard quotes Bergson: 'if, then, spirit is a reality, it is here, in the phenomenon of memory, that we may come in touch with it experimentally' (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 31).

Therefore, our body being an image in itself, it inevitably enters in connection with the other images. But as we have previously said, it does so from a privileged position, a centripetal one, as everything that surrounds it is perceived in relation to it. Hence, in such a way it cannot be perceived as pure matter, because it is conditioned, meaning it is perceived both from without (matter) as well as from within (spirit); it is a centre of indetermination. The body, by having the possibility of choice, only perceives what interests it, according to the utility of the perceived. Bergson designates this 'choice'³² as *conscious perception*. The body that is affected chooses its intervention in the world according to its representations. For that reason, perception is not, cannot be, a speculative, theoretic, and abstract activity. Perception, one might say, has its own agenda, in the sense that it is always preoccupied with its eminent/consequential action. Nevertheless, the perception identified as *habit*, because it is dependent on necessity, it is disconnected from the duration of the whole. In other words, because the purpose of this perception is necessarily action, the images resulting from it are immobile images, and as such, are not connected to duration itself. This is the reason why *pure perception* needs to be perceived differently. 'If we went no further, the part of consciousness in

³² Bergson notes that this choice is not to be understood as a *caprice*, but is inspired by past experience: 'the reaction does not take place without an appeal to the memories which analogous situations may have left behind them' (Bergson, 2004, p. 69).

perception would thus be confined to threading on the continuous string of memory an uninterrupted series of instantaneous visions, which would be part of things rather than of ourselves' (Bergson, 2004, p. 69).

Although, Bergson considers *pure perception* to be also conscious perception, it is 'charged' with remembrances (*souvenirs*) and thus does not always result in an action. Pure perception attends reality through a disinterested point of view. It is called pure perception because it gathers pure images, the ones that belong to pure duration and are liberated from matter³³. Those images, rather than being perceived through the intellect, are instead perceived by means of Bergson's intuition (these are virtual images). Intuition is then a sort of 'suspension' of our intellect that attains to the world's duration/time/memory. The operation of intuition asks us to set ourselves free from the necessity of the present (it is a disinterested point of view) and requires us to go back to the past. The past that Bergson refers to is no longer our exclusive individual past, but instead a general past that belongs to the duration of the 'whole'. Consequently, one cannot define experience in Bergson, either as being subjective or objective, but something in between, *indeterminacy* is the 'key word'. 'Keeping as close as possible to facts, we must seek to discover where, in the operations of memory, the office of the body begins, and where it ends' (Bergson, 2004, p. 85).

At the beginning of chapter IV of *Matter and Memory*, Bergson draws a conclusion from the first three chapters. The author considers that the body is always preoccupied with

³³ As Bergson underlines, pure perception and pure memory constantly intermingle. (Bergson, 2004, p. 71)

action and, as such, limits the life of spirit: ‘In regard to representations it is an instrument of choice and choice alone’ (Bergson, 2004, p. 233). Bergson exposes his dualistic theory on perception, where pure perception opposes pure memory, but both can represent a possibility for ‘reconciliation between the unextended and the extended, between quality and quantity’³⁴ (Bergson, 2004, p. 237).

Bergson asserts that habit thus gives us our mechanisms of representation, giving us limits. Pure perception gives us the freedom from the material world; although one might perceive pure memory as being part of pure perception, it is nevertheless considered by the author to be radically different from it. For Bergson, the past ‘alone’ is powerless (see Bergson, 2004, p. 176) and the present is sensory-motor, but as previously discussed, there is much more than just a difference in degree between past (memory) and present (perception). From Bergson’s perspective, only *pure memory* can give us the possibility to access a ‘general past’, and simultaneously render us the future, corresponding to the term *duration* in Bergson’s thought. Bergson’s duration is no longer imprisoned in the successive time of actual experience (Bergson, 2004, p. 177). In other words, duration ceases to be circumscribed by sensory-motor experience. Duration is, first in Bergson and later in Deleuze, the core idea in the perception of movement that gives us the possibility of living beyond life contingency. It opens life to the realm of experimentation, to the new, the unpredictable, the incommensurable. Bergson prepared the ground for the possibility of a thought in Deleuze perceived as movement, meaning, for the possibility of the immanence between thought and movement. With respect to the present thesis, it is this immanence between movement

³⁴ Which would be the same as saying “between space and time”.

and thought that allows me to explore the idea that dance, like cinema, has the capacity to constitute itself as thought.

Bergson determines that, if conscious perception belongs to the present, pure memory, in contrast, is latent and unconscious, and belongs to the *general past* (which is deeper and wider than our individual past). The body, my body, is that which establishes the connection between the actual (matter) and the virtual (spirit) through its constant becoming³⁵. This aspect refers back to what was previously identified as the '*split self*'. Only the self, who is perceived as split, is capable of enduring the flow of intensities and forces that run through our perceptive activity. The self constantly travels between conscious perception and the unconscious. The body perceives, but it is memory, it is the virtual, which allows for its conservation in time. It is the virtual that informs the Bergsonian unconscious (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 31) and it is the body that becomes, the body that is capable of constantly actualising the virtual, not to mention virtualising the actual. The latter resonates with how the body of the dancer operates while improvising, where the progression of movement is 'fed' by the constant interaction between the actual and the virtual. The actual in the movement of the dancer corresponds to the visible movements executed by the dancer, and it is dependent on the body's kinaesthetic limits, on the actual space. The actual (visible) movement is dependent upon the dancer's conscious perception. The virtual is the movement that, although invisible, such as memory, mental images, affects, etc., contributes to the 'intensification' of the actual, having its origin both in conscious perception as well as in the unconscious³⁶. To perceive the body of the dancer as a fixed identity instead of a

³⁵ This is represented in Bergson, by the image of the inverted cone. (Bergson, 2004, p. 197)

³⁶ This relation is equivalent to the notion of 'awareness' in the dancer which is developed in the fourth chapter.

‘virtual multiplicity of bodies’ or as heterogeneous, compromises the process of becoming in a Bergsonian and Deleuzian sense. From all that has been said, improvisation-based movement seems to be closer to Bergson’s idea of duration. Pre-determined choreographed movement contradicts the indeterminacy of becoming, because the dancer knows even before starting to move where the movement will take her/him. Drawing on Bergson’s theories, Deleuze’s becoming implies an experimentation within the limits of the body, beyond notions of identity, beyond representation, considered within a virtual plane of composition where artistic activity takes place. This is a becoming which is immanent to the movements of the world, to duration itself. ‘But this special image which persists in the midst of the others, and which I call my body, constitutes at every moment, as we have said, a section of the universal becoming’ (Bergson, 2004, p. 196).

2. DELEUZE'S DEPARTURE FROM BERGSON

Moulard argues that what Deleuze finds in Bergson's philosophy is a 'genuine philosophy of life' where everything is grounded in experience. Moulard asserts that Deleuze's 'use' of Bergson reflects his attempt to overcome a phenomenological perspective on reality, which dominated the 'philosophical landscape of the twentieth century' (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 145).

To rediscover Bergson is to follow or carry forward his approach in these three directions. It should be noted that these three themes are also to be found in phenomenology — intuition as method, philosophy as rigorous science and the new logic as a theory of multiplicities. It is true that these notions are understood very differently in the two cases. (Deleuze, 2002a, p. 117)

Husserlian phenomenological tradition understands perception as being based on an intentional consciousness. This is unlike Bergson's philosophy that considers memory to be that which forms perception. Bergson's philosophy is a philosophy of the unconscious. Bergson's *durée pure* frees human activity from both an exclusive dependency on what exists in the world (matter), and a transcendence of the spirit. How then does Deleuze, following Bergson, take experience further? Or, in other words, in which sense does Deleuze consider thought to be unequivocally immanent to experience? As we have previously seen in Bergson, the possibility of freedom in human activity does not come from outside the self, but, it is necessarily embedded in experience; the self is considered within a double existence (outside/inside). Bergson's abolition of the dichotomy between the body and the spirit freed philosophy from a

mechanistic perspective, and with particular interest in this research, freed movement from the extensive and quantitative space. When we refer to movement as relating to dance, Bergson's abolition of the dichotomy between the body and the spirit, frees movement from being understood as the simple execution of steps in space.

2.1 A PREFERENCE FOR THE VIRTUAL

Bergson's multiplicities introduce the analysis of the virtual within human experience and eradicate the caesura (break) between the life of the body and the life of the spirit, opening up a space for subjectivity (Deleuze, 1997, p. 47). For Deleuze, the recollection-image is the one that fills the gap between perception and affection, 'it leads us back individually to perception, instead of extending this into generic movement' (ibid.). The recollection-image thus gives *subjectivity* an altogether different sense, no longer a motor or material one, but a temporal and spiritual one. This temporal and spiritual dimension is what is 'added' to matter, not what makes it extensive (spatial), and in this sense, not a movement-image, but instead a recollection-image (ibid.).

The virtual grants human experience with access to more sophisticated levels of experimentation, in other words, to deeper levels of freedom, a superior empiricism, a transcendental one. No longer are we dependent on the previous mathematical multiplicities, quantitative and extensive (e.g. space). Bergson's multiplicity gained a completely different meaning from those of the mathematical systems. In Bergson, multiplicity ceases to be restricted to a multiplicity of numbers; instead a number itself would be perceived as a multiplicity (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 142). Bergson's multiplicities are perceived philosophically, as being different in kind, as quantitative (actual/visible) and qualitative (virtual/invisible) multiplicities. Moulard argues that, with Bergson, we change from dialectical thinking, towards a superior empiricism capable of 'grasping things in their singular, genetic, differential, and self-altering essence' (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 142).

Bergson shows how the forgetting of differences in kind — on the one hand between perception and affection, on the other hand between perception and recollection — gives rise to all kinds of false problems by making us think that our perception is inextensive in character. (Deleuze, 2002a, p. 23)

A new philosophical causality substitutes the ‘old’ mechanistic causality. Bergson names it a machinic causality, in other words, a synthesis of heterogeneities. Rodowick refers to the machinic aspect of thought as the way in which the time-image constructs ‘noosigns’. ‘The time-image constructs noosigns organized as cartographies of thought mappings or visualizations of the movements of thought in and as time. The ‘cause’ of thought is a power rather than an agency’ (Rodowick, 1997, p. 84).

As previously mentioned, Bergson’s intuition gives us the ‘artistry’ to go beyond life determinacy; it pushes us into time, into duration. This is because, although our experience is considered to be necessarily actual, it is at the same time virtual. Virtual and actual are indiscernible from each other: the actual gives us our immediate contact with the world, and the virtual the access to the depths of time, introducing us into the real (in Bergson’s terms) flow of time, of duration.

The present rationale reveals in both philosophers, Bergson and Deleuze, something that could be identified as a ‘preference for the virtual’; although, this preference should not be misinterpreted as an attempt to undermine the actual³⁷, considering that, for both

³⁷ As previously mentioned, these differences will correspond to differences in degree and in kind within perception and memory.

philosophers, there is no possibility of thought beyond experience. The virtual represents, particularly in Deleuze's thought, a 'deeper' level of experience, in other words, the possibility of the manifestation of the transcendental in experience, the possibility of a pure immanence of thought. The preference for the virtual reveals in Deleuze's thought the importance of the invisible, of the infinitesimal, the interstitial. The virtual is perceived as forces and intensities that are actualised through experience, through our experimental activity. These invisible energies and forces have the capacity to alter the actual once they are actualised through experience. The concept of *force* and *intensity* manifests a clear Nietzschean influence on Deleuze's thought (as we shall see later³⁸). For Rodowick, Deleuze's primary question is how to keep thought moving, 'not toward a predetermined end, but toward the new and unforeseen in terms of what Bergson calls the open or "creative evolution"' (Rodowick, 1997, p. 85).

The virtual in Deleuze frees experience from the present, from the immediate present, by introducing both memory and 'desire'³⁹ to this experience, which would be the same as saying 'introducing futurity into action'. *Desire*, produces the need in us to go into our stored memories, compelling us to act simultaneously in accordance to the present and expectantly towards the future. From Deleuze's perspective, there would not be a necessity to revive the past, unless there was already an anticipation/expectation for the future in it. The virtual in Deleuze is that which triggers the interpenetration of the past

³⁸ See also *Cinema 2*, 'Powers of the false' for further insight on the concept of *force*.

³⁹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* (first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 1972) engage in a critical analysis of Freud's Oedipus theory and try to recover the concept of desire as a totally new and revolutionary quality. Thus, rather than identifying desire with lack or with the signifier, they identify it as a drive of the unconscious to production itself. For Deleuze and Guattari, *desire produces reality*. Deleuze's concept, 'Body Without Organs' in *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*) inspired by Antonin Artaud's work becomes a clear manifesto on the *positive power* of Desire in artistic production.

and the future within the present of experience. 'If the present is actually distinguishable from the future and the past it is because it is presence of same thing, which precisely stops being present when it is replaced by something else' (Deleuze, 1997, p. 100). The virtual is what impregnates experience with the potentiality of difference: difference reveals itself through a singularity within memory, it cannot be confused with the repetition of the same, as in habit, but instead, that which introduces the new and the unexpected. As mentioned earlier, Bergson considers the present, the actual image, as 'something dead'⁴⁰. The virtual is what opens up the present to the future, to the radical new.

Pearson claims (2002b, p. 168) that Deleuze finds resources in Bergson, in order to complicate time and subjectivity, through articulating Bergson's thought with that of Proust, Nietzsche and Kant. From Pearson's perspective, this articulation created a novel and fertile encounter that allowed Deleuze to produce what Pearson calls 'inversion' (see Pearson, 2002, p. 169). This 'inversion', for Pearson, corresponds to the way in which Deleuze, not grounding time either in subjectivity (Kant) or in an intentional consciousness (phenomenology), connects it to Nietzsche's 'volcanic spatium of the eternal return' (ibid.). In Pearson's words, this aspect places time beyond the ambit of a 'simple or straight-forward' phenomenology of time (ibid.). In Deleuze's book on Nietzsche, we can clearly grasp the influence of Nietzsche's *will to power* into Deleuze's concept of difference. 'Nietzsche's speculative teaching is as follows: becoming, multiplicity and chance do not contain any negation; difference is pure affirmation; return is the being of difference excluding the whole of the negative' (Deleuze, 1983, p. 190). Deleuze's subjectivity is indeed virtual and it is never ours but

⁴⁰ A mere representation of reality, or one might say, a diminished perception of reality.

of time, 'Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual' (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 82-83). As Pearson stresses, this is the 'challenge' that Deleuze presents to phenomenology regarding both its synthesis of time presented in *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and in his presentation of a non-organic image of time in *Cinema 2* (Pearson, 2002b, p. 169).

Deleuze argues that it might sound commonplace to say 'that we are in time' (Deleuze, 1997, p. 82), but for the philosopher this represents in his own words, 'the highest paradox' (ibid.). For Deleuze, time does not exist as an interior in us, but time is 'the interiority in which we are, in which we move, live and change' (ibid.). Pearson claims that Deleuze's work, *Difference and Repetition* (1968) represents the philosopher's search for a transcendental empiricism (Pearson, 2002b, p. 169), previously discussed as constituting a method and the way to give primacy to the 'virtual' in Deleuze's philosophy.

Deleuze seeks a transcendental empiricism that will break with key assumptions of the Kantian project, such as a harmonious accord between the faculties, and a break with common sense and good sense as the natural determinations of thought. Only in this way can philosophy find the means to break with doxa. (Ibid.)

In Deleuze, it is fundamental to break with common sense or with the doxa because this is what allows for the disturbance of the actual or the disturbance of the 'established values' that limit thought. The 'new' can only be found through difference, which

opposes resemblance, identity, in other words, representation (Deleuze, 2004b, pp. 170-174).

2.2 OF DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION

Deleuze wants to find a way to ‘think’ difference ‘in itself’, as primary or ontologically fundamental, and consequently, to disclose difference as ‘essentially’ affirmatory (see Deleuze, 2004, preface xvii). Thus, for Deleuze the ‘primacy of identity’ defines the world of representation, which Deleuze considers a diminishing of reality and not reality in itself. For Deleuze, Representation, because it has only a single centre, ‘a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth’ (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 67), is incapable of grasping reality in itself. Deleuze argues that representation mediates everything, which makes it unproductive (not creative), and in this sense ‘negative’, because it is incapable of mobilising or moving anything. On the contrary, movement, because it implies a plurality of centres (multiplicities), ‘a superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of moments which essentially distort representation’ (ibid.), can essentially be more productive, more creative.

Deleuze describes the way in which difference is distinguished from representation and argues that modern art tends to realise its conditions within its compositional methods (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 68). This aspect is what makes it a ‘veritable *theatre* of metamorphoses and permutations’ (ibid.), making it also leave representation in ‘order to become ‘experience’, transcendental empiricism or science of the sensible’ (ibid.). The way in which Deleuze describes the operation of difference and the composition of

its series coincides with my own compositional strategies, especially in the format of the Eye Height performance. The juxtaposition of the following conceptual premises was one of the main strategies that helped me to disrupt any form of narrative that was constantly emanating from the performative ‘objects’ (e.g. movement, sound, stage) and their relations in space and time.

Each point of view must itself be the object, or the object must belong to the point of view. The object must therefore be in no way identical, but torn asunder in a difference in which the identity of the object as seen by a seeing subject vanishes ... Divergence and decentring must be affirmed in the series itself. Every object, every thing, must see its own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a difference between differences. Difference must be shown *differing*. (Ibid.)

Pearson claims that what Deleuze is clearly seeking is the ‘depths of time’, and analyses this project with the help of Nietzsche, Proust and cinema (see Pearson, 2002, p. 177). Pearson refers back to Nietzsche, ‘As Nietzsche says, going into the depths does not make us better human beings, only more profound ones’ (Pearson, 2002b, p. 204).

As Pearson states, Bergson ‘implicates the time of the present in a virtual multiplicity of duration’ (ibid.). Deleuze, in contrast, draws a distinction between the virtual and the actual. The virtual corresponds both to memory and the pure past, the actual to perception and the present. Pearson goes further, insisting that one should clearly perceive this present, not as an abstract mathematical point, but something that corresponds to our sensory-motor being. This is identified as consisting in a ‘past of the

present (a former present) and a future of the present'. Pearson stresses that this conception of the virtual is considered to be only a limited one, thus the need to go deeper in the understanding of the virtual (ibid.). For Deleuze, the present is all that is real, the other temporal dimensions being only aspects of the present.

The synthesis of time constitutes the present in time. It is not that the present is a dimension of time: the present alone exists. Rather, synthesis constitutes time as a living present, and the past and the future as dimensions of this present. (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 97)

For Deleuze, the paradox of repetition lies in the fact that we can only speak of it, through the differences that this repetition introduces in the mind of whoever contemplates the repetition. Thus, for Deleuze, repetition changes nothing in the object repeated (see Deleuze, 2004, p. 90). Following Hume, Deleuze claims that imagination operates through a series of contractions, although these contractions do not belong, either to memory or to an operation of the understanding.

True repetition takes place in imagination. Between a repetition which never ceases to unravel itself and a repetition which is deployed and conserved for us in the space of representation there was difference, the for-itself of repetition, the imaginary. Difference inhabits repetition. (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 97)

For Deleuze, contractions (memories) are the synthesis of time, where time is constituted. It is through synthesis that the successive independent instants are

contracted, thus constituting the living present (ibid.). The present is where time is perceived, both past and future being different aspects of this present. The past is retained in the contraction, and the future, as an expectation, is anticipated in the same contraction. Therefore, they do not constitute different instants; they are instead dimensions of the present itself. The present does not have to go outside of itself to pass from past to future, the living present goes from the particular to the general (future). Deleuze designates this synthesis as 'passive synthesis', meaning that although being constitutive, it is not active, in the sense that it is not carried by the mind. Nevertheless, it does occur *in* the mind that contemplates, 'prior to all memory and all reflection' (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 91).

For Deleuze's schema, the term 'time' corresponds unequivocally to repetition: 'to repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent.' (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 1).

For one to grasp the relation between the actual and the virtual in Deleuze, it is crucial to go through, even if briefly, Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* where the philosopher analyses the three passive syntheses of time. The first synthesis explains the presence of the present, the second synthesis explains the pastness of the present, and the third synthesis the futurity of the present. In each case the syntheses are passive in nature, because they are not the work of a constituting (typically transcendental) subjectivity.

These three syntheses of time, although examined separately, are layers of time, and are always interconnected. They correspond to three ‘levels’ of our existence in time only differing in our different modes of experience.

The first synthesis corresponds to the presence of the present, which is a pure organic mechanistic strata of existence. Here we are still in a plane of pure presence (pure experience). The human body is experienced as an organic entity that lives out a purely sensory-motor existence, connecting to the world matter in a purely physiological manner. In this plane we are engaged in a series of contractions, just as any other living being (animal, mineral or plant). The contractions, realised through experience by us, are ones of habit (both acquired through sensory-motor activity as well as primary habits that already constitute our materiality). The sensory-motor schema is nothing more than the passive synthesis of contraction based on need (see Deleuze, 2004, pp. 100–117).

The second synthesis corresponds to what Deleuze describes as ‘the pastness of the present’ that is lived empirically and expectantly towards the future. The second passive synthesis, which corresponds to immediate experience is absolutely fundamental to perceive, to live the present as a temporality that is passing and is retained as past; if the first synthesis is identified as habit, the second synthesis is that of memory (Mnemosyne). This memory of the past acts as an ‘already there’ ground for the present, without which there would be no possible experience.

Once the philosopher starts to elaborate on the relation between the first two syntheses of time, one can start to unravel what constitutes Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and why these syntheses could be considered as passive. Deleuze argues that habit is the foundation of time, the ‘moving soil occupied by the passing present’ (Deleuze, 2004b,

p. 101), but the present is precisely that which passes. Deleuze affirms that something is necessary though, to make the present to pass, 'that to which the present and habit belong' (ibid.).

As Deleuze stresses, everything must depend upon a 'foundation', and as we have seen, memory constitutes the foundation of habit. Nevertheless, memory itself must be grounded in another synthesis different from that of habit (see Deleuze, 2004, p. 101).

Habitus and Mnemosyne, the alliance of the sky and the ground. Habit is the originary synthesis of time, which constitutes the life of the passing present; memory is the fundamental synthesis of time, which constitutes the being of the past (that which causes the present to pass). (Ibid.)

Deleuze argues that the synthesis of habit is passive and if compared with that of memory, one is able to identify how repetition and contraction differ from one another. Thus, in both cases the present is indeed a contraction, while each synthesis relates to completely different dimensions. In the case of habit, the present corresponds to the most contracted of successive elements (instants), which are independent from one another. In relation to memory, the present is the 'most contracted degree of an entire past' (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 104). Therefore, between the two repetitions, the first of which is material, and the second spiritual, there ought to be a huge difference. The first, as we have seen, is constituted by successive independent instants. The second is rather a repetition of the 'whole on diverse coexisting levels' (ibid.). Each of them establishes a completely different relationship to difference itself. Deleuze considers that, although difference and repetition may be considered as objects of representation, the latter conveys it negatively, in the sense that it considers a repetition of the same. For Deleuze,

repetition as such is 'bare and mechanical' and cannot be perceived as 'difference in itself' (ibid.). Deleuze asserts that the third synthesis is the only one with the capacity to overcome representation and the self, thus constituting itself as 'true difference', where repetition becomes 'difference in itself': '... the second synthesis of time points beyond itself in the direction of a third which denounces the illusion of the in-itself as still a correlate of representation' (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 111). As Deleuze argues, the present is always contracted difference, and can only be represented by the active synthesis, which projects its elements 'into a space of conservation and calculation' (ibid.). For Deleuze, this shows that the object projected into space can only be perceived as a representation, meaning, it is subordinated to the identity of the represented elements or to its resemblances (ibid.). Spiritual repetition, in contrast, unfolds the being in itself of the past. Representation can only reach the present, and, because of that, subordinates all repetition to the identity of the present. The question for Deleuze is, then, how to penetrate the passive synthesis of memory? How to live the being of itself of the past? 'The entire past is conserved in itself, but how can we save it for ourselves, how can we penetrate that in-itself without reducing it to the former present that it was, how can we save it for ourselves?' (Deleuze, 2004b, pp. 106-107). Deleuze finds the answer to this question in Proust. The only possible answer is through *reminiscence*, through an involuntary memory that differs in *kind* from any active synthesis that is necessarily associated with voluntary memory (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 107). For Deleuze, reminiscence constitutes the noumenon or the thought that is invested and that refers us back from the present present to former presents. As Deleuze contends, the noumenon is Eros, and, again, we see desire enter into the equation. For Deleuze, only Eros has the capacity to penetrate the pure past in itself, through the repetition, which is identified by Mnemosyne. The former question becomes yet another question:

Where does it get this power? Why is the exploration of the pure past erotic? Why is it that Eros holds both the secret of questions and answers, and the secret of an insistence in all our existence? Unless we have not yet found the last word, unless there is a third synthesis of time ... (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 107)

The third passive synthesis corresponds to the futurity of the present; it is identified as the third aspect of the present, the present as a break in time. The third synthesis corresponds to what Deleuze describes as an 'empty form of time': a time without content, a direct presentation of time. The determinable is disrupted by the indeterminable, the present opens to the future. The totality once secured by the second synthesis is now destroyed by a fracture inflicted in the ground of the second synthesis. This rift or 'caesura' disrupts the circular cadence of contraction and relaxation disturbing its rhythm, 'Time is out of joint', states Deleuze, quoting Shakespeare.

By contrast, time out of joint means demented time or time outside the curve which gave it a god, liberated from its overly simple circular figure, freed from the events which made up its content, its relation to movement overturned; in short, time presenting itself as an empty and pure form. (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 111)

Time is freed from the circular procession of temporality. It is beyond general and particular, beyond transcendental and empirical. A time disrupted from within is no longer a circular time, an eternal return, but the Eternal Return of Nietzsche, the return of the returning, repetition in itself, difference in itself.

Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal return. Eternal return cannot mean the return of the identical because it presupposes a world (that of the will to power) in which all previous identities have been abolished and dissolved. Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back the same, but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 50)

For Deleuze, Nietzsche's philosophy (will to power) affirms the nature of pure difference. And what is implicit in this philosophy is that the Universe in which we are in is pure becoming, and as such, does not comply with concepts of sameness, identity, resemblance, similarity, or equivalence; rather, these concepts pertain to representation alone.

Deleuze argues that, if the first synthesis (habit) 'constituted time as a living present by means of a passive foundation on which past and future depended' (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 117), the second synthesis would constitute time as a pure past; as mentioned previously, a 'ground' that allows the present to pass, and the arrival of another present. However, in the third synthesis, the present is considered by Deleuze as no more than an actor, 'an agent destined to be effaced' (ibid.). The third synthesis constitutes the future, 'which affirms at once both the unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its production, and the independence of the work in relation to its author or actor' (ibid.). Deleuze considers the three syntheses, present, past and future as Repetition, although they must be considered within completely different modes. The present will be considered as the repeater (actor/agent), the past as repetition itself, but the future is that which is repeated, meaning that it is not dependent on a repeater, an agent. It will be time repeating itself:

The present is the repeater, the past is repetition itself, but the future is that which is repeated. Furthermore, the secret of repetition as a whole lies in that which is repeated, in that which is twice signified. The future, which subordinates the other two to itself and strips them of their autonomy, is the royal repetition ... The third ensures the order, the totality of the series and the final end of time. (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 117)

The third synthesis possesses a 'special requirement', already seen in Bergson, which is the two-fold identity of the self, a non-identical self, which in Deleuze reaches a higher power: the dissolution of the self as a condition for the possibility of becoming, for becoming qua difference. This aspect again reveals a reminiscence of Nietzsche's 'will to power'. Deleuze says in *Difference and Repetition* that the third time, where the future appears, possesses a 'secret coherence', which necessarily excludes that of the self.

What the self has become equal to is the unequal in itself. In this manner, the I which is fractured according to the order of time and the self which is divided according to the temporal series correspond and find a common descendant in the man without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, the 'plebeian' guardian of a secret, the already-Overman whose scattered members gravitate around the sublime image. (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 112)

2.3 THE CRYSTAL IMAGE, AN IMAGE OF THOUGHT

Deleuze considers all human activity (thought, understanding and imagination), as emerging from material premises, where empirical action, experience itself, prevails as a unique possibility of the construction of thought. Although this should not be confused with a positivistic materialism, since repetition reveals difference to be at the heart of the orchestration of matter and time. This aspect also reveals that, although the author considers all formation of knowledge to be dependent on the empirical experience, it is in fact *difference* that conveys the possibility of the progression of knowledge beyond sensible (immediate) experience.

It is in difference that movement is produced as an 'affect', that phenomena flash their meaning like signs. The intense world of differences, in which we find the reason behind qualities and the being of the sensible, is precisely the object of a superior empiricism. (Deleuze, 2004b, pp. 68-69)

The word experience is substituted by the word *experimentation*. For Deleuze 'real experience' is experimentation.

Everything changes once we determine the conditions of real experience ... the two senses of the aesthetic become one, to the point where the being of the sensible reveals itself in the work of art, while at the same time the work of art becomes experimentation. (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 82)

As Gil suggests (2008, Introduction) artistic experimentation is very close to the idea of experimentation in Deleuze. Gil refers to Deleuze's philosophy as being a transcendental philosophy, but one that picks up from the empiric, the empiric of experimentation 'beyond the empiric that traditionally defines sensible experience' (ibid.). This aspect, in particular, is what defines Deleuze's philosophy as a transcendental empiricism.

Bergson, before Deleuze, had already identified a distinction between immediate sensory-motor assemblages that are material, and those that are passively mechanistic in nature. Bergson defines them as *zones of indetermination*. These zones of indetermination no longer belong to the 'plane' (territory) of immediacy, necessity. In higher life forms, and when the sensory-motor schema is relaxed, a space for reflection opens up, and it is in this indiscernible zone that memory, experience and action interact. This zone is where the virtual and the actual entwine. Deleuze remarks that, in the 'broader trajectories' perception and recollection, the real and the imaginary, the physical and the mental, or rather their images continuously follow each other around a point of indiscernibility (Deleuze, 1997, p. 69).

The *crystal image* occupies this point of indiscernibility (this virtual plane), and corresponds to the 'smallest circuit'. The crystal image corresponds to the most contracted circuit in the synthesis of time and can only be found in the third synthesis. As Deleuze argues, at this point there is a coalescence of the actual and the virtual image, which corresponds to the crystal-image. The crystal-image is a double image, an image with two sides, simultaneously actual and virtual. Deleuze says that in the crystal-image, which is cut from its motor extension, one can identify two different types of signs, an opsign (optic) and a sonsign (acoustic). Deleuze calls this image a *pure optical*

and sound image that is, an image that does not necessarily result in an action (Deleuze, 1997, p. 69). Deleuze states that, even though the pure optical and sound image might be confused with the recollection-image of Bergson (dream-images and world-images), they are in fact of another nature (Ibid.). The opsigns and sonsigns, as described in *Cinema 2*, are images that break the sensory-motor schema, where the seen is no longer extended into action (see Deleuze, 1997, glossary). The *optical and sound image* finds its true genetic element with its own virtual image (as in a mirror); they do not connect with an actual sensory image like the recollection-image in Bergson. ‘But here we see that the opsign finds its true genetic element when the optical image crystallizes with its own virtual image, on the small internal circuit. For Deleuze, this is a crystal-image, which gives us the key, or rather the ‘heart’, of opsigns and their compositions’ (ibid.). Deleuze, in relation to the cinematic image of the neo-realism, refers to the pure optical and sound images as images that imply a ‘beyond movement’ (Deleuze, 1997, p. 22). To be ‘beyond movement’ does not mean that either the movement of the characters or the movement of the camera is stopped, rather, that the movement is no longer perceived as a sensory-motor image (movement-image). The movement (thought) is now perceived through another type of image. As explained in chapter 1, the movement-image remains as a first dimension of the image, though it continues to grow in dimensions, not dimensions of space, but into more complex virtual dimensions ‘which go beyond space’ (ibid.).

For Bergson, calling up the past requires us not to simply act or play it rather ‘we must withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment’ (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 112). Moulard stresses that Bergson considers that in order to recall the past, it is important for one to value the useless, to have the will to dream. This particular aspect marks, from

Moulard's point of view, the distance between Bergson and Deleuze with respect to the cinematic image.

Moulard argues that Bergson considers only humans to have the capacity to dream, or in other words, to 'call up the past in the form of an image' (Bergson, 2004, p. 94), while Deleuze, in contrast, ascribes this capacity to what he designates, 'the inherent machinic processes in the production of the cinematic image' (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 112). If Bergson, on one hand, considers that only humans have the capacity to detach from action, Deleuze, on the other, considers that this detachment derives from an impossibility of assimilating the intolerable, an experience of impotence (ibid.).

Rodowick suggests that when Deleuze, in the cinema books, refers to the organic movement-image as 'classic' and the time-image as 'modern', this does not mean that one follows the other in a temporal or natural progression. For Rodowick, the Deleuzian use of the terms 'classic' or 'modern', are neither judgemental nor used as a critique of some sort (Rodowick, 1997, p. 12). For Rodowick, the distinction relates instead to a gradual transformation of the nature of belief and the possibilities of thought (as expressed in the 'Powers of the False', chapter VI in Cinema 2). As mentioned at the beginning of the first chapter, Deleuze perceives this transformation through the event of the Second World War. For Deleuze, the experience of the atrocities suffered throughout the Second World War, made the previous philosophical 'truth' or perception of reality unsustainable.

As Rodowick argues, the previous organic regime, corresponding to the movement-image, linked images through rational divisions due to a projection of a model of truth in relation to totality. The movement-image was dependent on a belief in the possibility of action and the stability of truth. From Rodowick's perspective, when Deleuze adapts the notion of the crystalline regime, inspired by the German historian Wilhelm Worringer, he does so in order to demonstrate that each different regime, the organic and the crystalline, would correspond to two different compositional strategies. Each strategy expresses a different cultural relation to the world (Rodowick, 1997, p. 12). The organic forms express the belief on a harmonious unity, 'Where humanity feels at one with the world' (ibid.) and were based on natural forms. The organic regime relates to the belief that the natural laws support and provide form with truth (ibid.). The crystalline regime, by contrast, implies a will to abstraction, an attempt to overcome a conflict with the world, with chaos. 'When a culture feels that it is in conflict with the world, that events are chaotic and hostile, it tends to produce pure geometric forms as an attempt to pattern and transcend this chaos' (ibid.).

If Bergson ascribes the capacity to detach from action to humans alone, Deleuze on the other hand, relates it to the incapacity to assimilate the intolerable. This aspect reflects an all-new conception of philosophical thought and the idea of truth, and differentiates Bergson and Deleuze's thought. Their different conceptions relate mainly to the genesis of thought and its processes. Moulard argues that this differentiation is what makes Bergson a humanist and an anthropocentric philosopher, and Deleuze an essentially machinic one (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 112). Nevertheless, indiscernibility marks, in both philosophers, the passage from movement to time, from the sensory-motor situation to the pure optical and sound image (ibid.). The remarkable difference between the Bergson's recollection-image and Deleuze's pure optical and sound image is that the

former still connects to the actual, in the sense that it coincides with the processes of actualisation of virtual memories, while the latter is only ever associated with a virtual image (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 113).

For Deleuze, only within a *virtual plane* does the past have the capacity to survive in itself, and not just as a present that passes, or in other words, as a past that is perceived as an old present. For Deleuze, what is to be encountered in this virtual plane is indeed the crystal image.

Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the crystal. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 81)

Deleuze refers to the crystal image as being that which always lives on the limit, thus the limit is what marks the vanishing point between ‘the immediate past which is already no longer and the immediate future which is not yet’ (Deleuze, 1997, p. 81).

Bergson’s recollection-image was able to expand conscious perception into deeper or more complex layers of memory and of thought, making it a time-image, but for Deleuze, it still remained ‘trapped in the actual’. Deleuze’s preoccupation is to identify the genetic element of the optical image, the one that the philosopher considers to be its pure attribute, meaning immanence between the actual and the virtual, the coincidence

of a point of indiscernibility. For Deleuze, the recollection-image, despite being a virtual image, is still actualised or in process of actualisation in consciousness or psychological states (Deleuze, 1997, p. 79). The recollection-image remains as mental images actualised in accordance with a new present, and from a present that has been in a rather chronological succession. It is in this sense that Deleuze affirms that these images are dated. The virtual image is perceived in a completely different way:

The virtual image in the pure state is defined, not in accordance with a new present in relation to which it would be (relatively) past, but in accordance with the actual present *of which* it is the past, absolutely and simultaneously: although it is specific it is none the less part of 'the past in general', in the sense that it has not yet received a date. (Ibid.)

Deleuze considers the pure optical and sound image to be a pure virtuality, meaning that it is not dependent on its actualisation, because it corresponds directly to an actual image. It is a double image, a mirror image. As Deleuze argues, it is correlative with the actual image with which it forms 'the smallest circuit which serves as base or point for all the others' (ibid.). For Deleuze, it is an actual-virtual circuit on the spot, a circuit *sur place*, and not an actualisation of the virtual. It exists regardless of the necessities of a shifting actual. It is a crystal-image and not an organic image (ibid, p. 80).

As described in *Cinema 2* (Deleuze, 1997, p. 78), the crystal-image consists of the indivisible unit of the actual image and its corresponding virtual image. How does the coalescence between the two happen? Referring to Bergson's philosophy, Deleuze stresses that the *actual* is everything that corresponds to the present and what is evident

in this present is that which changes or passes, in other words, it becomes past in the moment it is no longer present, or in the moment that another present substitutes it. While the present passes, it appears as present and past simultaneously; if this present is not past at the same time that it is present then it is not passing (Deleuze, 1997, p. 79). In the crystal-image, the past does not succeed the present that it is not anymore, but coexists with the present that it was. The present corresponds to the actual image, and the past, which is contemporaneous to it, corresponds to the virtual image. Deleuze refers to Bergson's '*déjà vu*' as evidence of this particular characteristic of time (a contemporary memory of the present) (ibid.).

The *crystal-image* is not a psychological state or a consciousness. It exists outside of consciousness; it exists in time (Deleuze, 1997, p. 80). For Deleuze, the difficulty of accepting or assimilating this image comes from the fact that the *memory-image* or the *dream-like* image persists as conscious images. They are actualised according to our needs. Nevertheless, and as Deleuze notes, when we try to identify their source, we notice that these particular virtual images come from a general past, from a *pure memory*, and for this reason, they are no more than degrees or modes of actualisation (ibid.). Deleuze stresses that the *pure recollections*, which form the *crystal-image*, exist in time in an imperceptible way, in a general past, a past within itself, a pure past, without an identifiable date (ibid.).

The contemporaneous yet split time between past and present is what we see in the crystal. Although the crystal is not time, it allows us however to see it. Not chronological time, comprehended as a logical succession of events, but a subjective time, a perpetual foundation of time, a more profound time (Deleuze, 1997, p. 81). As

Deleuze stresses, this time constitutes itself as force of life, but a non-organic life that encapsulates the world. The indiscernibility of the crystal image emanates from the fact that its scission never achieves an end. The crystal image never halts the exchange of the two different images that constitute it: the actual image of the present that passes, and the virtual image of the past that it preserves. Although different from each other, they are indiscernible, in the sense that we cannot distinguish one from the other because the past coexists with the present that it was (ibid.).

The recollection-image operates as the external condition of the time-image. The crystal-image, because it represents the shortest circuit of the time-image, and does not necessarily connect to the actual, constitutes its internal condition. From Moulard's perspective, the crystal-image in Deleuze, 'holds the secret' to what the author identifies as a *superior empiricism*. For Moulard, Deleuze's experimentation lies beyond consciousness, memory, recollection or dreams. As for Deleuze, Bergson's dream-image does not yet represent (as Bergson claimed) a point of indiscernibility. The dream-image of Bergson still needs a dreamer, and the conscience of that dream still needs a spectator (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 115): 'The dream-image is subject to the condition of attributing the dream to a dreamer, and the awareness of the dream (the real) to the viewer' (*Cinema 2*, 1997, p. 58).

In *Cinema 2*, Deleuze refers to the dream-image in cinema (see Deleuze, 1997, p. 58), as having two poles. One pole corresponds, more or less, to the possibilities of the apparatus itself (dissolves, superimpositions, deframings, complex camera movements, special effects, lab manipulations). Deleuze refers to this pole as going 'right to the abstract, in the direction of abstraction' (ibid.). The other pole, identified as being

‘restrained’, works by ‘clear cuts’ or ‘montage-cut’. The latter progresses ‘simply through a perpetual unhinging which “looks like” dream, but between objects that remain concrete’ (ibid.). For Deleuze, the techniques of the image do refer to the metaphysics of the imagination. They work in the same way that the imagination does, in the sense that we imagine the passage from one image to the other.

Deleuze and Bergson indeed perceive the cinematic image differently. For Bergson, cinema reconstitutes movement artificially. From Bergson’s point of view, what the cinematic apparatus does is to add poses of movement (photographs) artificially and sequentially through its different mechanical procedures (the film reels). For Bergson, the cinematic processes match the processes of our acquisition of knowledge. Just as in the analytic process of perception, instead of attaching ourselves to the ‘inner becoming of things’, we perceive things from the outside (Bergson, 1911, p. 322). The way we operate is by taking ‘snapshots’ from reality and linking them together abstractly in a becoming or succession that is uniform and invisible (ibid., p. 323).

Moulard argues that, for Bergson, cinematic processes seem to ‘prohibit the immediate intuition of the becoming that subtends all forms’ (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, p. 106). Deleuze, in contrast, perceives cinema in a completely different way. Cinema apparatus stands for the compossibility of the immanence of thought. For Deleuze, ‘cinema itself thinks’ and thus makes possible the maximum level of abstraction. From Moulard’s perspective, the special focus given in Deleuze’s cinema books reflects the philosopher’s opposition to Bergson’s perspective on cinema, the idea that cinema does not imitate natural perception, but on the contrary, it frees itself from it (ibid.). The apparatus coincides with human’s capacity for pure abstraction. Deleuze’s cinema books express

the idea that the movement, which is perceived and translated into the cinematic image, translates the achievement of 'self movement'. For Deleuze, cinema makes *movement* 'the immediate given of the image' (Deleuze, 1997, p. 156).

This kind of movement no longer depends on a moving body or an object which realizes it, nor on a spirit which reconstitutes it. It is the image which itself moves in itself. In this sense, therefore, it is neither figurative nor abstract. It could be said that this is already the case with all artistic images ... (Ibid.)

As Deleuze argues, in painting or photography the movement is dependent on a reconstruction of the mind, because the image itself is immobile. Thus, we are the ones who attribute movement to it, through our imagination. Those images of movement are always dependent upon a moving body, which is our own body. From Deleuze's perspective, the 'artistic essence of the image is realised only when the image becomes automatic, only then does the image produce a shock to thought, 'directly communicating vibrations to the cortex and touching our nervous and cerebral system directly' (Deleuze, 1997, p. 156).

Rodowick perceives the Deleuzian new image as an image that is not content with creating a 'set of relations' (Rodowick, 1997, p. 77), one that has to form a new substance, as if the automatic movement would give rise to a '*spiritual automaton* in us which reacts in turn on movement' (ibid.).

The spiritual automaton no longer designates — as it does in classical philosophy — the logic or abstract possibility of formally deducing thoughts from each other, but the circuit into which they enter with the movement-image, the shared power of what forces thinking and what thinks under the shock. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 156)

For Deleuze cinema is a new way of thinking. It operates in the same way as our cerebral processes (ibid, p. 215). Deleuze's optical and sound image, its *opsigns* and *sonsigns*, make time and thought perceptible, meaning, they make time and thought visible and acoustical (see Rodowick, 1997, p. 78). Rodowick argues that what Deleuze's cinema books try to resolve is the understanding of what kind of images are formed once we no longer perceive duration as a translation of movements into actions. The exteriority and extensiveness of the movement-image in space evolves into an image that coincides with the 'genesis in mental relations or time' (Rodowick, 1997, p. 79). As Rodowick contends, to create a change in the image a 'triple reversal' had to happen. First, it was necessary to break with the previous sensory-motor schema, to transcend the action-image towards a pure optical image. Second, the image had to open up to 'powerful and direct revelations', which are the ones of the time-image itself, the readable image and the thinking image. The second aspect is what makes the correspondence of the *opsigns* and *sonsigns* to the *chronosigns*, *lectosigns*, and *noosigns*. The third reversal is the requirement for a redefinition of the quality of movement, which has to be different from that which characterises the movement-image. As mentioned before, it is not that the movement-image disappears completely, but instead, movement is no longer subordinated to its representation in a succession of actions, and through a quantitative and extensive space. The pure optical sound image, the time-image, displays an intuition of the 'whole', perceived through a continuous becoming (see Rodowick, 1997, p. 80). The pure optical sound image affects us through an

experience of time itself. Time becomes immanent to thought, to movement. Mullarkey affirms that what Deleuze's time-image gives us is a *direct* representation of the genesis of reality.

'Time as breakage, as wound, as fissure, as crack, as differential — all the features that Deleuze's process philosophy explores across its corpus' (Mullarkey, 2009, p. 93). Mullarkey asserts that the meaning of Deleuze's 'time out of joint' is precisely the capacity revealed by time to 'dismember' all organised situations (ibid.). For Mullarkey, Deleuze's thought follows that of Nietzsche and Bergson (among others), and considers the failure of the sensory-motor schemata to open the possibility for a new realm of consciousness. As if, from a 'failure of vision', we would be able to access a 'truth vision' (ibid.). A possibility that is implied by the new image, instead of seeing the thing, we see the 'process of seeing' (ibid.).

3. THE TIME-IMAGE IN DANCE

They won't put it anywhere. Time isn't a thing, it's an idea. It'll die out in the mind.

F. Dostoyevsky, *The Possessed*

3.1 INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the first chapter (see section 1.4.3), Rodowick, following Deleuze, reinforces the idea that time in the ‘pure optical and sound image’ becomes immanent to thought, because the lectosign constructs a new form of description with crystalline qualities characterised by its indiscernibility, between its actual and virtual elements. ‘The lectosign constructs a new form of description — a “crystalline” description or crystalline images, as opposed to the organic images of the first semiotic. The image is no longer used up in its analogical and spatial rendering of an object ...’ (Rodowick, 1997, p. 80). Deleuze’s cinema books go in this direction, to affirm the birth of a new image, a crystal one that persists in neo-realist cinema. This image allows for the birth of new forms of description, where the organic image, characterised by its sequential, spatial, causal effects, no longer dominates the cinema image of neo-realism. The visual and sound elements of the new image are now understood as being connected internally, the image becomes as readable as it is seen. We can find a parallel of Deleuze’s thought in Jacques Rancière’s work, *The Future of the Image* (2009), where the author asserts that art images are made up of what he terms ‘dissemblances’. For Rancière, these images operate discrepancies, meaning that words may describe what the ‘eye might see or describe what it will never see’ (Rancière, 2009b, p. 7).

Deleuze's new image of time complexifies the role of the viewer; its opsigns and sonsigns are perceived through the constant interchange between the acoustic and the optical. We viewers become confused and lost within the thematic references of the image, or in the non-correspondence between the sound and the visual. The image is no longer just to be understood, but to be felt and sensed. The film *Pickpocket* by Robert Bresson (1959), for instance, has been repeatedly epitomised by film theorists as an example of an image of touch that goes beyond a simple action.

Deleuze on Bresson's *Pickpocket*:

The hand, then, takes on a role in the image which goes infinitely beyond the sensory-motor demands, which takes the place of the face itself for the purpose of affects, and which, in the area of perception, becomes the mode of construction of a space which is adequate to the decisions of the spirit. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 12)

Touch becomes the signifier in the image, transforming the visual into a tactile effect. This specific example is one, among others, which clearly opens up the possibility of the recognition of a 'new perception' of the cinematic image of neo-realism. The different ways of using the camera reveal new ways of perceiving the movement, sound, and narrative. The aforementioned 'disbelief' in a 'previous world' created the need to invent new ways of articulating sound, vision, space, and by necessity a body that perceives differently, and that acts (or not) in the world (Rodowick, 1997, pp. 12-13).

To understand the senses as simply being in direct correspondence with the sense organs would be to undermine their implicit complexity within perception, as they evidently go beyond any common correspondence. Synaesthesia has proven to us that their

actualisation (in a Deleuzian sense) is manifested in multiple ways, and these manifestations correspond to the Deleuzian ‘multiplicities’, as previously discussed in the first chapter (see section 1.4.1).

The ‘new cinema’, Neo-realist cinema, represents for Deleuze the possibility of a new way of thinking, translated into the different processes of thinking, implicit in the forms that the ‘new image’ introduces for perceiving movement and time itself. For Deleuze, cinema corresponds exactly to our own cerebral processes. The optical and sound image, their opsigns and sonsigns, have made time and thought perceptible, making them visible and acoustic. What is now crucial is to understand what kind of images may be constructed in this new regime of the image, where duration (*la durée*) substitutes the simple translation of movements into actions in space and time. The movement of the time-image displays an intuition of the ‘whole’ (duration), perceived through its continuous becoming.

As mentioned in the first chapter (section 1.4.3), it is not that the image has become non-referential or non-objective, especially if one wants to talk about dance and the body. The body has its own physiological limits, which can never be surpassed if one is only to consider the body in its actual physical existence. Rather, what happens is that the criterion of referentiality has changed, because the image/movement/body is now subordinated to its internal and virtual elements and relations going beyond the actual (visible) movement. This creates constant shifts in the image, which correspond to Deleuze’s ‘deterritorialization’, and constitutes the trigger for the processes of becoming, both in the image and in thought, executed by and through movement and ‘with’ time, as opposed to ‘in’ time.

3.2 A TENDENCY TOWARDS MOVEMENT OR AN EXHAUSTION OF MOVEMENT

Modern life is such that, confronted with the mechanical, the most stereotypical repetitions, inside and outside ourselves, we endlessly extract from them little differences, variations and modifications. (Deleuze, 2004b, pp. Preface, xvii)

In a clear reference to Sloterdijk's essay 'Mobilization of the planet from the spirit of self-intensification', André Lepecki introduces his book *Exhausting Dance* (2006) by quoting the author:

One must introduce in the diagnostic of our times, a kinaesthetic dimension because, without such a dimension, all discourse about modernity will completely bypass that which in modernity is most real. (Sloterdijk, 2000b, p. 27 cited in Lepecki, 2006, p. 1)

A dance review by Anna Kisselgoff in the New York Times (31 December 2000) serves as a further point of departure for Lepecki:

Stop and Go. Call it a trend or a tic, the increasing frequency of hiccupping sequences in choreography is impossible to ignore. Viewers interested in flow, or a continuum of movement, have been finding slim pickings in many premieres. (Kisselgoff, 2000, p. 6 cited in Lepecki, 2006, p. 1)

Lepecki suggests that what Kisselgoff seems to be recognising is a general rarefaction of movement in choreography, or what she defines as ‘hiccuppings’, a continuous interruption of flow, which should not pertain to dance. In response to Kisselgoff’s conclusion, ‘It is all very “today”. What about tomorrow?’. Lepecki emphasises that what is at stake in Kisselgoff’s critique is the assumption that dance is subject to either a possible fad in choreography, which is characterised by the interruption of the characteristic continuum flow/movement of dance, and that this, as a fad, is not worthy of profound critical analysis, or else, it should be perceived ‘as a threat to dance’s tomorrow’ (Lepecki, 2006, p. 1). Where Kisselgoff sees threat to ‘tomorrow’s dance’, Lepecki sees what he defines as a ‘strategy’ that reflects an ‘exhaustion of dance’. This leads to an exhaustion of the obligation to move or of the assumption that dance’s identity lies in its ‘being-in-flow’ (ibid.).

I would argue that Lepecki’s conceptual analysis throughout *Exhausting Dance* can serve either as a contextualisation of or explanation for the choreographic strategies embodied in the work of the choreographers/performers, to which he refers throughout his book, or in a broader sense, to the role that choreography plays in understanding movement outside the exclusive realm of dance. From my perspective, Lepecki’s use of a Sloterdijk quotation in his introduction clearly testifies to this ambition to grant choreography a grander role in the perception of movement. Further, in the introduction, Lepecki clarifies his ‘political stance’ referring to what he perceives as an ‘obsessive concern with the display of moving bodies’ (Lepecki, 2006, p. 3). He questions why the aforementioned choreographic practices should be considered as a threat to dance (ibid.). Lepecki refers to the imposition of continuous movement on dance as something aligned to that which is implicit in Sloterdijk’s essay, that ‘the kinetic project of modernity

becomes modernity's ontology', which is 'the production and display of a body and a subjectivity fit to perform this unstoppable motility' (ibid.).

Lepecki asserts that the strict alignment of dance with movement, as 'announced' by John Martin (dance critic, 1893–1985), clearly relates to Martin's modernist ideology, where the purpose was theoretically to secure 'for dance an autonomy that would make it an equal to other high art forms' (Lepecki, 2006, p. 4). Following on from Randy Martin, Lepecki refers to this phenomenon as a 'construct' that informed the production, circulation and critical reception of dance, and defined its acceptance across the spectrum of dance contexts (dance reviews, programming decisions or the acceptance or dismissal of dances according to whether they were 'proper' or mere acts of ontological betrayal) (ibid.). Lepecki affirms that 'dance's ontological question remains open' (ibid.) with respect to dance's aesthetical, political, economic, theoretical and kinetic aspects. In the following section, I propose a focus on Lepecki's ontology of movement, again considering it in relation to Sloterdijk's essay, which has helped me to critically address the potential of current choreographic practices in relation to movement, the image and time itself.

3.2.1 HOW CAN CHOREOGRAPHY CONTRIBUTE TO THE PERCEPTION OF MOVEMENT AS THOUGHT?

Petra Sabisch, in her book *Choreographing Relations. Practical Philosophy and Contemporary Choreography* (2011), introduces her work by asserting that the question 'what can choreography do?' is profoundly indebted to Spinoza's *Ethics*, thus relating directly to the philosophical question asked by Spinoza, 'what can a body do?', which is

based on the principle that what characterises the body is not determined by an exclusive analysis of its physiological components, but rather its capacity, or its ‘power’ to affect and to be affected. Sabisch asserts that choreography can determine whether the body’s power can be increased or diminished (intensified), thus indicating the limits of what we can do (Sabisch, 2011, p. 8). Choreography can be perceived as an experimental ground for the possibilities of movement and rehearsal into the limits of the body: its capacity to be affected and to affect. Sabisch considers that, in order to be able to define the ‘ontological modes of existence of choreography’, one needs to analyse the choreographic processes, ‘the genetic conditions through which their “doing” comes into being and provides new options’ (ibid.). The question, which Sabisch identifies as being an ethical one, ‘what can choreography do?’ is essential, if one wishes to affirm the power of choreography to constantly produce new relations, and at the same time, possess the ability that philosophy has, to ‘explain the conditions of the new’ (ibid.).

My rationale conveys the idea that there is much more to dance than the simple perpetuation of its ‘common’ condition, which is to produce constant movement. Hence, if one wishes to perceive the idea of movement in accordance with Deleuze’s idea of movement, one should instead perceive movement as a potency, an ‘intensity’, a ‘force’.

For Deleuze the movement that is considered beyond the movement-image, that of the time-image, is capable of attaining to ‘intensity’ and it is perceived as a ‘force’. This movement, although not visible, is actualised at any given moment, becoming visible, or not. This does not mean that, though not visible, movement cannot exist, but rather that movement is always there, waiting for the instant of its manifestation (e.g. Paxton’s ‘small dance’ attests clearly to this idea in the experience of the dancer). The movement

is always present, even if latent in the body, even as an image of thought. Movement in this sense is intense, because it does not exhaust itself into the actual, nor is it perceived as the simple displacement or execution of steps in space. In its virtual facet, movement retains its 'force' as pure potency, as an intensity. Deleuze's 'preference for the virtual' implies the idea that the movement, considered in its virtual facet, retains its force and is felt, rather than seen. It is more powerful because it does not exhaust itself by unfolding in the extensive (actual) space, or by dividing itself into unities of time. For Deleuze, these are the reasons to consider the time-image, or the pure optical and sound image, to be more powerful than the movement-image, as the former aligns itself with the space where it manifests itself, while the latter is a direct presentation of time, which escapes the imprisonment of the action into conditions of sequential time. Therefore, it is in a Deleuzian sense an 'intensive repetition', which should be perceived differently from 'extended repetition', as the latter is actual, material, and occupies space, while the former is intensive and immaterial. It does not have volume, and therefore it is virtual.

To fully conceive choreography as a strategy, or to perceive choreography as a Deleuzian 'machine' to be applied to movement so that movement becomes equivalent to the processes of thought, one needs to relate dance research to that of philosophy. This is despite the fact that, as Deleuze and Guattari discuss in their work, *What is Philosophy* (1991), art and philosophy are different in the sense that they produce in different ways; dance, as an art form, produces 'affects', while philosophy, on the other hand, produces 'concepts'.

Lepecki affirms that, by privileging the relationship between dance, dance studies and philosophy, one necessarily overcomes the assumption that dance is confined to 'flow or

continuum movement' (Lepecki, 2006, p. 5), and may access other aspects that are fundamental to both dance and choreography. For Lepecki, in order to lay down 'its ground of being' (ibid.), and to be able to create an appropriate critical approach within dance studies, dance needs to establish a new dialogue with contemporary philosophy. For that reason, within his dance analysis, Lepecki underlines the importance of philosophers such as Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari for the development of his rationale. This is because, as Lepecki contends, their philosophy is not only a philosophy of the body, but one that allows 'for a political reframing of the body'. From Lepecki's perspective, these philosophers do not perceive the body as an enclosed entity, 'but as an open and dynamic system of exchange', thus reflecting the philosophical idea of perceiving the body as a multiplicity which is always in a constant process of 'becoming'. In this sense, one can understand choreography as a means of rethinking the subject in terms of the body, which is not exclusively dependent on its kinetic attributes.

If there is one contribution I would like to propose to dance studies it is to consider in which ways choreography and philosophy share that same fundamental political, ontological, physiological, and ethical question that Deleuze recuperates from Spinoza and from Nietzsche: what can a body do? (Lepecki, 2006, p. 6)

The articulation between choreography and philosophical critical analysis can contribute to the redefinition of the role of choreography, for example, helping to establish choreographic practices as processes of knowledge, or helping movement to be perceived as thought. Conducting choreographic research which is informed by contemporary thought allows for an understanding of what Lepecki identifies as an

‘ontology of movement’, or an ‘ontology of dance’. It follows that dance needed to overcome its subordination to the continuous and unstoppable flow that dominated modernity⁴¹ and defined dance’s ‘condition’. To free dance or movement from the project of modernity meant, for dance, to embark on the ‘political’ quest of rethinking its subordination to the kinetic ‘dictatorship’. The ‘being in the world’, or the ‘worldlings’ of Erin Manning (Manning, 2009, p. 22), represents that effort of movement to become immanent to ‘*la durée*’ of the world. As aforementioned, duration (*la durée*) substitutes the simple translation of movements into actions in space and time. The movement displays an ‘intuition of the whole’ (duration), perceived through its continuous becoming. Dance movement can become immanent to the movements of the ‘world’, as opposed to following the false movements of an era. This aspect relates directly to Deleuze’s quest in his cinema books: the author’s search for an immanence of movement with the world through the cinematic image. Lepecki asserts that, ‘choreography emerges in early modernity to “remachine” the body so it can “represent itself” as a total “being-toward-movement”’ (Lepecki, 2006, p. 7). To perceive dance as a pure display of unstoppable movement undermines dance’s potential as a way of thinking through movement, and as a ‘force’ to change our ‘being in the world’. As asserted by Lepecki, the ‘exhaustion of dance’ reflects the attempt to go against the kinetic project of modernity. It stands as a critic that, paradoxically, while disrupting the direct connection between dance and movement, this perspective liberates dance and creates the possibility of a ‘new movement’. This represents, without any doubt, a political endeavour.

⁴¹ For a more detailed insight into Lepecki’s particular relation to the concept of ‘modernity’, see pages 10 to 13.

‘To exhaust dance is to exhaust modernity’s permanent emblem. It is to push modernity’s mode of creating and privileging a kinetic subjectivity to its critical limit’ (Lepecki, 2006, p. 8). Lepecki suggests that for dance to be liberated from its kinetic imposition, a process of ‘subjectification’ or ‘the production of a way of existing [that] can’t be equated with a subject’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 98 cited in *Exhausting Dance*, 2006, p. 8) needs to take place. Lepecki understands subjectivity as a ‘performative power’ (ibid.), meaning that the subject is perceived as, a ‘mode of intensity’ as opposed to a ‘personal subject’. Lepecki asserts that this ‘subjectivity’ indexes ‘modes of agency (political ones, desiring ones, affective ones, choreographic ones)’. The author identifies them as ‘technologies of the self’, as in Foucault’s or in Deleuze’s thought, where these subjectivities result in processes of subjectification, becomings, ‘the unleashing of potencies and forces in order to create for oneself the possibility of ‘existing as a work of art’’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 95 cited in Lepecki, 2006, p. 8).

As Lepecki emphasises, to Sloterdijk, the only way to assess the political ontology of modernity is through a genuine critique of what he identifies as ‘the kinetic impulse of modernity’. For Sloterdijk, since the ontology of modernity is ‘a pure being-toward-movement’, it needs to be accessed through a ‘critical theory of mobilization’ (Sloterdijk cited in Lepecki, 2006, p. 12). Peter Sloterdijk, in the work ‘Mobilization of the planet from the spirit of self-intensification’ (in *Planes of Composition*, 2010, p. 3), advocates that the interpretation of the present should be based on what is defined as a philosophical kinetics that originates from three axioms;

First, that we are moving in a world that is moving itself; second, that the self-movements of the world include our own self movements and affect them; and third,

that in modernity, the self-movements of the world originate from our self-movements, which are cumulatively added to the world movement. (Ibid.)⁴²

Sloterdijk adds that it is then possible, taking into consideration these three axioms, to develop a relationship between what the author describes as an old world, a modern world and a post-modern world (ibid.). Sloterdijk contends that one can no longer ignore the obvious, which is that ‘kinetics is the ethics of modernity’ (ibid., p. 4). From Sloterdijk’s perspective, this means that the sole purpose of modernity is progress, and that this represents modernity’s kinetic-aesthetic characteristic that can be translated into the need (or goal) to eliminate or overcome the limits of human self-movement. This can only be executed through something, which the author sees as belonging to modern philosophy, subjectivity⁴³. In this particular sense the term ‘progress’:

... does not mean a simple change of position where an agent advances from A to B. In its essence, the only ‘step’ that is progressive is the one that leads to an increase in the ‘ability to step’. Thus the formula of modernizing processes is as follows: progress is movement toward movement, movement toward increased movement, movement toward an increased mobility. (Sloterdijk, 2010, p. 5).

Sloterdijk affirms that this formula results in a categoric impulse to move that demands from human beings an exhausting constant movement. This movement in turn, even

⁴² This aspect clearly relates to Deleuze’s idea that one does not become *in* the world, but instead, that we become *with* the world

⁴³ As the virtual once considered something transcendental is now perceived as integral to human experience, as ‘just another facet of action itself’ a mode of subjectification.

though it is associated with the idea of freedom, is still perceived as an absolute obligation to move, which might result in fixity (ibid.). This is because, as the author asserts, when in modernity one is talking of self-movement, one is necessarily talking of self-determination. Modernity ‘transforms’ the concept of ‘being’ and its meaning into ‘having to be’ and ‘wanting to be’ more mobile, characterising it ontologically as a pure ‘being toward movement’. The resistance to this condition results in what Sloterdijk coins as ‘moral ruin’⁴⁴ (ibid., p. 6). This is implicit in this reality, as we cannot perceive it in any other way as being real to us, and which we cannot contradict, because this is perceived by us as, ‘want and have to want’. Hence, as the author puts forward: ‘The fundamental process of modernity promotes itself as a ‘human movement to free oneself’, then it is a process that we absolutely do want and a movement that is impossible for us not to make’ (ibid.). Taking this idea further, one can no longer ignore the fact that modernity’s project, despite the fact that it is evidently a kinetic one, is, in fact, in a more profound sense, an ethical one, or as Sloterdijk underlines, a moral kinetic one, that ‘condemns us not only to freedom, but also to a constant movement toward freedom’ (ibid.).

Sloterdijk emphasises that though such a critique can be made of modernity, one should not underestimate the ‘movement progress of modern generations’. In the sense that in less than two hundred years, the bourgeoisie and the middle class accomplished remarkable things in the spheres of politics, economics, language, information, traffic, expression and sex, and that this should be considered a ‘miracle’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, the author considers that most steps toward progress have led to ‘new types of forced movements that wrestle with the suffocating endings of pre-modern times regarding unknown forces and miserable energy’ (Sloterdijk, 2010, p. 6). This means that modernity established a dynamic, or a ‘regime’ of some sorts, intended to preserve, what

⁴⁴ Or what Kisselgoff perceived in the dance, as ‘hiccupping’ or a ‘threat to dance’s tomorrow’.

Sloterdijk identifies as a 'mindless rigour among super-mobile forms' (ibid.), where the hectic disparate movements lacking in sense of purpose lead to automation, to the self-perceived as a machine (ibid., p. 7).

Further, in the essay Sloterdijk uses the metaphor of the automobile to describe the idea of the 'self' in modernity, such as in the relation with the automobile where the 'I' and its self-movements are metaphysically inseparable, 'the automobile is the technical double of the always active transcendental subject'. As mentioned previously, self-movement corresponds to self-determination, as the 'I' perceived without movement is unconceivable (ibid.). Sloterdijk calls the automobile the 'sanctum of modernity', 'the cultural centre of kinetic world religion', 'the rolling sacrament that makes us participate in something faster than ourselves', suggesting that the 'I' feels itself expanding by the illusion of going in the direction of a 'higher and faster self to whom is offered the entire world' (ibid.). Thus, yet another metaphor follows the previous one, which translates the disenchantment, or the 'aftertaste', with the modernist promise of progress and velocity, the one of the traffic jam, where general self-movement turned occasionally into general immobility (ibid., p. 8). The author suggests that the experience of the traffic jam gives us the feeling that something has gone terribly wrong (emphasis given), that we have arrived at the 'stop-and-go' of post-modernity. The nostalgia in us for a different velocity makes us recognise 'the failure of fake modernity, the end of an illusion — like a kinetic good Friday when all hope for redemption by acceleration is lost' (ibid.).

Sloterdijk ironises by saying that the driver in the traffic jam, who might not have even heard of the term 'postmodernity', perceives the 'foreshadowing of another "era"', that something has to give, that the self-movement has come to a halt.

And in fact, this can be formulated in terms of cultural theory: where unleashed self-movement leads to a halt or a whirl, the beginning of a transitional experience emerges in which the modern active changes to the postmodern passive. (Ibid.)

Sloterdijk's idea of modernity 'being toward movement' and the inevitability of a nostalgia or the need for different or slower velocities, or new ways of subjectification, are illustrated in modern films such as, *The First Auto* by director Roy Del Ruth (USA, 1927), the emblematic Charlie Chaplin's *Modern Times* (1936). The film *À nous la liberté* by René Clair (1931) is also a remarkable metaphor for Sloterdijk's assessment of modernity as a false promise of liberty. The three films are contemporary to each other, and reflect Sloterdijk's 'disbelief' in modernity's kinetic project. As Lepecki notes, modernity locked subjectivity 'within an experience of being severed from the world' (Lepecki, 2006, p. 10). Lepecki emphasises that the fact that kinetics has become a political-ethical question makes dance a possible means of fighting against 'the hegemonic fantasies of modernity once those fantasies are linked to the imperative to constantly display mobility' (ibid., p.11). Lepecki refers back to two basic political positions identified by Deleuze, 'embracing movement, or blocking it' (ibid., p. 12). The latter is described by Deleuze as being a reactionary force and, for that reason, contrary to the desirable forces and powers of becoming that coexist on a plane of consistence. This plane corresponds to the plane of immanence that is continuously producing intensities that circulate unblocked.

Sloterdijk (Sloterdijk, 2010, pp. 11-12) and Lepecki (Lepecki, 2006, pp. 9-11) further discuss the differentiation of the terms, 'modernity' and 'postmodernity', questioning if a real change in society happened, which could justify the passage from the term

modernity to that of postmodernity. Both authors question an effective implementation of postmodernity. Lepecki's text, in particular, becomes especially pertinent as it articulates different theories to clarify or better present the authors' perspective. Relevant as it is, I have nevertheless chosen not to engage in such a discussion here; the profusion of authors and fields of knowledge that have tackled this aspect means that, in order to elaborate a proper critical approach to it, I would have to analyse the arguments in a transversal way, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, in the present research, this aspect is worth mentioning, as it remains relevant to identify a change in the modes of production of art in general and dance in particular. This specific aspect brings to mind Sally Banes' well-known discussion of dance history in *Terpsichore in Sneakers* (1980) and the particular difficulty of categorising dance as either modern or postmodern, in comparison to the use of the terms in other art forms.

Sloterdijk concludes that, paradoxically, kinetics has become the 'school of calmness' (Sloterdijk, 2010, p. 12). I would suggest that what Sloterdijk identifies as a 'paradoxical consequence' should instead be analysed through the lens of Rancière's term 'dissensus' or 'resistance'. In his book *Dissensus* (2010), Jacques Rancière asserts that if one could perceive a politics within aesthetics, this politics would manifest itself 'in the practices and modes of visibility of art that re-configure the fabric of sensory experience' (Rancière, 2010, p. 140). Here, Rancière stresses though that it is quite impossible to determine a direct cause-effect relationship between the intentions realised in art and a capacity for a political subjectivation. Thus, these relations do not necessarily exist in correlation, or are impossible to be identified with exactitude. The author puts forward the idea that what one might identify as a 'politics of art' involves the 'intertwining of several logics' (Rancière, 2010, p. 141). This is because the arts have an aesthetic of their own, which does not necessarily align with the space, time, visible and invisible

outside of their own realm, and they are thus more dependent on the message that the artist wants to convey. Nevertheless, artists create strategies for the purpose of altering ‘the frames, speeds and scales according to which we perceive the visible’, and combine them with specific invisible elements that carry specific meanings in order to ‘make the invisible visible or to question the self-evidence of the visible’ (ibid.). In this way, they change our perceptive scope and provide us with the possibility of creating novel relationships between things and meanings that until then had not been related. Rancière rejects the term ‘fiction’, to describe the labour of the artist, as this word, for the author, needs first to be reconceived; the simple assumption of its meaning as a construction of an imaginary world has to be revised (ibid.), and above all, the term should not be understood as the construction of an imaginary world as opposed to a real world. Fiction, from Rancière’s perspective, is the way of ‘changing the existing modes of sensory presentations and forms of enunciation; of varying frames, scales and rhythms; and of building new relationships between reality and appearance, the individual and the collective’ (ibid). Rancière affirms that the work of the artist is closer to what he identifies as a re-framing of the real, or what he coins as the framing of ‘dissensus’ (ibid.). The meaning of the word ‘dissensus’, or ‘resistance’, is in opposition to that of the classical regime of art, or the representative regime of art, which implied an alignment between the form of intellectual determination and that of sensory appropriation. In the classical regime, art was considered to be a work of form, meaning that matter was subjugated to form, and that the pleasure taken from its observation was dependent on the judgement of the adequacy of the form to that of the laws of a sensory nature. As Rancière asserts, that relation is the one implied in the Aristotelian *mimesis*, the ‘agreement between a productive nature — a *poesis* — and a receptive nature — an *aesthesis*’ (Rancière, 2010, p. 173). Rancière advocates that the first formula of ‘dissensus’ or ‘resistance’ was already given by Kant and through his distinction between nature and humanity (ibid). Rancière emphasises though that what is important

to determine now is this relation without relation, something the author identifies as being a problem that runs through all Deleuze's texts on art. Rancière argues that from one humanity to another, the path can only be forged by what Deleuze, following Bergson, identified as 'inhumanity' (ibid., p. 174).

Moreover, with Kant, the experience of the sublime induced us to leave the domain of art and aesthetic. It signalled the passage from the aesthetic to the moral sphere. With Deleuze, however, this difference between the aesthetic autonomy and moral autonomy is re-invested within the very practice of art and the aesthetic experience. Art is the transcription of the experience of the suprasensible sensible, the manifestation of a transcendence of life, which is the Deleuzian name for being. It is the transcription of an experience of the heteronomy of life with respect to the human. (Rancière, 2010, p. 181)

In Bergson's thought, the inhuman reflects the idea that in perception and particularly in the aesthetic experience, memory is what occupies the interval between perception and motor response. The difficulty in recognising or connecting this memory to a previous experience results in the assumption that this memory should come from a different 'place'. Therefore, Bergson, and Deleuze too, assume that this indeterminacy, that this freedom, is fed by what Bergson names as 'pure memory'. It is considered as a pure memory because it 'exists' beyond a practical material existence; it belongs to the virtual, to what the author identifies as 'inhuman'. It is considered as 'inhuman' because it belongs to a 'whole', to a duration (*durée*), where we become that which frees us from all life contingency and allows us subjectivity.

3.3 CHANGING THE RHYTHM, SLOWING DOWN TIME

Rancière's 'dissensus' inevitably sends us back to the Deleuzian 'pure optical and sound image', an image constructed through the 'irrational cuts' that resonate with Rancière's idea of 'relations without relation', or art perceived beyond representation. In this way, he refers to art beyond the pure creation of form, where the invisible becomes visible, or the art that questions the self-evidence of the visible. Rancière sees art as a reframing of the 'real', or a way of changing the modes of our 'sensory presentation, forms of enunciation, varying frames, scales and rhythms' (Rancière, 2010, p. 141). The 'pure optical and sound image', can be considered as possessing this potential, within its compositional premises, which can be introduced to choreographic composition. Therefore, and for the compositional premises to be applied to movement composition, according to Lepecki and Sloterdijk's aforementioned analysis on velocities, one has to understand exactly how this image relates differently to rhythm, flow, and duration. To start with, let us assume that one of the fundamental characteristics of this image is the indubitable need to, or idea of, 'slowing down time', in order to adjust itself to the processes of thought, in other words, to become immanent to thought. The expression 'slowing down time' should not be taken literally, in the sense that one should not associate 'slowing down time', with the execution of slow movements. What then does 'slowing down time' mean exactly?

What is important is that the anomalies of movement become the essential point instead of being accidental or contingent. This is the era of false continuity ... In other words crystalline narration will fracture the complementarity of a lived hodological space and a represented Euclidean space. Having lost its sensory-motor connections, concrete space

ceases to be organized according to tensions and resolution of tensions, according to goals, obstacles, means or even detours. (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 128-129)

This ‘slowing down of time’ is worked out in the artistic object through the manipulation of the materials belonging to each particular work. Deleuze relates often to the velocity of the camera as having this capacity to transmit to the viewer this experience of a different time⁴⁵. Let us digress for a moment from dance and cinema, to pick a paradigmatic example from the fine arts given by José Gil, which can better illustrate this point. In *A imagem nua e as pequenas percepções — O intervalo absoluto* (Beuys. 1996)⁴⁶, Gil elaborates on the aesthetic characteristics of the work of Joseph Beuys (1921–1986). The author asserts that, in Beuys’s work, the artist is mainly concerned with using the materials themselves and their qualities, by articulating them in ways that would not result in ‘symbolic nets’. Gil asserts that the creation of symbolic nets would more easily be identified through the work of Duchamp (1887–1968), and his ‘ready-made’ (Gil, 1996, pp. 197-218). As Gil maintains, Beuys displays the objects by creating aleatory combinations with them. The way that the artist chooses to display these objects in the space does not produce an obvious sense, but instead makes the objects depend on their own qualities or characteristics and the way they alter over time (e.g. wax, coal dust, insects, honey, chocolate, Beuys himself, etc.). Gil claims that, for the artist, what is important is to trigger in the spectator an ‘affect’, an ‘energetic pulsation’, in relation to the materials, as opposed to a rational elaboration on their relations and presence. Time is a crucial element in Beuys’ installations, in the sense

⁴⁵ The use of a very slow pace in the *Eye Height* film explores the idea of creating a temporal paradox between the velocities imprinted to the movement from those of the camera. See Appendices: 3. Visual material, *Eye Height/installation/ Multi-screen sample final sequence*.

⁴⁶ Free translation: ‘The naked image and the small perceptions — the absolute interval. Beuys’.

that all materials that are presented by the artist, conjure the presence of time. For Gil, Beuys' work underlines the perception of the artistic object as a 'process', rather than considering it as a 'final' work of art, or an 'artistic product'. Therefore, in the presence of these mutable objects, we feel this time as belonging to 'our time'. We see the artistic object 'becoming' in front of our eyes, and access its 'strangeness' in the space of the artistic event. The same strategy can be eventually identified in dance, if one considers improvisation-based movement, where movements are not pre-defined. In a pre-defined choreographic work, the dancer is always anticipating, even if only mentally, the next step, and works through the dance in order to achieve a specific final result, that which is desired by the choreographer. The audience too can recognise a logic in the sequences that are being displayed, and after a while audience members can anticipate the next movement because a 'meaning', even an abstract one, needs to be conveyed to the audience, which the audience itself recognises. In improvisation-based movement, the dancer does not know what the 'next step' is, as the next step depends on the needs of the materials themselves (body, movement, sound, space, time, etc.) and their articulations. The dancer and the audience need to engage with the dance at the very moment that it is being displayed. Thus, 'engaging in the process' means that one perceives what is happening primarily, with all the senses that are being affected. Such a process, because it is directly dependent on the behaviour, or mutability, of its materials, while relating to each other, is 'less likely' to be accessed through rational or intuitive cognitive processes. One can 'access the dance' which is being displayed before our eyes in the way that it affects our senses directly. The words 'less likely' relate to the idea that one is never free of interpretation, or of trying to extract 'meaning' from what we experience. This is one of the main reasons why the present research is not based on free improvisation, and uses instead the juxtaposition or complexification of the choreographic structures⁴⁷. This is done in order to constantly disrupt the natural

⁴⁷ See scores of the different performative formats, where the different layers (sound, movement, space,

tendency, or need, that one has to formulate ‘meaning’ from everything that we experience. This aspect is clarified in the next chapter. This genre of procedure in the choreographic composition aligns with the Deleuzian pure optical and sound image operative mode. It thus corresponds to the way in which the image is constructed, through irrational cuts. For Deleuze, the new forms of relationality of the pure optical and sound image, the irrational cut, manifest an operation where the ‘cut’ becomes important in itself. ‘The cut, or interstice, between two series of images no longer forms part of either two series: it is the equivalent of an irrational cut, which determines the non-commensurable relations between images’ (Deleuze, 1997, p. 213). Deleuze asserts that contrary to classical cinema, where images were linked through association, or through the use of metaphor or metonym, the new regime establishes ‘relinkages of independent images’ (ibid). Instead of images following each other in a logical sequence, they are instead one image ‘*plus* another, and each shot is deframed in relation to the framing of the following shot’ (ibid., p. 214). The pure optical and sound image confronts us with the unthought that is life and we become powerless before it.

It is a whole new system of rhythm, and a serial or atonal cinema, a new conception of montage ... this time-image puts thought into contact with an unthought, the unsummonable, the inexplicable, the undecidable, the incommensurable. (Ibid.)

In *Relationscapes* (2009), Erin Manning identifies the material of movement as ‘preaccelerations’. The author asserts that movement does not need to be thought, in its first instance, as a quantitative displacement from A to B. Resonating also with Bergson’s conception of movement, Manning places the emphasis on the ‘immanence of

interactive design, time) indicate this juxtaposition or complexification.

movement moving' (Manning, 2009, p. 6), meaning, the way movement is felt before it actualises. Manning's concept of 'preaccelerations' relates to the way that movement is felt in the gathering, or, what the author describes as, 'a welling that propels the directionality of how movement moves'. It is thus the 'virtual force of movement's taking form' (ibid.), the intensive natural force, or pulsion that characterises the movement in its incipency (becoming visible), and which does not necessarily predict where the movement is going.

As Gil affirms in *A imagem nua e as pequenas percepções*, the way to characterise the 'time of the work of art' is to relate it to the time that corresponds to the genesis of forms, to the ontological slowness of the construction of form itself. These formations, because they require the consideration of an 'absolute now', coincide with the birth of time itself (Gil, 1996, p. 197). This is an experience easily recognised and felt, for instance, in Tarkovsky's very long and slow shots of camera (e.g. the dream sequence from the movie *Stalker*, 1979), or in the singular travelling shots of Béla Tarr (e.g. travelling shots in the film *Damnation*, 1988). Gil argues that, in artistic work, what constitutes its temporalisation is the manipulation of time itself (Gil, 1996, p. 197). The work establishes a continuous present, which is the time of its presentation, within its multiple time dimensions, considered within the assimilation of chaos and emptiness. For Gil, the challenge of art is that of a non-temporal present, where all movements, belonging to an objective time, converge to a single 'interval'. Gil identifies the 'interval' as a 'zero instant', which is that which characterises the work of art, its concreteness and presentation.

The ubiquitous present is defined as follows: from an initial instant (chaos), or an interval, unfolds a movement that is still a pure impulse without aim, without purpose,

without tipping point. We are in the interval. The form is born in this absolute interval where time temporalises itself⁴⁸. (Gil, 1996, p. 198)

In order to disrupt reality, which is characterised by an objective time, the artist forces a temporal convergence, which reveals the time of consciousness, conveying a specific time of existence. The artist creates a virtual time, where all ‘forces’ and sensations enter into accordance with time’s consciousness. This is the ‘absolute interval’ which is capable of triggering the intensification of the present. This is the ‘place’ where the states of consciousness acquire fluidity, crossing over each other continuously, homogenising, leaping, so that ‘feeling’ and the world gather again concordantly. This is how Gil conceives art as an ‘attack’ on all conditional modes imposed on us from outside, modes which determine the specific ways in which one is supposed to see and feel. Therefore, the way in which this new temporality manifests itself, where the ‘new form’ breaks through, is the ‘slowing down of time’, where the clock no longer intervenes (ibid.). This allows for the adjustment of time within time itself. The interval is the one that separates the virtual from the actual, thus, that which separates the interior space already constructed from that which is yet to come. Gil further affirms that it is indeed chaos that opens the artistic work to life. The ‘plane of composition’ in its constant ‘craving’ (emphasis given) for the ‘plane of immanence’ makes the work of the artist a constant effort to achieve the latter (Gil, 1996, p. 199). The time of the ‘artistic creation’ is ‘fuelled’ by chaos, in the artist’s constant attempt to emerge from it.

It is through the operative mode of art, as a manipulation of time itself, and perceived as a ‘plane of composition’, that one is capable of understanding the Deleuzian concept of

⁴⁸ Free translation: ‘O presente de ubiquidade define-se assim: a partir de um instante (ou de um intervalo) inicial (caos), desdobra-se um movimento que não é apenas ainda um puro impulso sem alvo, sem fim, sem ponto de queda. Estamos no intervalo. Neste intervalo absoluto, o tempo temporalizase, a forma nasce.’

getting ‘thought to move’⁴⁹, or the consideration of thought as movement. Time has become immanent to thought and thought to movement. Manning’s understanding of the dancer as ‘bodies-in-the-making’ (Manning, 2009, p. 6) resonates with Deleuze’s proposition to put thought into motion. Manning stresses, though, that the dancer’s movement should not be perceived as belonging strictly to the mind, but rather to the ‘body-becoming’. As Manning affirms, thought never opposes movement. Thought moves the body, in the same way as the body moving produces thought, as in perception. This ‘moving-with’ thought is ‘durational in the first instance’ (ibid.). The durational is considered by Manning as the ‘plane of experience on which expressive finality has not yet taken hold’ (ibid.). Thus, by shifting towards expression, it is understood as moving through concepts in ‘prearticulation’, similar to Gil’s ‘interval’. From Manning’s perspective, the way that, in philosophy, a thought becomes a concept finds a parallel in the way in which duration becomes experiential space-time (ibid.).

There is rhythm to all of this. To posit rhythm as extra or external to experience is to misunderstand how rhythms make up events, rhythm gives affective tonality to experience, making experience this and not that. Rhythm techniques are not solely dedicated to sound: there is rhythm in inflection, in Kngwarr-eye’s brushstrokes, in William Forsythe’s movement improvisations, in Marey’s chronotographies. (Manning, 2009, pp. 9-10)

⁴⁹ I address this particular aspect in detail in the next section of this chapter.

3.4 THE DIFFICULTIES OF ARTICULATING PHILOSOPHY WITH DANCE PRACTICE

In her essay ‘Difference and Repetition in Both Sitting Duet’ (2005), Briginshaw discusses Jonathan Burrows’ work *Both Sitting Duet* and refers to the need to clarify the Deleuzian distinction between the difference ‘in kind’ of the ‘extended repetitions’ and ‘intensive repetitions’. This is because the former are considered to be actual (visible), and for that reason have volume and occupy space, while the latter, because they are perceived as virtual (invisible), do not have volume and as such are considered immaterial. Further, Briginshaw affirms that her analysis focuses on the ‘extended repetitions’ of both performers, the ones that correspond to the visible, to the concrete relations established between the two men and between the self and the other.

Both Sitting Duet is a collaborative performance created and interpreted by Jonathan Burrows (dancer) and Matteo Fargion (composer), and initially inspired by a score by composer Morton Feldman, entitled *For John Cage* (1982). I had the opportunity to see this performance live at CAPITALS festival at the Gulbenkian Foundation (2003). Although I easily connect with Briginshaw’s ideas throughout the article, a particular aspect of her analysis drove me back to the difficulty that is implicit in articulating dance practice through philosophical concepts. Briginshaw’s caution against following Deleuze’s recurrent deferring repetitions to the limit is grounded in the author’s belief that they are dangerous and not applicable if one wants to maintain ‘a notion of an embodied dancing subject’⁵⁰ (Briginshaw, 2005, p. 16). I do feel some discomfort with

⁵⁰ In my opinion, this ‘danger’ constitutes a misunderstanding of the idea of the ‘dissolution of the self’ implicit in the processes of ‘becoming’ in a Deleuzian sense, which for Briginshaw presents itself as a ‘danger’ to the dancer’s body.

Birginshaw's identification of an 'embodied dancing subject', especially if one considers it through the prism of Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze does refer to this particular difficulty in *Difference and Repetition*: 'Is it really difference which relates different to different in these intensive systems? Does the difference between differences relate difference to itself without any other intermediary?' (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 145) Deleuze further identifies where the confusion lies. He questions if when speaking of 'communication between heterogeneous systems' and of coupling and resonance⁵¹, one has to consider a 'minimum of resemblance between the series or an identity in the agent which brings the communication' (ibid.) Does this 'too much' difference undermine the processes of the difference between the series themselves? Does this mean that they would no longer be able to communicate? This would be exactly the same concern expressed by Birginshaw's 'risk'. Is it difference condemned to be understood only by virtue of a resemblance between the things, which differs? Deleuze stresses that these are the questions which make it necessary to pay the most attention to the roles of difference, resemblance and identity. Therefore, one should always question what it is that in fact ensures the communication; is it the series that are differing or a particular third party or an 'agent' that is capable of securing the communication? (ibid.) 'Thunderbolts explode between different intensities, but they are perceived by an invisible, imperceptible dark precursor, which determines their path in advance but in reverse, as though, intagliated. Likewise, every system contains its dark precursor' (ibid.). For Deleuze the 'intensive repetitions' are always possible, because, as the author asserts, every system has its 'dark precursor', which depends neither upon identity nor resemblance, as identity and resemblance are not its preconditions, but rather its effects. Thus, resemblance and identity are, for Deleuze, mere illusions, and are only possible to be perceived as resemblances, retrospectively, because of our

⁵¹ The relationship established in *Both Sitting Duet*, between the two men, between sound and movement, between musician and dancer, etc.

‘inveterate habit of thinking difference on the basis of representation’ (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 146).

From my perspective the primary focus of *Both Sitting Duet* is the rhythmical and temporal aspects of the sound and the movement, especially if one takes into consideration their initial source of inspiration, Morton Feldman’s piece. Briginshaw’s commentary about a possible ‘risk’ seems to neglect Deleuze’s other aspect, considered fundamental within artistic practice, the existence of a ‘safe territory’ where ‘intense repetitions’ become. Choreography is the ‘safe territory’, and does correspond to Deleuze and Guatarri’s ‘plane of immanence’, a ‘plane of consistency’ or of composition where ‘intensive repetitions’ take place.

Claire Colebrook in her essay, ‘How can we tell the dancer from the dance’ (2005) addresses the crux of the problem: ‘If we consider dance in this new context, then dance is neither expressive of an already existing life, nor a pure act that is self-sufficient and self-constituting. Rather, dance is a confrontation with life as a plane of open and divergent becomings’ (Colebrook, 2005, p. 1). As Colebrook asserts, Deleuze’s account of action has liberated movement from an external end and what the cinema books affirm, is the idea that events are perceived through their power, rather as a pre-determined image of life. For this reason, we need to ‘confront the power of the virtual’. This aspect manifests, in Colebrook’s opinion, the fact that Deleuze’s philosophy of life is not perceived as a ‘means to an end’, but instead the author perceives the becomings as ‘counter-actualisations’. This is because the ‘world’ already possesses a potential power to become, different from what constitutes it already (ibid.).

To see the Deleuzian ‘intensive repetition’ as a menace to dance embodiment is to undermine the potential of the concept itself, and indicates confusion in the understanding of the difference between actual movement, and that of intensive/virtual movement in dance. In *Both Sitting Duet*, the most interesting focus is, for me, precisely the velocities, rhythm, dissonances, and detours that are taken to their limits, within ‘intensive repetitions’, to the extent where one can no longer perceive ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’ in the relations between movement and sound. In *Both Sitting Duet* one is carried away by a pure sense of rhythm and time, where sound, movement and vision become dissonant and indiscernible, therefore resonating with Deleuze’s pure optical and sound image. To analyse *Both Sitting Duet* through emphasising the ‘self’, extensive repetitions and aspects of gestural gender, as Briginshaw proposes, somehow neglects the aesthetic ‘force’ of the play, even if one can draw from it interesting conclusions in this way. Nevertheless, and going back to what has been previously discussed in the first chapter, one can never perceive an image exclusively as a time-image, but one can certainly ‘feel’ the time-image prevailing. As Deleuze maintains, it is not that the movement-image has disappeared, but that it remains as a first dimension of an image that never stops growing in dimensions (Deleuze, 1997, p. 22). In *Both Sitting Duet*, the complexity of the rhythm and repetitions grows in a direction where it is no longer possible to identify the movement within an action-reaction relationship, or as an exclusive ‘extensive repetition’. The prevailing experience that one comes out with is one of ‘rhythm’ in its most abstract sense. The difference between the rhythm of the gesture and that of sound has become indiscernible. Nevertheless, Briginshaw, towards the end, expresses the essential idea of the play, reinforcing the idea that only difference in itself can be perceived as being affirmative, because it is no longer considered a representation.

I would say for *Both Sitting Duet*, as Deleuze claims for Ideas, that it liberates difference and causes 'it to evolve in positive systems in which different is related to different, making divergence, disparity and decentring so many objects of affirmation which rupture the framework of conceptual representation. (Briginshaw, 2005, p. 20)

In recent years, Deleuze has become profusely referenced either as an inspiration to choreographic work, or as a conceptual tool in dance critiques or dance studies. Sometimes the literal use of Deleuze's vocabulary, which is profoundly imagistic and suggestive, often leads to rash conclusions that are not always very productive, either because they diminish the potential of the concepts themselves, or cause dance to fall into mere representations or metaphors of the concepts. The fact that Deleuze's approach is unequivocally complex, constantly juxtaposing different theories, may also contribute to this confusion, especially when artists deal with the concepts in an intuitive way. In order to grasp the Deleuzian use of specific concepts, one needs to trace back to the philosophers that inspired him. Doing so enables one to understand both the origin of the concepts, as well as the way these concepts have changed through Deleuze's philosophical development. In my opinion, to be able to conduct sound research practice in dance, in combination with a rigorous philosophical approach, one also requires an awareness of what is specific to dance, and constitutes its materiality. This is because, simply illustrating or representing the philosophical concepts would result in fixed and unproductive representations, and as such a total misunderstanding of the way in which Deleuze uses the words 'concept' and 'art'.

In her book, *Relationescapes*, Erin Manning quotes from Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, and leads us directly to the idea that the best way to perceive the relationship between philosophy and movement would be through what she identifies as an 'encounter'. 'Something in the world forces us to think. This something is not an object

of recognition, but a fundamental encounter' (Manning, 2009, p. 1). Manning introduces her book by describing her work in the collaborative project, 'Dancing the virtual' (May 2006, *Sense Lab*). In her book, Manning refers to the work as a 'challenge' that derived from 'the often upheld dichotomy between creation and thought/research' (ibid.). Further, she describes the need that she felt, together with Brian Massumi, to 'think in ways' of achieving its specific aim, 'to produce a platform for speculative pragmatism where what begins technically as movement is immediately a movement of thought' (Manning, 2009, p. 1).

The present research repeatedly addresses this particular aspect, by trying to trace back the Deleuzian concepts and find resonances or juxtapositions without forcing them into the dance practice, knowing from the beginning that, as much as philosophy and dance can help one another think, they nevertheless think differently. Therefore, and most importantly, one should not take the Deleuzian concepts as simple metaphors and be suggestively driven by its literal meaning, as tempting as it might be, or one would lose all sense of proportion and the ability to understand how the processes of thought differ from those of dance. Nonetheless, my statement should not be mistaken for an apologia for Samuel Beckett's famous phrase, 'Dance first. Think later. It's the natural order', as I believe there is no such thing as a Cartesian order of sorts, in the way we dance or think, dance is already thinking.

'Give me a body then': this is the formula of philosophical reversal. The body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself ... It is, on the contrary, that which it plunges into or must plunge into, in order to reach the unthought that is life. Not that

the body thinks, but obstinate and stubborn, it forces us to think, and forces us to think what is conceived from thought, life. (Deleuze, 1997, p. 189)

For Deleuze, it is not that life presents itself before the categories of thought, but instead, 'thought will be thrown into the categories of life' (ibid.). Thus, for him life corresponds exactly to the body postures and its attitudes, meaning that 'we don't even know what a body can do' (ibid.) in all its different manifestations. Thinking is the way we learn through the 'non-thinking body', the body that thinks through movement, through its actions, through its behaviour. This is exactly what Deleuze perceives as a time-image, the attitudes of the body, its postures, which reveal the series of time. The body is not 'present', it is always an agglomeration of time, as it gathers present, past (memory) and an anticipation of the future in its attitudes. 'The attitude of the body relates thought to time as to that outside which is infinitely further than the outside world. Perhaps tiredness is the first and last attitude, because it simultaneously contains the before and the after' (ibid.). Deleuze wanted to put thought into movement, and that is what is revealed in the cinema books, the attempt to change the image in a way that it becomes one with movement. Deleuze and Guatarri's plane of immanence (*plan d'immanence*), is exactly the 'place' where one is no longer able to distinguish thought from movement, because they have become indiscernible from each other.

Deleuze writes in *Difference and Repetition* that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were the philosophers who brought to philosophy new means of expression by introducing it into movement. Hence, as opposed to Hegel, who Deleuze considered as someone who never went beyond abstract logical movement of mediation, in Deleuze's words, 'false movement', because it is a movement that would never overcome representation. In

Deleuze's words, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche wanted to 'put metaphysics in motion' (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 9). They wanted 'metaphysics to act' and simply to propose a new representation of movement would result again in representation. Deleuze stresses that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche's movement is a means of transgressing representation. For them, movement had to have the capacity to affect 'the mind outside of all representation' (ibid.), to substitute signs for 'mediate presentations' to 'invent vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind' (ibid.). The latter constitute, for Deleuze, the idea of the man of theatre, of the visionary director, something that Deleuze finds in the work of Antonin Artaud.

Artaud never understood powerlessness to think as a simple inferiority which would strike us in relation to thought. It is part of thought, so that we should make our way of thinking from it, without claiming to be restoring an all-powerful thought. We should rather make use of this powerlessness to believe in life, and to discover the identity of thought and life ... (Deleuze, 1997, p. 170)

For Deleuze, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have invented an 'equivalent of theatre within philosophy, thereby founding simultaneously this theatre of the future and a new philosophy' (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 9).

4. STRATEGIES OF ENCOUNTER

4.1 THE MOVEMENT RESEARCH

Chapters 4 and 5 offer a detailed account of the practical research I carried out as part of this doctoral project, taking into consideration the previously discussed theoretical framework. An important aim of these chapters is to make clear the idiosyncracies of practice as research, and more specifically to unpack how practice functions as thinking. In these chapters, I have introduced a stylistic change in the text, which is the frequent use of active voice and the pronoun 'I' (as opposed to having predominantly used passive voice in the previous chapters in my discussion of theoretical perspectives). This is because the content here refers primarily to my own choreographic work, which was created as an integral part of this research.

It should be also mentioned that the choice of the active voice in these chapters is more than a question of adopting a clear written style in order to avoid using unnecessarily convoluted sentence structures. Importantly, the shift from passive to active voice intends to remind readers that any attempt to produce written articulations of academic research processes which include artistic practice is highly challenging. Although I argue in this thesis that philosophy/aesthetics and dance can help one another think, it is important to also draw attention to the fact that thought occurs differently in these two areas. To foreground this crucial point, I have sought to discuss the active presence of concepts in the practice by constantly showing that I have avoided using them as metaphors. I have instead focused on the role of thought as embodied process which is integral to the choreographic process, by approaching the relationship between thought and movement as immanent. At this point, it might be useful to draw some connections with the theoretical framework of this research and add that the ways in which I have

approached practice could be understood through the lens of a ‘plane of composition’ in a Deleuzian sense, or according to Erin Manning’s perspective of ‘bodies-in-the-making’ (Manning, 2009, p. 6)⁵².

It is also interesting to mention here how Giles Deleuze ultimately refers to Transcendental empiricism: ‘Empiricism truly becomes transcendental and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible’ (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 68).

The above comment is not intended to provide a justification of the ways in which I undertook choreographic research in this project, but principally to highlight that my choreographic approach resonates strongly with philosophical positions, such as those introduced by Deleuze and Manning, who fully embrace the crucial role of embodied processes.

4.1.1 HOW CAN WE KNOW THE DANCER FROM THE DANCE

The title of this section, taken from the poem ‘Among school children’ (1928) by William Butler Yeats, relates to Claire Colebrook’s essay of the same title in which she undertakes an aesthetic/ethical analysis of the purpose of dance, an analysis that finds resonance with the role of dance in my work. The author puts forward the idea of dance performance not as a ‘style’ that is added to a body, but as the presentation of the body in creation, connecting her rationale with that behind Judith Butler’s notion of the performative (Colebrook, 2005, p. 9). Colebrook suggests that if dance were to liberate

⁵² See chapter three, sections 3.3 and 3.4 where these notions are discussed in detail.

itself from meaning, ‘from essence’, or that which can be perceived as ‘selfhood’, dance would no longer be considered a ‘fragment or instance of action dependent upon a prior potential’. Instead, dance would manifest itself as action, rather than being subdued to the imposition of ‘coming into being’ (ibid).

An acting or doing that creates itself through style and variation: not the variation of a body, but body as nothing more than variation. This possibility is explored in the idea of dance that informs the philosophy, literature, and philosophy of literature of Friedrich Nietzsche, W.B. Yeats, Stéphane Mallarmé, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze. (Colebrook, 2005, p. 9)

During the course of the practical experiments (performances, installation) I developed a conceptual choreographic apparatus in order to rethink the possibilities of choreography or of movement and, in turn, to establish processes of thought in-the-making, or to quote Manning, ‘bodies-in-the-making’ (Manning, 2009, p. 6). My main aim in the studio work was to maintain the focus on the movement, perceived as ‘material’, in order to construct a specific image which would have the potential to provide the audience with a particular experience, in terms of the aforementioned Deleuzian pure optical and sound image, which is capable of directly affecting the senses. Alongside the creation of the different formats, I often altered the movement characteristics or premises, both conceptually, as well as practically, in order to meet the arising ‘necessities’ of the practice itself, which has a logic and a dynamic of its own. Thus movement is not always capable of relating to the set of conceptual apparatus, but depends on all manner of dynamics and problems that arise within practice. The movement of the body had to be perceived as ‘pure materiality’, along with the other materialities that the conceptual apparatus dealt with; the sound, the set, the space, the light, the image, etc. The concept of the ‘functionality’ of the movement should not be confused with the idea that the

dancers were mere executants of pre-choreographed movement. Rather, it was that the parameters given to the dancers to explore their movement were set in relation to the sound, the image, the sensors (*Untitled#1*, #2) or the set (*Eye Height*). This stands in opposition to the idea of the existence of a predefined movement sequence set by a choreographer. This particular approach to the dance aspect within the performance is undoubtedly grounded in my background as a dancer, and in my preference for particular traditions within movement such as Contact Improvisation. In her essay *Dancing Bodies* (Foster, 1997, p. 241) Susan Leigh Foster asserts that dancers integrate the training of their bodies in different techniques with their aesthetic, social and moral beliefs about dance. 'The repertoire of metaphors learned in class functions not only to define the dancer's body but also to establish the epistemological foundation for performing dance' (ibid.). Further, the author affirms that each technique constructs a specialised and a specific body that represents the choreographer's aesthetic vision of dance. To say that my dance does not convey a particular tradition in dance, being 'experimental' and attaining only to the needs or the specificities of the performance, would reflect a lack of consciousness of my own aesthetic/political preferences within dance. In the present research though, it was clear from the beginning that the initial conceptual and choreographic aspects required specific qualities in the movement and in the moving bodies. The first movement experiments carried out by Gouveia and me in the studio (see videos of *Untitled*) served as research into the identification of these qualities. These initial experiments and findings subsequently influenced which specific dancers I chose for the project. It is important to note that the selection of the dancers was based not only on their movement characteristics, but also on their capacities as improvisers and as creative 'decision makers'. The latter finds a correlation in Mathilde Monnier's commentary on the purpose of a dancer's warm up (cited in Apprill, 2012). This depends on the dancer's capacity to enter into a state of self-awareness, or become

conscious of the relation between her/his body and the ‘spirit’⁵³, and to materialise the ‘spirit’ in a physicality that translates a self-vision of her/his own body (ibid.). I would further stress that all collaborations were based, primarily, on the idea of ‘like-minded’ artists or a shared aesthetic/political perspective on performance.

Aesthetic expression can result when a self uses the body as a vehicle for communicating its thoughts and feelings, or when the self merges with the body and articulates its own physical situation. Body and self can also coexist, enunciating their own concerns and commenting on each other’s. Many other relations are also possible, each producing a specific aesthetic impact on the dancer, the dance, and the viewer. (Foster, 1997, p. 241)

Dance historians identify Merce Cunningham (1919–2009) as the choreographer who instigated the ‘turning point’ in choreography, granting dance the possibility of ‘pure abstract movement’, going beyond narrative structure-based choreography. As Gil states, Cunningham created, within his characteristic abstract movement, and his artistic collaborations, what he identifies as a ‘virtual unity’ to his choreographies (Gil, 2001, p. 44). In an interview with Jacqueline Lesschaeve, Cunningham expressed his belief that dance does not need to be narrative or to tell a story, since the body itself, while moving, can only be perceived as being expressive, and for that reason, does not need to superimpose narrative onto movement, ‘... I always feel that movement itself is expressive, regardless of intentions of expressivity, beyond intention’ (Cunningham & Lesschaeve, 1985, p. 105). Cunningham’s choreographic transition aligned itself with the other arts of his time in terms of its abstract compositional aspects. Cunningham’s long-time collaboration with the composer John Cage (1912–1982) definitely

⁵³ I would consider here Monnier’s ‘spirit’ as the virtual elements that constitute the body, such as memories, affects, images, etc. (cited in Apprill, 2012).

contributed to this alignment. Richard Kostelanetz, in his book *The Theatre of Mixed Means* (1968), refers to the term ‘mixed means’ as something that characterises a performance that can be at once music, dance, drama, and kinetic sculpture; as the author affirms, it is ‘an entirely new form that eschews references to any of those arts’ (1968a, p. 39). Despite the fact that, from my perspective, the adjective ‘new’ seems rather circumscribed to western artistic contexts, I have to accept that Kostelanetz’s analysis reflects, nevertheless, a ‘new tendency’ among the avant-garde artists, in the construction of these artistic formats. Kostelanetz adds that John Cage can be considered as the precursor of these formats.

John Cage may be considered by historians the putative father of the mixed-means theatre. For over twenty years his ideas have permeated the consciousness of New York’s artistic community. It was Cage who put together the first truly mixed-means performance in America — an untitled piece performed at Black Mountain College in 1952. (Kostelanetz, 1968a, p. 50)

Foster, who suggests that Cunningham belongs to the third generation of American modern dancers, characterises his movement as a method that presents the physicality of multiple bodies inscribed in complex spatial and temporal patterns. As Foster outlines, Cunningham’s conception of the dancing body ‘fuses’ the body and the ‘self’ by engaging the self in the exclusive task of enhancing its ‘body’s articulacy’ (Foster, 1997, p. 248). Foster’s commentary underlines the differences in the manifestations of the self in the choreographies of Martha Graham and Isadora Duncan. She argues that, contrary to these modern choreographers, in Cunningham’s work the self is constantly drawn upon to lend sophistication to the articulation of movement, as opposed to representing

the dancer's emotional states or the emotional states of the characters in the narrative. This means that the purpose of the body's movement is not to be self-expressive (like Isadora Duncan or Martha Graham), but rather to prepare and to present movement, such as in ballet. 'The self does not use the body for its own expressive purposes as in Graham or Duncan; rather, it dedicates itself, as in ballet, to the craft-like task of preparing and presenting movement' (ibid.).

Foster argues, though, that a difference between ballet and Cunningham's movement needs to be considered. Thus, in contrast to ballet, Cunningham's choreographies are characterised by a radically non-hierarchical emphasis on the dancers' competence, and a distinctive value prevalence and celebration of 'unique physique quirkiness' (ibid.). Foster adds that the particularity of Cunningham's movement is its relation to duration, meter, rhythm and its complex (emphasis given) spatiotemporal relations. 'The basic thing about dancing is the energy, and an amplification of it, which comes through the rhythm, and if you lose that you end up in decoration.' (Cunningham & Lesschaeve, 1985, p. 125) 'If you don't divide a space classically, the space remains more ambiguous and seems larger.' (Ibid., p. 20)

Further, Foster discusses Cunningham's particular relation to the musical composition, characterising this relation as reinforcing the emphasis on the composition and experiments with different tonal and timbral frameworks, independent of the dance. Thus, affirming this independence, and the strong and contrasting relation between the movement and the dance, resulted in the affirmation of the autonomy both of the dance and the music (ibid.). Cunningham explains:

The common denominator between music and dance is time ... [M]y work with John had convinced me that it was possible, even necessary for the dance to stand on its own legs rather than on music, and also that the two arts could exist together using the same amount of time, each in its own way, one for the eye and the kinaesthetic sense, the other for the ear ... I think it is livelier to have more than one activity going on at once, so that the eye and the ear of the spectator are not fixed, but are free to make for each observer his own experience. (Cunningham & Lesschaeve, 1985, p. 147)

In the present research, the latter resonates with the use of strategies that keep the movement and sound composition independent from each other, and the reinforcement of the potential of both. The relation between the movement and the sound differs from that of Cunningham and Cage because in these particular explorations the dancer also operates as a ‘musician’. Dancers fulfil this role by producing sound directly through their movements (*Untitled, Eye Height*) or through the manipulation of the sound being produced by the musicians (*Untitled#1, #2*). This approach makes movement and the musical composition often indiscernible from each other, deliberately creating ‘confusion’ between the visual and the audible. The latter relates to the requirements of the Deleuzian pure optical and sound image and his description of how the viewer experiences the image, meaning, through ‘irrational cuts’.

Contact Improvisation (CI) technique and its principles were considered to be suitable for the movement quality that I sought. The movement had to be particularly sensitive, either to the surfaces in contact (*Untitled, Eye Height*), or to the imposed and complex space/time coordinates. Contact-specific strategies in relation to the use of space, weight, rhythm, and flow, provided me with appropriate tools for a critical understanding and development of these aspects in the different performative formats.

The improvisational structures, its characteristics and rules, are also more easily recognised in CI movement strategies. Nevertheless, the process of collaboration with other artists (Ricardo Jacinto, Nuno Torres, Shiori Usui, Vasco Viana, Vangelis Lympouridis) largely contributed to the production of differently combined strategies or the application of parameters from each artistic discipline (music, visual art, cinema, interaction design). Foster contrasts Contact Improvisation strategies with those of Cunningham as follows: ‘if Cunningham’s body was a jointed one, the body cultivated in contact improvisation is weighted and momentous’ (Foster, 1997, p. 250). Steve Paxton, Nancy Stark Smith, and Lisa Nelson developed Contact Improvisation collaboratively in the early 1970s. Foster identifies CI as being a technique that mainly explores the relation between gravity and the other bodies (ibid.). CI also establishes a particular relation to time, already implicit in Foster’s commentary on duration and flow. It is equally important to note Foster’s identification of CI dancers as choreographic conveyors of a particular aesthetic or political choice in dance. Unlike many other movement and dance techniques, CI is not based on a set of vocabulary or positions to be learned by the dancer (ibid.). The Contact Improvisation dancer learns how to explore, through improvisation, her/his own movement potential, within stylistic and technical rules that characterise CI technique. Paxton summarises that which is implicit in the component words: *Contact*, ‘reading the environment and adapting to its instructions’, and *Improvisation*, ‘observation and willingness to respond’ (Paxton, 2006a)

As Foster stresses, in CI the body is perceived as possessing its own intelligence, which has been ‘obscured’ (emphasis given) by its daily habits. To engage in contact research movement is somehow to rediscover the ‘once’ natural ability of movement perceived within ‘flow’, or to rediscover movement spontaneity, to allow movement to develop

itself through its natural articulations. As Foster describes, rather than producing a series of preconceived forms and movements, the way in which a contact jam or class progresses is by letting the movement ‘happen’. The latter translates a political/ethical dynamic implicit in the class, hence the dynamic of the participant group is considered through a democratic, unpredictable and exclusive physical situation. ‘The dancer’s self becomes immersed in the body’, without being invested in an idea of identity (Foster, 1997, p. 251).

4.1.2 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MOVEMENT IMAGE FROM A TIME IMAGE IN DANCE.

In an interview with Steve Paxton (2006) undertaken through long email communication, I discussed with him what the main movement aspects are that differentiate improvised dance from that in which the dancer interprets a pre-determined set of choreographed movement. We also discussed how these differences in both types of movement affect the resulting experience of the dancer and the audience. I would like to reiterate though that in the present research, the different performance formats were created through structured improvisation techniques. Improvisation is preponderant in my choreographic composition, which is developed through the creation of structures applied to the improvised movement. For this reason, I consider it important to provide the reader with my understanding of the difference between improvisation and more technically choreographed movement, in relation to other authors. This will allow me subsequently to examine the principles behind my movement strategies in more detail and to discuss the purpose of creating them.

Foster and Bergson's⁵⁴ perception of improvised movement reveals the need for a specific 'awareness', or consciousness, on the part of the dancer. This is an awareness that connects more intensively to the virtual aspects of the movement itself or to a consciousness of both an interior as well as an exterior perception (in Bergson's sense). To clarify further the above, I would like to compare some choreographed movement material with that of the improvisational dancer. Paxton affirms that what one can observe in the dancer while she or he executes a set of predefined movements is that she

⁵⁴ Bergson's idea of improvisation is discussed in the first chapter, section 1.3.1.

or he constantly repeats the same vocabulary of movement. Paxton states that these repetitions are always accompanied by different emotions such as happiness, or what he identifies as ‘emotoids’, in other words, conditions that produce an emotional affect, such as fatigue (Paxton, 2006c): ‘Whatever the e-condition, it is intimately woven into the experience of the movement exercises. Then, when performing repertory, the dancer is expected to produce via movements moods suitable for the production’ (ibid.).

As Paxton suggests, any considered emotion is intimately implicit in the movement experience. While executing a predefined set of choreographed steps, the dancer is expected to reproduce through her/his movement the emotions that correspond to it. The reproduction of the emotions associated with each kind of movement lend the movement what Paxton designates as ‘coloration’, which enhances the intensity of the dance while presenting it to an audience.

Paxton asserts that in improvisation, dancers do not necessarily repeat the same movements and if they do, this does not happen in an organised way. They can opt not to represent their emotions, and the consciousness of those emotions would be something like a ‘floating’ consciousness, a sort of abstract sensation, which can differ in scale, perspective, or one might say, visibility. Paxton affirms that here consciousness is minimal or that the consciousness of these sensations would be better described as ‘unconscious realities’ (ibid.).

Paxton argues that if one takes into consideration the execution of choreographed movement, ‘the dancer produces states of mind’ (ibid.) that correspond to time units that are sequentially represented in the dancer’s movement progression in space, or in other words, that accompany the dancer’s steps. The improviser instead has to concentrate

much more on the ‘milliseconds of the recent history of his body’, thus showing the alternation of his emotions, while presenting movement which, in Paxton’s view, are not displayed as fast as in the case of choreographed material. What seems to happen is that in the latter, the changes are predetermined by the time of the presentation. The improviser is not necessarily dependent on a narrative or on the music. Paxton does not suggest that one is less expressive or artistic than the other. Rather, what he refers to is that the former is more identifiable with an ‘artistic construction’, while the latter, because it possesses an immanence to the time of the composition, could eventually be designated as what he refers to as ‘less art’ (ibid.). Paxton’s statement drives us to the conclusion that his use of the term ‘less art’, relates to the fact that in the improvisation, movement does not necessarily derive from conscious intentionality, precedent to the execution of movement. Thus, any existent intentionality in the improvised movement is immanent to it. Manning notes that Gil identifies the plane of immanence with that of the ‘interval’, which populates the dance and ‘makes tangible’ through the dance, the movement’s *modus operandi*. Manning quotes Gil:

To dance is to create immanence through movement: this is why there is no meaning outside of the plane nor outside of the actions of the dancer ... The meaning of movement is the very movement of meaning. (2009, p. 28)

Following the above rationale, and articulating it with the premises of the Deleuzian time-image, one can conclude that improvised movement is more easily identified with a time-image. The dancer, and the audience have the experience of a movement that is being created in the present moment, which corresponds to the moment of its presentation. Thus there is a similar experience of time previously described in relation

to installations by Beuys. The consciousness of the movement and its execution are immanent to each other, happening simultaneously, and it is no longer possible to know which comes first. This type of movement is more easily recognised as being ‘inhabited’ by virtual elements, which are not necessarily visible, but are felt as intensities. The emanation of the movement force is sensed through the continuous disruption of the form by the dancer, in order to always create new forms. It is felt in the dancer’s hesitations, stops, grimaces, while she/he progresses in the ‘resolution’ of the movement and its articulations. The intensification of the virtual elements within the dance (the very small or the invisible) communicates to the audience an experience that goes beyond the visible and would be sensed at the level of affect⁵⁵. Therefore, through making possible the outbreak of a ‘reality’ (in a Deleuzian sense) characterised by a multiplicity in the body movement beyond any possible identity, the body and its movement become a durational materiality, an ‘elasticity’. Manning calls it ‘The Elasticity of the Almost’, and she discusses this as a ‘rare instance’ of an ‘almost-actualization of the micro perceptual within the actual’, where the movement becomes ‘more-than’, gathering in it ‘all of the potential of its pastness and its futurity’ (Manning, 2009, p. 36). The becoming-actual of the elastic corresponds to its virtual becoming, that which demands from our experience the feeling of its affects, and what is felt is ‘the rhythmic sensation of the fullness of movement, beyond its actualization’ (ibid.). Manning adds that the affect opens the dance to an actualisation that cannot be perceived as a mere displacement, but instead as the becoming of the actualisation of a virtual intensity. ‘To remain in the elasticity for as long as possible is the goal — but remaining

⁵⁵ In this respect, the virtual elements in the improvisation are not exclusive to improvisation formats. They are also felt in any execution of choreographed sequences. The difference is that, in improvisation, they are more intensively felt, as the audience does not have the referentiality given by the set of movements, that will confer a logic of some sort to the dance, or a narrative, or a time/space sequence to focus on.

on the edge of virtuality is a challenging task. Sometimes we linger.’ (Manning, 2009, p. 37).

The immanence between the dancer’s consciousness and her/his production of movement is what produces the possibility of the coexistence of virtual/actual images and that which characterises the indiscernibility between what is virtual (memories, thoughts, affects), and what is actual (the visible, movement). As if each actual movement could transport in itself an infinite quantity of virtual elements that makes it progress in time and space, always keeping an element of indeterminacy and uncertainty, which is visible in the dancer’s hesitations, transitions, grimaces, in the very big and the very small things that paradoxically inhabit the dancer’s movement (a gesture, a look, a smile, an hesitation, a momentary disequilibrium). In each actualisation of the virtual, the dancer manifests her/his singularity, her/his difference. To put dance into time involves a passage from virtual to actual, opening the body to a plane of multiplicities, a plane of coexistence between the actual and the virtual. However, if the body actualises itself, it immediately virtualises itself again, giving ‘space’ to new and constant actualisations. As if this *body* is constantly rehearsing its own destruction (reference to the Deleuzian concept of Body Without Organs), in order to rebuild itself afresh. The body is always constructing new forms, or always travelling in the limit of form. The virtualisation allows the constant circulation and actualisation of the multiple virtual bodies that inhabit it and are contained in the body. The virtualisation opens the body to ‘become’. ‘As we move our body, we move not only with the force-form that seems palpable — the interval we create — but also with the multiplicity of virtual bodies that recompose along the plane of immanence of our sensing bodies in movement’ (Gil cited in Manning, 2009, p. 28).

The choreographed movement is more easily identified as a linear presentation, meaning, one movement follows another, and precedes yet another one, and subsequent movements will follow a logic relative to the previous ones. This logic can be understood as narrative, even within a more abstract movement (non-representative), as a kinaesthetic logic corresponding to the movement language previously identified by the audience. The time here is subordinated to action, appearing as if it is organised. The body is always concentrating on the action that follows, depending on a logical succession of a set of movements pre-defined in space and time. A body that dances in this way is not seeking to overcome its own limits, but instead it is concerned with its conservation, or with the display of its technical abilities or virtuosity. This body does not become its full self⁵⁶, but perpetuates a 'useful' image that meets the needs of the choreography as a construction of 'meaning'. This aspect resonates with Foster's identification of the 'hired body' (1997, p. 256). The author gives the example of the 'early modernists', who proclaimed the 'naturalness' of the training of the dancer, but nevertheless 'obscured' the construction of this body, by making it dependent on 'prevailing aesthetic ideals'. Foster asserts that contrary to the body of the early modernists, who promoted the 'body's movement as material substance to be worked into art' (ibid.), and maintained an intense connection to an idea of 'self', the hired body, or the 'multipurpose hired body subsumes and smooths over differences' (ibid.). In this way, as Foster contends, this body is being built 'at a great distance from the self'. The 'hired body' is in Foster's opinion, a pragmatic interpreter of movement or of what is required from it. It does not affirm the existence of a 'true, deep self' (ibid.), but rather

⁵⁶ This relates to the idea that it would be inaccurate to say that 'becoming' does not take place in certain dance movements. What is different is the degree or the intensification of the dancer's becoming, because the movement is no longer dependent on the requirements of the execution of a pre-defined set of movements which conditions its becoming.

creates a relational self, the main effort of which is to empathise and fulfil the body's need for display. 'The hired body likewise threatens to obscure the opportunity, opened to us over this century, to apprehend the body as multiple, protean, and capable, literally, of being made into many different expressive bodies' (ibid.).

4.2 THE STUDIO PRACTICE

4.2.1 INTRODUCTION

When I invited my long-term dance collaborator⁵⁷ into the studio to try something together, I knew almost intuitively that in order to address my philosophical conceptual concerns properly in relation to dance practice, I had to disrupt my choreographic ‘comfort zone’. Until then, my strategies in choreographic composition and my creative practice were characterised by something between dance and theatre. My movement was often supported by text, though not in a linear narrative way, but rather as a support for ‘dance tableaux’, in a poetic and metaphorical way. I had reached a point in my creative practice where I felt that my approach was no longer fruitful. This was something that had already started to become evident during my Master’s research. My work was essentially pictorial (hence the description ‘dance tableaux’), a mixture of a specific display of objects, and colours, punctuated by movement and text. These tableaux were also the result of collaborations with visual artists (in the construction of set and props), which I had done since the beginning of my artistic career. The discomfort that I had started to feel was in relation to the movement’s dependence on text, or even on metaphor itself. I found movement and meaning to be too subordinated to the text, even though this ‘text’ was not necessarily spoken. Nevertheless, ‘text’ was always behind the composition, thus diminishing the potentiality of movement. My discomfort, though, was not in relation to the construction of these pictorial images, but rather in relation to the necessity of overcoming the tendency of this approach to convey specific meanings to the audience. The body’s movement is by essence extremely difficult to perceive beyond any existent meaning or metaphorical reference, since it is always instantly

⁵⁷ I have been working together with Ana Gouveia for over 12 years.

connected to social, political, psychological references. Nancy affirms in his book *Corpus* that all bodies 'are caught up in a network of signification, and that no 'free body' floats beyond sense'. (Nancy, 2008, p. 23)

I say in reply that *sense itself will float, in order to stop or start at its limit*: and that this limit *is the body*, and not as a pure and simple ex-teriority of sense, or as some unknown, intact, untouchable matter ... (such, indeed, is the extreme caricature of 'the sensory' in all idealisms and *materialisms*) — *not then, finally, as 'the body,' but instead as THE BODY OF SENSE.* (Ibid.)

Throughout this research practice, the latter was the most difficult challenge to be addressed, hence the attempt to free the body movement from the above mentioned referential aspects. Obviously, I did not always achieve it, but what is important to understand is that this attempt is one of the main characteristics that led to the chosen choreographic strategies. The compositional structures, juxtaposed with the movement improvisation throughout the different formats, incorporate different rules or parameters that are established in relation to the movement and its articulation with sound, space and time. This results in the progression of movement, which depends not only on the choreographic structures, but also on the articulation of the movement with those structures in relation to its intrinsic needs (problem-solving). In order to escape the tendency towards any thematic contextuality, the starting point of the construction of the image was the idea of a 'landscape', something to be contemplated rather than interpreted.

4.3 UNTITLED

What is important now is to recover our senses. We must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more. Our task is not to find the maximum amount of content in a work of art, much less to squeeze more content out of the work than is already there. Our task is to cut back content so that we can see the thing at all ... In place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art. (Sontag, 1966, p. 14)

4.3.1 FIRST PHASE OF UNTITLED

The first phase of *Untitled* (November–December 2007) corresponded to the research on the ideal vertical level of the body in relation to its distance from the floor, its dynamic and positions. These levels, dynamics and positions were chosen for their efficiency in conveying an experience of the specific visual landscape that I had in mind. The first movement experiments comprised research into the range of possible body heights (e.g., low/floor, medium/waste level, high/stand). The first movement that I encountered, and decided to explore further with Gouveia in all its different facets and potential, was the movement that I named ‘Rocking’⁵⁸. In this movement, the dancer lies on the floor (facing upwards or towards the floor or turned sideways), and tries to find a rhythmic pattern by rocking her/his body. The ‘rocking’ was explored in a durational way⁵⁹,

⁵⁸ See videos of *Untitled*

⁵⁹ Sometimes we did this for hours in order to understand what kind of consequences exhaustion would have for the movement itself or for particular psychological states. The longer we stayed in the movement, the more the movement would progress within a logic of its own, and then surprisingly new movements or different physical or consciousness states would occur. We sometimes did it to the point of nausea, like when we ride in a carousel.

through the positions described above, within its different possible rhythms, velocity, dynamics, intensity, and visual relationships between the dancing bodies and the space. The body could ‘rock’ either in the same space, or through displacing itself across space, by changing its position or by ‘sliding’ across the floor.

In this phase the parameters applied to the relation of the movement to the space were rather simple. The dancer had to be aware of the space occupied in relation to the other dancer and the totality of the performance space in relation to the dance⁶⁰. It was imperative that the position of the body was as low and as close to the floor as possible, somehow occupying a compact ‘horizon line’ between the floor and the above space. This contributed to the creation of a three-layer landscape: the floor, the horizon line, and the space above. Any loss of contact with the floor, or a noticeable separation of the limbs from the rest of the body, immediately resulted in an undesirable narrative to surface⁶¹. The more intense the body contact with the floor the more successful the effect on the ‘weight of the image’ and visual intensification of the floor layer.

The display and distribution of the movement in space, created an infinite image in perspective. The alignment of the bodies in perspective created a much desirable visual confusion in the identification of individual anthropomorphic forms and complicated the recognition of proximity and distance⁶². Later, this particular connection, friction,

⁶⁰ Which was not necessarily the entire space of the studio, often the demarcated space changed size for the different experiments.

⁶¹ The arms and legs had to be close to the body, in order to avoid any extra gestural expressive element to the movement.

⁶² The described work and its objectives were always most easily accomplished with at least three dancers. At this point in the research Marlene Freitas joined us for a short period. Madalena Xavier also

resulting from the close contact with the floor, revealed itself to be fundamental in the production of sound, which partially defined the relationship between dancers and musicians. The ‘*Tromp L’oeil*’ created by the confusion in perspective was also very important, particularly in the *Eye Height* format. ‘Substitution ... the infinite cannot be made into matter but it is possible to create an illusion of the infinite: the image’ (Tarkovsky, 1993, p. 38).

It was necessary for the dancers to avoid, as much as possible, positions directly associated with the activities of daily life, which the movement inherently evoked, such as relaxing, sleeping, sexual activity, etc. The dancers had to explore unusual articulations and contortions of the body, in order to destroy the body’s anthropomorphic characteristics, or to give to the body the quality of plasticine, to make of the body a ‘pure materiality’ for the movement.

By the time Marlene Freitas joined us we were already exploring other movements: rolling, to dislocate more easily and faster through space, twists, spirals, backsliding, and moving by extending and contracting our articular vectors⁶³. The particular attention given to the ‘rocking’ movement relates to the fact that its qualities were extremely productive, because they provided the ground for further exploration of movement material. Rocking can be described as the ‘leitmotiv’ of the movement choices, though this affirmation should not be understood to mean that rocking formed the only or most

participated in the movement research from time to time, stepping into my place. This allowed me to stop dancing, so that I could watch the rehearsal and gain a clearer understanding of the visual consequences of the movement from an outside perspective.

⁶³ These other movements can all be seen on the videos of *Untitled*.

predominant movement, as this happened only at the beginning of the movement research. Nevertheless, the explorations of the characteristics of rocking facilitated the basic qualities, in terms of the movement that I sought. It was later possible to identify movements with similar qualities or to apply, when needed, its qualities to other movements.

The specific qualities that I consider fundamental to ‘rocking’ are:

- It allows the achievement of profound concentration, different states of consciousness.
- It produces real physiologic alterations within the body that augment sensation.
- It communicates a meditative and contemplative state.
- To the viewer, it appears to require no bodily effort, which helps to ‘smooth’ the image and make it contemplative.
- It manifests some primordial movement in the body.
- It imposes and intensifies its image, just like any other incomprehensible object on the landscape.
- It is impossible to perceive its movement sequentially.
- It produces numbness, both in the dancer and in the viewer.
- It constantly produces new forms in an organic way, under a notion of flow without fixing in any specific form.
- It eases the production of non-anthropomorphic forms.

Another main concern that relates to the creation of the image was the way time was used or displayed within the movement. The idea of ‘slowing down time’ discussed in the second chapter, was fundamental to the exploration of the movement progression, its

dynamics, rhythms, velocities and duration. The simple slowing down of the movement was never sufficient to induce a particular experience related to time in the production of the image⁶⁴. The movement always had to disrupt any logical sequence in its transitions, or if sequence was unavoidable, this had to be exhausted through a continuous repetition in order to avoid the surfacing of any logical ‘meaning’. Another aspect regarding the avoidance of narrative, and the creation of a particular relation with time, concerned the establishment of a specific distance⁶⁵ between the viewer and the moving bodies.

The distinctive time running through the shots makes the rhythm of the picture, and rhythm is determined not by the length of the edited pieces, but by the pressure of the time that runs through them. Editing cannot determine rhythm (in this respect it can only be a feature of style); indeed, time courses through the picture despite editing rather than because of it. The course of time, recorded in the frame, is what the director has to catch in the pieces laid out on the editing table. (Tarkovsky, 1993, p. 117)

The Deleuzian cinematic examples of the time-image in *Cinema 2* helped to constantly rethink time strategies in the movement experiments. I often revisited Tati’s *Play Time* (1967), Kiarostami’s *Five* (2003), Tarkovsky’s *Stalker* (1979) and Kubrick’s *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968). In these films I focused on meticulously analysing the camera shots, framing, movement and velocity. The transitions from one image to the other, the distance of the focus in relation to the objects, the length of the shots, etc. Another important reference used in the composition of time and movement, was inspired by the

⁶⁴ Considering the premises of the composition of the pure optical and sound image.

⁶⁵ Difficult as it is to put into words, I would say that the ideal distance is always greater than a comfortable one, something that would provoke ‘blurriness’ in the image. This can be observed in the first video of *Untitled* with the three dancers.

Noh Theatre⁶⁶ strategies, and its non-chronological structures of movement and sound composition (instruments and voice). For example, in Noh, the movement and sound is not determined by an exterior imposed metric, but follows instead a notion of a ‘common breath’ shared by the performers⁶⁷. The dancers/actors, musicians and singers share a specific dynamic, which the Noh master described to me as a wave⁶⁸. It starts slowly, progresses to a crescendo, to be concluded in a decrescendo. The latter is an example of the kind of strategy applied to movements such as the rocking movement. Instead of subordinating the movement to a specific exterior metric, the dancers had to find between them a common movement cadence within the improvisation, and then complexify it, by alternating rhythms in-between this cadence. This particular use of time, provided for an experience of togetherness and unstoppable flow in the movement, and imprinted on the movement a feeling of durational and cyclic time. Under this quality of time, the movement becomes experienced, both by the dancers as well as by the viewers, as a kind of a ‘mantra’ causing numbness or a ‘dreamlike’ state⁶⁹.

⁶⁶ In 2004 I participated in a residence program at Kyoto Art Center (Japan). The programme was based on the teaching of the principles of Noh through practice. This experience provided me with much information that contributed to my understanding of the influence of Eastern artistic performance formats in the work of the American Avant-garde artists, e.g. Cunningham and Cage.

⁶⁷ This is very similar to the notion of flow sharing in Contact Improvisation. I would underline that it is no coincidence that CI was deeply influenced by Aikido (martial art). Paxton affirms that Aikido provided CI with the notion of movement as circular and extended rather than linear and contracted.

⁶⁸ In Noh this particular ‘tempo’ is called the ‘Jo Ha Kyū’, a tripartite structure applied to a wide variety of traditional Japanese arts that reveals a preference for odd numbers. ‘The result is the discovery of beauty in unbalanced harmony and a process for reaching fulfilment’ (Komparu, 1983, p. 25). Komparu suggests that this translates their belief in a special balance between even-earth-man within time, seeing position in space and speed in time as one (ibid.).

⁶⁹ This was easier to be felt in improvisation done over long extended periods of time.

The fact that the studio floor was made of wood made me gradually conscious of the dancers' involuntary production of sound. My sources of inspiration, both theoretical as well as practical (the pure optical and sound image, the films, Noh theatre), also contributed to that awareness. The sound that was being produced was not rich enough to constitute by itself sufficient material to be worked out in a performance, but it was sufficiently present not to be ignored. At the time I attended, on several occasions, the concerts of the experimental music group *Cacto*, with Ricardo Jacinto⁷⁰ (cello) and Nuno Torres (alto saxophone). I found Cacto's work particularly interesting and somehow conforming to the objectives of *Untitled*. Cacto's music is worked out through a minimal exploration of sounds based on improvisational structures. Their use of sound is very 'gestural', sometimes working 'near silence', mostly providing the audience with an experience of sonic landscapes. I invited them to the studio to do some experiments with sound and movement. Immediately the musicians revealed an interest in the sounds involuntarily produced by the movement on the floor. Jacinto, as a visual artist, became also engaged with the particularities of the image that I wanted to produce, and our use of the space. The first experiments were developed through very simple improvised structures⁷¹. The focus was on developing common compositional parameters to be used in the improvisations, whilst respecting each other's characteristic lexicon and independence. The fact that the music was produced acoustically, created from the beginning a much closed connection between the sound and the movement. The 'gestural' encounters between the instruments and the movement were sometimes very desirable and surprising, e.g. the similarities in the breath of the dancers and the saxophone⁷², and at other times, just unproductive, because they caused narrative to

⁷⁰ Jacinto is also a visual artist and an architect.

⁷¹ See *Untitled*, First phase: scores & drawings.

⁷² Torres uses a lot of breathing into the saxophone that does not produce notes. Instead, the sound that is produced comes from the air travelling through the instrument.

arise. The introduction of sound into the work revealed itself to be very challenging, giving it another dimension that enhanced its visual potential as an image. This complicated the choreographic compositional work, providing it, nevertheless, with an all-new set of possible relations and materials to be researched⁷³. I have chosen *Cacto* for their similar non-narrative composition in terms of sound (e.g. their avoidance of melody, or rhythmical sound patterns). Nevertheless, the historical traditional relationship between movement and sound, easily conditioned the irruption of common places in our responsiveness. For instance, it required a conscious effort from the dancers not to be led by the sound in the production of movement. The dancers had a natural tendency to follow either the dynamics or the ‘colours’, or to be too obvious in the relation between sound and silence, e.g. only moving when there was sound, or only when there was silence. This created the early need to complexify⁷⁴ the compositional parameters, and somehow to make us focus on their execution and articulation instead of letting ourselves simply be led by the music⁷⁵. Contrary to what happened before in the movement research, the more structured, short and efficiently designed the exercises were, the easier it was to make progress with the objectives. The long extended periods of improvisation were only used to explore new possibilities in terms of vocabulary⁷⁶. It was interesting to note that because of their experience the musicians were interacting

⁷³ The pure optical and sound image premises become much more accurately addressed with this specific interaction with sound, which required of me a more in-depth exploration of the Deleuzian ‘irrational cut’.

⁷⁴ To ‘complexify’ meant to create multiple combinations in terms of the parameters to be applied to both the movement and the sound, as well as to the relation between the two. Another strategy was to gradually augment the quantity of parameters, so they would not become familiar to us. We had to constantly rethink our choices and possible combinations. Therefore, the structure becomes mutable and unpredictable, because it is dependent on the range of all the other choices and possible combinations in real time.

⁷⁵ Jacques Tati’s *Play Time* provided me with valuable material, which encouraged me to re-think the interdependence of sound and movement in relation to the composition of the image.

⁷⁶ The musicians sometimes used microphones to capture the sounds produced by our bodies, as these were moving on the floor, which encouraged them to think of new possibilities in their vocabulary.

with our production of sound more easily than with the movement itself. These difficulties related to our own artistic experience and educational background, and had to be worked out not only through practical work, but also by verbally and physically explaining to each other the particularities of each others' own material (movement/body and sound/instruments). These conversations often ended up in surprisingly interesting ethical⁷⁷ discussions, regarding movement and sound relations. Resonating far beyond movement and dance, and sometimes, involuntarily providing me with much material to articulate theoretically⁷⁸.

Jacinto and I initially spent some time discussing whether it was necessary to change the disposition of the space of the dance, in relation to the audience, in order to enhance the idea of landscape. Each time we had people observing the rehearsals, they either sat immediately on the floor to watch it, or if they stood, this added a 'bizarre' quality to the experience, both from the performers' point of view, as well as that of the audience. For the videos from this phase of *Untitled*, I placed the camera on the floor, at the level of the dance. This, from my perspective, beyond any practical considerations, reflected already an unconscious preference for a specific image to be conveyed to the viewer. Jacinto and I started to develop this idea further, taking into consideration all the aspects that were conceptually required from the image, and its relation to the practical aspects

⁷⁷ This relates mostly to notions of hierarchy and independence (freedom).

⁷⁸ I find this particularly interesting to note, because I always tried, as much as possible, to translate my theoretical research objectives into material that could be explored through practice (building exercises into the rehearsals). I was convinced that only in specific moments was it necessary to explain to my collaborators the concepts behind my experiments. I wanted to create the possibility for a truly collaborative work, not conditioning the practice to my expectations, but leaving space for decisions which were first discussed together, before being taken. In this way, practice informed theory as much as theory informed practice. In this way, my work became more prolific in the sense that I had to constantly re-think the possible relations and juxtapositions between practice and theory.

that concern the performance. Yasujiro Ozu's 'Tatami Shot'⁷⁹, seemed at the time, an interesting visual resource, to be articulated with the sound and space characteristics of the Noh stage⁸⁰, and to visually engage the audience in a particular way in the performance. François Cheng's analysis of Chinese painting (1991) was also an inspiration for the chosen stage height. The author identifies the different levels, or points of view, that the traditional Chinese painting creates in relation to the viewer⁸¹, and its consequent experience in terms of space and time. These visual strategies resonate, in my opinion, with the Noh visual and architectural strategies, which is not surprising if one considers that both cultures are linked together in their cultural history and aesthetic genesis.

It was difficult to create an ideal position on the floor to the audience. Jacinto suggested that the floor instead should be lifted to meet the correspondent height of a person seated on a chair. This would also solve the already uncomfortable two-layer relative position between musicians and dancers⁸². A long period was required to produce the stage, related to its conceptualisation, sponsorship and building. Though not intending to give up on the idea, I decided together with Jacinto to give it sufficient time to be further developed and thought through.

⁷⁹ This camera shot was invented by Ozu to produce a specific effect in relation to the movement of the characters in his movies, especially connoted with Japanese culture. The camera is placed at a lower height corresponding to the height of a person kneeled on a tatami mat. The camera is fixed at this height, which means the standing characters are 'cut' by the waste. It also produces a very particular effect in relation to the sound, i.e., we might hear them talking but we would not see their faces.

⁸⁰ The Noh stage has similar space characteristics to the space of *Untitled*. Everything happens in front of the audience, adding to it the same possibility that was still open in *Untitled*, which is to see it from the front and sideways. In terms of sound, the Noh stage is an empty wooden box that resonates the sound of the performers when they step on it. This is enhanced by placing empty clay jars inside it, the undersides of which connect directly with the surface.

⁸¹ The paintings often represent views from above, from below, and at eye level.

⁸² See Jacinto's first drawing of the stage: *Untitled*/First phase: scores & drawings.

4.3.2 SECOND PHASE OF UNTITLED

In the second phase of *Untitled* I worked physically and conceptually through the movement material chosen in the first phase (January–February 2008). To be alone in the studio, after an intensive collaboration process, was fundamental to re-adjust the conceptual framework to the practical experiments and to go into the movement material in depth. The studio work comprised exhaustively juxtaposing/exposing the movement to the premises considered fundamental to the creation of the image.

- Efficiency: the minimum use of movement(s) possible in relation to the desired effect in the image.⁸³
- Expressiveness: work the movement in the direction of the least expression possible. To make it ‘neutral’.⁸⁴
- Dynamic: the power imprinted on its execution, which connects also to rhythm, velocity and intensity, but also corresponds to the explorations of specific physical states, and concentration levels, e.g. exhaustion, stillness.
- Rhythm: cadence and tempo consistency, especially in the ‘rocking’, which I explored with the help of a metronome.
- Velocity: corresponds to the exploration of the range of different velocities, in the movements, and also the specific imprinted velocity to the movement’s initiation/finalisation, and or progression.

⁸³ In dance, the expression used is ‘to clean the movement’.

⁸⁴ E.g. I worked extensively on exercising the eye/gaze ‘position’ in relation to the audience, closed, open, focus, unfocused, low, high, etc.

- Intensity: Implies exploration within velocity and force, but it relates more to its synaesthetic aspects.
- Displacement: how the movement, forms, dynamics, etc. progress in space. Experimentation with distance, occupation of space.
- Form: the different possibilities in the body form, considered both in relation to the movement progression, as well as to stillness. As little expressivity in the form as possible, e.g. gestural.
- Image: Analysis of the movement in relation to the body as well as the space. This feedback was mostly given by filming. The camera was placed at the 'dance level' on the floor.
- Effort: working through the idea of as little apparent effort possible in the execution of the movement.

This phase was developed in Edinburgh, and for that reason I needed new musicians to collaborate with. I was given the opportunity to undertake a residency at the music department of the University of Edinburgh. Shiori Usui was a PhD student in composition at Edinburgh University. Usui's work is mostly characterised by improvisational traditions within experimental music, 'noise' and minimalism. Usui was particularly interested at the time in developing work inspired by sounds coming from the exterior and interior body. The fact that Usui was not familiar with the different aspects of dance history required me to further investigate the aforementioned musical traditions and to listen to some material suggested by her. I also provided Usui with dance examples that I considered fundamental to create a parallel between the musical traditions she referred to and their equivalent in terms of dance composition/history. This helped us to find common aspects in our work, and to discuss them further in relation to their respective aesthetic characteristics, as well as to establish common

working strategies. Usui was particularly interested in the philosophical aspects of my composition as she found them resonating with artistic traditions of her culture. Vangelis Lympouridis, a visual artist (sculpture) and a PhD student in interactive sound design at the department of informatics also joined us. Lympouridis was interested in developing collaborative work in the areas of movement and sound, which was the main focus of his research. Lympouridis' background in sculpture helped him to connect instantly with the construction of movement, in relation to the body itself and to the spatial concerns. Lympouridis was aware of the explorations of both the Bauhaus and the American avant-garde artistic collaborations between choreographers, musicians and visual artists, which provided a good starting point for our discussions. Cunningham and Cage's collaboration, which was a shared knowledge between the three of us, contributed also to the creation of a common ground in the discussions. Additionally we had a period in which we consulted and reflected upon materials (visual, sound) from each other's artistic disciplines and analysed them with respect to their practical and aesthetic/theoretical aspects⁸⁵.

The collaboration period was set (April–May 2008); Usui was responsible for the music composition, I was responsible for the movement composition and Lympouridis for the interaction design. The sound consisted of pre-recorded material processed by computer and manipulated in real time by Usui. The same relation that had previously been established acoustically was now electronic. The sound sources corresponded to:

- The sound of a body being scratched or rubbed (pre-recorded).
- Sounds coming from a very primitive, minimal motion (pre-recorded).

⁸⁵ The fact that both Usui and Lympouridis were also engaged in theoretical research through their PhDs may have contributed to a more theory-oriented practice. The need that we all had to generate appropriate feedback for our own individual research required a more intensive focus on each other's objectives, and a bigger compromise in our choices.

- Sounds coming from the body moving on the floor (sound considered to the composition).

The work focused on the potential of the new sound material in relation to movement and the composition premises. I decided to maintain the movement and the choreographic premises used in the first phase, thus to draw my conclusions based on the specificities of the electronic sound, and the implications of its use, in relation to the image⁸⁶. The movements chosen for this phase were:

- Rocking
- Contraction & extension
- Intensity (velocity, dynamic, rhythm)
- Work through positions of stillness in the space

My main concern was to understand the particularities of the electronic experience, in comparison to the acoustic one, and as such my focus was on how to address the new sound through the existent movement. The compositional structures remained more or less the same as the ones used in the acoustic experience.

- The sharing of the same parameters in an independent way.
- First simple and then gradually more complex structures to be applied to the improvisation.

⁸⁶ See videos of this phase. We also experimented with different positions for the camera in relation to the movement: *Untitled*/second phase: AH rehearsal samples; Pleasance rehearsal samples.

- Long-extended periods of free improvisation, to explore new sound vocabulary.

The use of free improvisation, through long-extended periods of time enabled Usui to explore her sound proposal in depth. The fact that I was the only dancer restricted my experience, because I became more dependent on the video feedback in terms of the image being produced. The ‘one-to-one’ relation (one musician, one dancer) changed unequivocally the dynamics of the interaction and resulted in a different experience, inevitably changing the image being produced. Although the contemplative (landscape) experience remained, the landscape gained new contours.

The experience with electronics added a new potential to the research practice, bringing different and prolific sonic elements to the performance, but at the same time the format⁸⁷ through which was explored, subtracted other elements that I consider fundamental to my research practice.

Added:

- A different relation to the sound. A more artificial, ‘cold’ experience in relation to the landscape, making it less narrative⁸⁸.
- A closer correspondence to the body, given its similarity to the pre-recorded sounds.

⁸⁷ Especially the ‘one-to-one’ relationship.

⁸⁸ The element of ‘temperature’ in the image is particularly important; I address this element in detail in the final phase of the *Eye Height* project, i.e., where we end up doing films with these two qualities in the image, cold and warm, dependent on the use of colour.

- A wider range/variety of sound.

Subtracted:

- The ‘intensity’ of the experience diminishes, given fewer variables of interaction (fewer performers), both in relation to sound as well as to movement.
- The complexity diminishes given the lack of proliferation of dialogues and relations. Fewer variables to the composition.
- The absence of the gestural aspect of the acoustic, given by the musicians playing, subtracts also movement aspects from the image as a ‘whole’.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Usui also felt this problem. Lympouridis provided her with a Joystick to manipulate the sound, in order to increase her haptic experience while manipulating the sound.

4.4 UNTITLED#1

4.4.1 FIRST PHASE OF UNTITLED#1

Untitled#1 follows the collaboration with Vangelis Lympouridis in the second phase of *Untitled*. Lympouridis had access to a system of wireless sensor-based tracking devices provided by the School of Informatics at Edinburgh University. The sensors allowed for the manipulation of sound by the dancer's movement in real time, giving to the dancer a particularly interesting freedom of movement, in the sense that, because they were wireless they did not condition the dancer's mobility in space. I found the sensors particularly challenging, as they gave the possibility to further explore the aforementioned gestural empathy between the movement and the acoustic instruments. The interactive new layer, allowed also for more nuanced research into the specificities of the image, providing a deeper insight into the idea of *immanence*, between the sound and the movement, and making the invisible audible through the use of sensors.

Some main initial objectives were kept, in order to allow for a more straight-forward comparison and analysis of the different processes/formats and their implication through the different articulations:

- Narrative: avoid any formal aspect in the movement choices or in the programming that could lead to a specific narrative.
- Time: Avoid Linear/sequential time.

- Space: Consider a specific distribution in space in terms of perspective⁹⁰, although, as part of its feature, the sensors could only ‘read’ the self-referential space of the body.
- Sound/movement relation: To maintain, within the composition, the independence between sound and movement.

The movement had to be completely redesigned in order to work with the sensors on the body. One of the practical implications of the use of sensors was that they did not allow for movement on the floor. I decided in favour of minimal movement to maximum effect in the sound manipulation, as I considered that any movement that was not relevant to the manipulation of the sound would result in mere decoration. The most functional position and minimal use of movement for the intended effect was the stand-up one, with some flections of the arms and torso. Another important element to be considered was the fact that the sensors only identify/relate to the body in a self-referential way, meaning that the sensors did not distinguish between the relative positions of the body in space. The interaction design was done in Max/MSP software. Lympouridis and I conducted exhaustive research (June 2008) into the body’s kinaesthetic aspects⁹¹, in all the possible movement combinations/articulations that were self-referential coordinates of the upper body, to be considered in the coding⁹². This was fundamental to restrict the endless possible parameters to be used in the programming, and to specify the movement articulations/combinations on the sensors body model.

⁹⁰ To keep the idea of landscape.

⁹¹ See image related to the kinaesthetic exploration of the body, orientation, and specific positions of the sensors in the body in *Untitled#1*/first phase: position of the sensors on the body. Self-referential space.

⁹² For this exploration of the movement, it was extremely helpful to use Laban’s kinesphere.

The position of the 5 sensors on the body:

- 2 left arm: arm and forearm
- 2 Right arm: arm and forearm
- 1 chest

The movements identified by the sensors:

Arms right and left

- Elbow angles (flexed or extended)
- Height related to the central axis
- Armpit (height).

Hands

- Distance from palms.

Chest

- The body's inertial/magnetic orientation. Where it was pointing/facing.

Waist

- Circumference movement around the central axis of the body model.
- Upper body flexion or extension, inclined forwards or backwards.

Movement premises:

- Maximum functionality towards an effective manipulation of sound.

- Not to create movement phrases. The progression of the movement was directly dependent on its output in terms of sound.
- Explore all possible combinations of movement into the parts of the readable body (captured by the sensors).
- Explore velocities and amplitudes.
- Using segments (straight lines) of the body so that the musicians and the audience could more clearly identify how the movement was interfering with the sound.

Time premises:

- Avoid sequential, linear time.
- Work with repetition.
- Revisiting past (memories) — this was also allowed in the programming as the movement could retain sounds that were played previously by the musicians.

Space premises:

- Explore different facing possibilities⁹³.

The fact that the sensors could not detect the relative positions of the body in space made us consider the use of cameras to identify real space in the programming. This

⁹³ Later some other sound elements were created in relation to ‘areas of sound’ depending on the orientation of the body. This corresponded to specific elements of sound that were added to the programming parameters, i.e. different sound areas depending on which direction the body was facing to.

identification of real space would then be represented in a video projection of a ‘virtual stage’⁹⁴ that was developed in collaboration with Mike Greer. The virtual stage would show the progression of the movement of the body on it. The idea of the ‘virtual stage’ was based on the drawings that were already being developed in Portugal for the physical stage⁹⁵. This idea was finally abandoned for practical reasons, but I consider it worth mentioning, as I believe it would have given another layer and an interesting complexity to be added to the choreographic composition with respect to its space/time coordinates.

The fact that we were working over distance with the musicians⁹⁶ necessitated the creation of several drawings⁹⁷ to facilitate communication. In parallel, the musicians were developing their own lexicon of sounds according to our information. It was determined that the movement would alter the sound mainly in terms of: volume, pitch, distortion, granulation, reverberation, velocity, repetition, and duration.

⁹⁴ *Untitled#1*/first phase: Mike Greer’s digital stage concept.

⁹⁵ See the first design of the stage developed by Ricardo Jacinto, André Castro and Elysabeth Remelgado: *Eye Height*/Fábrica da Pólvora residency, rehearsals-Drawings.

⁹⁶ The musicians were based in Portugal.

⁹⁷ The use of drawings/scores was a recurring strategy in the collaborative work that, though in place before, from this point on was intensified, and reflected an attempt to facilitate communication and to create a common ground between the different artistic areas.

4.4.2 SECOND PHASE OF UNTITLED#1

The second phase of *Untitled#1* (July 2008) corresponds to my month-long artistic residency at DanceBase and to its public presentation. This phase was developed in collaboration with Vangelis Lympouridis (interaction design), Ricardo Jacinto (cello) and Nuno Torres (saxophone). Once in residence, we initiated a series of rehearsals, to experiment with the set of parameters pre-defined between the movement and the manipulation of sound. The experiments with live sound necessitated readjustments to the programming in order to make the manipulation more efficient in relation to the performance. After discussing the compositional premises thoroughly, it became evident that it was fundamental to the performance that the audience be able to perceive the spatiality of the sound. Pre-recorded sound samples by the musicians were added to the coding relating to the chest sensor, which created different ‘soundscapes’ depending on the body inertial/magnetic orientation⁹⁸. This aspect would eventually enhance the engagement of the audience with the space, as they would be able to identify their position in relation to the sound distribution in the space. In order to relieve the different experiments of the impact of the manipulation of sound and how they were relating to specific aspects such as live music, space/pre-recorded sound and time. The experiments were divided into different ‘exercises’, which were expected to provide the audience with a clearer understanding of the different explorations between the sound, the movement, and the interaction design. The exercises corresponded to different ‘themes’, meaning, to different parameters in the programming, and were time based (10 to 15

⁹⁸ See images of the different areas of sound in the space: *Untitled#1*/second phase: scores and drawings.

minutes in length). The specific exploration in each exercise allowed also for a faster identification and response on the part of the performers during the improvisation.

First exercise

This exercise corresponded to the exploration of the space through the distribution of sound on it. The idea was to create a description/presentation of the space, through the sound, in order to engage the audience with the space. Specific sounds were also attributed to the different spaces occupied by the audience⁹⁹. The sounds corresponded to pre-recorded material in the studio by the musicians (sound samples). The distribution of the sound to a specific space was determined by the body position/facing, which was manipulated by the chest sensor¹⁰⁰. The arm sensors controlled the volume depending on their height in relation to the central axis (body model). The rotation of the body, equilibrium/disequilibrium, in relation to the central axis controlled the reverberation. There were small angles on the lateral space that were silent zones, I could explore these zones in the composition to create silence. The total length of the exercise was pre-determined by the programming. The duration of each transition was to be decided by me, throughout the improvisation. I used a strategy of repetition in order to intensify the different sound/spaces/scapes and to make them recognisable to the audience.

Second exercise

In this exercise the main focus was on the interaction between the performers (dancer, musicians). The space was divided in two: when facing the musicians, the left arm

⁹⁹ This aspect can be perceived in the video, and corresponds to the first part of the video, where the musicians are not playing: see *Untitled#1/second phase-Untitled#1-performance* at DanceBase.

¹⁰⁰ See the space drawings of the DanceBase residency: *Untitled#1/second phase-scores & drawings*.

manipulated the sound produced by the musician on the left (cello) and the right arm manipulated that produced by the musician on the right (saxophone). When facing the audience, I could no longer interact with the sound made by the musicians. With respect to the aforementioned coding of the different sensors on the body, I would alter the sound in terms of volume, pitch, distortion, granulation, reverberation, velocity, repetition, and duration. The movements were very minimal: flexion or raising of the arms, movement of the chest in relation to the central axis, flexion of the torso, and different facing possibilities. Combined they would accumulate the given parameters. The sound travelled through the speakers, changing its origin and progression (panning), and creating different distances in relation to the audience. The musicians were aware of the correspondence of each movement to the specific sound alteration, which allowed them to consciously choose which sound to play in order to produce a specific effect in the improvisation. The main concern at this stage was to avoid a direct correspondence between the movement and the sound (e.g. Mickey Mouse effect). The linearity between the two was very difficult to avoid, as almost all the movements had an immediate influence on the sound, consequently diminishing their individual potential, and the complexity of the composition. This aspect is researched more in depth in *Untitled#2*, where we find strategies to complexify this relation.

Third exercise

The experiments in this exercise concerned mostly the different aspects of time manipulation in the composition: memory, repetition, contraction, extension, etc. The space was still divided in two as in the previous stage (right and left). This time the chest sensor would chose the musician to interact with. The previous parameters were more or less kept, and added to them was a specific coding attributed to the distance between the

palms. The distance between the palms had the possibility to ‘grab’ pieces of sound to be used at a future time in the improvisation, something like sound memories. The sound memory would differ in size, depending on the distance between the palms when captured. These memories would then interact with the sound played by the musicians in real time. By altering the palm distance I could extend and contract the sound memories (the sound was compressed or expanded), consequently altering its characteristics. The chest sensor would allow me to go through the memory, ‘musical phrase’, as if reading it sequentially forward and backwards. The sound memory could be activated endlessly in continuous repetition, and it was my decision to drop it from the improvisation and to pick another one.

For me, this particular exercise made the most ‘rewarding’ use of the composition out of all the exercises because here, what was conceptually implied as virtual elements (in a Deleuzian sense) in terms of time manipulation, suddenly became amazingly audible. The complexity of time in terms of present, past, future, duration, repetition, contraction, extension, overlaps, skips, etc., is no longer a psychological, emotional experience, but becomes a concrete experience through sound.

Fourth exercise

The main idea was to create an improvisational challenge, where the pre-established rules were neither fixed in a sequential order, nor in their duration, as in the previous exercises. The computer applied the programming parameters randomly, travelling from one exercise to the other. The performers had to recognise and respond to the changes through their improvisation. This experience called for an intensification of concentration for the constant alterations and a flexibility and velocity in response.

Untitled#1 was crucial in order to experiment and explore new strategies for the use of the interactive composition. The overwhelming potential of the devices, and the short amount of time that we had to work with them, made the progression of the work difficult and not always efficient in terms of its results. *Untitled#1* allowed many questions to be raised during the process, questions that, though not resolved in *Untitled#1*, were considered significant matters of enquiry to be thought through *Untitled#2*. The undeniable potential of the sensors and its complexity made me reflect in depth on the role of movement in relation to the interaction design and the music. The fact that the sound composition was completely dependent on the movement restricted its freedom. This dependency undermined some choreographic aspects that I consider fundamental to the present research, thus the non-hierarchical strategies and independence of sound and movement. Nevertheless, the manipulation of the sound by the body and its projection through space revealed new dimensions, creating different layers, volumes and perspectives, allowing for a visibility of the invisible, or one might say, an indiscernibility between the two, which resonates with the image qualities that I was pursuing.

Throughout the experience it was possible to foresee different outcomes, dependent on changes in the compositional parameters, in the movement, the sound and the programming. The need to simplify the programming and complexify the relations between the sound and the movement became evident in this process, as the main problem seemed to reside in the preponderance of the interactive aspects that tightened the relationship between the sound and the movement.

4.5 UNTITLED#2

4.5.1 FIRST PHASE OF UNTITLED#2

The first phase consisted of a two-week period of preparation for the residency and the performance of *Untitled#2* (September 2008). This phase was developed in Edinburgh in collaboration with Vangelis Lympouridis and Shiori Usui, and in articulation¹⁰¹ with the musicians, Ricardo Jacinto and Nuno Torres. The research work was characterised by intense discussions and correspondence between the above collaborators. The work focused on the possible new articulations between the different areas, and on the resolution of the compositional problems identified in *Untitled#1*. Usui's participation added two new elements to *Untitled#1*:

- Pre-recorded body sounds by Usui, which were processed by the interactive system. This time the sensors were manipulating this sound, and not that coming from the musicians.
- Live voice sounds by Usui.

The residency/performance was conceived with a different format in mind and had the following participants:

- Dancers: Ana Gouveia, Beatriz Cantinho (sensors), Madalena Xavier.
- Musicians: Nuno Torres (Alto saxophone), Ricardo Jacinto (Cello), Shiori Usui (voice).
- Interaction design: Vangelis Lympouridis.

¹⁰¹ The musicians were based in Portugal.

Drawing on the previous experiences/formats, I was aware of the need to find more efficient strategies to reinforce the independence between the sound and the movement. This time, the live sound was not manipulated, and two of the dancers were not using sensors. The main practical aspects to be reworked through the composition were:

- To explore through the composition, different relationships between the different elements of the performance, in all possible combinations. E.g. movement/movement, movement/space movement/sensors, movement/live music. The music and the programming would follow the same logic.
- To explore different relationships between the performers. e.g. one-to-one, two-to-three, etc.
- To explore different spatial occupations/orientations in relation to the audience. Producing a different visual and audible experience from that of *Untitled#1*, ideally an immersive one¹⁰².

My main focus in the present format was to explore ways of creating different multiple layers in the composition, integrating and articulating all the different elements and at the same time making their relation more complex. This complexification had already been discussed as constituting a strategy initiated in the first phase of *Untitled*. This time though, the complexity escalated, as there were more performative elements to take into consideration. The idea behind was that the layered parameters in the composition, would request, from the performers, more complex real-time decisions. Therefore, presenting to the audience the performer's process of thought, going beyond a mere display of her/his movement and/or sound. The processes of thought become visible, through the performer's real time action/choices and decisions, between the movement

¹⁰² See the different drawings of the space: *Untitled#2*/first phase-Scores/drawings.

and the sound¹⁰³. This aspect is already slightly perceived in any free improvisation, the difference being that here the idea of ‘flow’ and organic progression is substituted by, a ‘sense of struggle’, towards the relations and the articulations imposed on the performer. It is a constant negotiation with the structure itself and between the performers, who have to find their way through it.

4.5.2 SECOND PHASE OF UNTITLED#2

The work consisted of an exclusive movement research period with the dancers in Portugal (September–October 2008). The movement exploration was grounded in the aforementioned necessity to intensify the independence between the movement and the sound through the use of the sensors. Given my previous experience in *Untitled#1*, I considered it fundamental to develop first a consistent choreographic structure, independent of both the music and the interactive design. The movement was developed as a performance ‘on its own’, though encompassing its later articulation with both the music and the sensors. The latter was worked out through the creation of a common movement arrangement for the three dancers. The fact that I was the only dancer using the sensors did not change my movement qualities/characteristics in relation to the other dancers. The underlying idea was that all dancers were potential carriers of the sensors, and the programming had to be developed independently of movement specificities. Exclusive movement relationships between the three dancers were also developed to tighten our connection during the performance and reinforce the movement independence. Contrary to the *Untitled#1* experience, none of the movement that was

¹⁰³ See scores referring to the research on the time/space/programming compositional parameters: *Untitled#2*/first phase-Scores/Drawings.

created was intended to have a direct and specific interaction with the sound. Rather, the focus was on the movement's spatial and time coordinates, dynamics, rhythms, velocities, amplitude, postures, etc., which would later inform the programming¹⁰⁴.

We started with a predefined phrase of movement, which was not choreographically relevant (each dancer created her phrase), to be used as material¹⁰⁵ in the exploration of the different exercises. Through the exercises the accumulation and contamination of each other's movements happened naturally and gradually.

- Repetition: establish different forms of repetition in relation to each other. E.g. creating and disrupting the pre-determined paths, falling into the dynamics and/or directions of the other, recovering your own, etc.
- Memories: Using memories¹⁰⁶, ours (short, long), stolen (short, long). Short/long movement memories in time, by recovering past movements of our own or from the other dancers.
- Time and space: The same movement prolonged in time and space and contracted in these two coordinates. Perspective, pre-determined paths.
- Self-referential space: The movement in a 'body space', the same movement in relation to the different spatial coordinates. Symmetry/asymmetry, within one's own body and between bodies.

¹⁰⁴ See first vertical score for the movement in red: *Untitled#2/second phase-scores & drawings*.

¹⁰⁵ See video of the movement rehearsals: *Untitled#2/second phase-rehearsal sample*.

¹⁰⁶ These *memories* correspond to short or long phrases of improvised movement.

The studio work alone with the dancers allowed for an intense focus on the choreography, in order to identify and resolve any potential subordination of the movement to the musical composition. The intention was to re-establish a non-hierarchical relationship between the different elements of the performance, which I perceive as one of the core values of my research practice.

The movement, although progressing mainly through improvisation, was pre-defined in terms of some specific positions of the body (postures), dynamics, repetitions, and specific paths. The space was designed both in terms of its occupation in relation to the audience, as well as between the dancers. The specific orientations of the body were also pre-defined so they could more easily integrate the programming and the sound composition.

4.5.3 THIRD PHASE OF UNTITLED#2

The residency at *Ponto de Encontro* (Almada/Lisbon. November 2008) was used to conduct rehearsals with the entire group and for the public presentation of the work. This format created a thorough cohabitation of the different elements of the performance, enabling an independence between them. This consequently produced a visual landscape that resonated with the idea of the pure optical and sound image, and in my opinion, the desirable complexity that makes the visual and the sonic intertwine and become indiscernible. The performance space was like an island in space. The audience could view it from two opposite sides, lending a sense of transparency to the performance space. The audience could move, if they wished to, from one side to the other. The musicians were positioned on one side of the island and had a clear view of the

dancers¹⁰⁷. This created the possibility for closer interaction between the movement and the sound. The movement of the dancers provided a kind of a parallel spatial visual score to the musicians. The sound consisted of that played live by the musicians, and the pre-recorded samples activated by the sensors in my body and processed by the computer.

This residency maintained a similar visual landscape to *Untitled*¹⁰⁸, but instead of the landscape being perceived both in terms of layers (height) and perspective, it changed exclusively to notions on perspective. In this way, I worked with the visual idea of profundity, and different ‘vanishing points’ were created by the progression and accumulation of paths executed by the dancers on space. The movement itself was far more sophisticated than that in *Untitled#1*, although it was still necessary to be in a standing position because of the sensors, though more flexions of the legs and torso were added to the movement in relation to *Untitled#1*. The fact that two more sensors were added to the body model (thighs, left and right) also contributed to the analysis and coding of different heights, always self-referential to the body space. Time operations and their display and manipulation in the overall composition were the main objective of all the different elements (movement, sound, interactive design). The proximity between musicians and dancers allowed for direct relationships (conversations, dialogues) during the improvisation. Usui’s voice, an element introduced in this residency, also contributed to the creation of a closer relationship between the bodies of the dancers and the sound. The sounds of her voice carried a profound notion of body noises, which were also the type of pre-recorded samples (sounds of the body processed by the computer —

¹⁰⁷ See video of the performance: *Untitled#2*/third phase-performance.

¹⁰⁸ It is interesting to note that this studio was the same one in which we had developed most of *Untitled*.

breathing, laughing, eating, digestion, etc.) to be manipulated by my movement through the sensors.

The coding of the sensors was done through the identification of specific body postures¹⁰⁹ that would activate the sound samples and alter them depending on the velocity, dynamic and rhythm imprinted on the movement. The electronic sound would progress along with the changing of the postures. The previously established 'stilling' of each other's movement and the coding of all movement postures, resulted in me sonifying their postures, in the same way that my postures would become silent in their body. The musicians could then relate to both our drawing in space as well as to our postures, as they carried a particular sound colouration in it. The movement itself constituted a visual score to the musicians, meaning that they were able, through observing our movements, to understand and anticipate the choreographic influence on the sound (electronic), thus augmenting their range of responses through their improvisation.

The complexity of the common score¹¹⁰, based on the multiple rules to be dealt with through the improvisation, demanded especially of the dancers, exhaustive attention to their real-time choices. The dancer's real time decisions could not conflict with the predetermined structure in terms of space, movement, sound and programming. The multiplicity of the performative elements and their constant changes, made the dance become a visible process of choice and decision-making. The dancers had to be fully

¹⁰⁹ See examples of what I call 'postures', which correspond to specific positions of the body that inform the system, a combination of movement coordinates identified by the body model: *Untitled#2/third phase*-Gouveia and Xavier postures recognition by the sensors.

¹¹⁰ See the three different final movement scores: *Untitled#2/third phase*. Scores & drawings-Final movement score

*Choreographing thought: movement as an image of thought, seen through the Deleuzian
Pure Optical and Sound Image.*

aware of their movement choices at each instant so as not to disrupt the structure's functionality (rules, sound, programming). The movement became a 'language' to communicate and constantly negotiate with the other performers (musicians and dancers), because the movements were 'readable', through their pathways, form (posture), velocities, and dynamics, by the other performers as well as by the system.

5. CHOREOGRAPHING LANDSCAPES

5.1 EYE HEIGHT

Eye Height performance is a choreography that activates a scenographic/instrumental object. This object is a 'stage instrument' of six meters squared, made from nine wooden modules, with an undulated variable surface, forty to seventy-five centimeter in thickness. Dancers perform movement on the surface of this object, which behaves as a resonance box for sounds that are created by the friction and percussion of moving bodies on its surface. The vibration induced by the dancers activates nine sets of tuned piano strings inside the stage instrument. *Eye Height* creates an extensive landscape of performers (dancers and musicians), audience, and space. As suggested by the title, the spectator's eye is at the same height as the stage-set. The landscape is perceived in layers, and thus creates a visual depth. The sound produced by the dancers interacts with the live music. Dancers and musicians share the same music/dance score.

5.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The *Eye Height* project is part of the sequence of practice-based research developed in *Untitled*. In November 2009 the project successfully acquired sufficient resources and we developed the initial idea for the set. The development of the stage (set) initiated by the design team was put under way by the construction team¹¹¹, and consistently accompanied the development of the movement and sound research. This parallel development of the construction and the movement/sound composition relates to the high costs involved in the production of the stage, and the professionals involved (dancers, musicians, technicians, production, etc.). The construction of the stage had to be continuously tested, to guarantee that both the construction materials and the design were adequate for the intended explorations and the overall objectives. For this reason, we started to test the movement on one module first, then on three, six and finally on nine modules. The construction was continuously adapted to respond to the newly arising problems and necessities found throughout the rehearsals.

The introduction of the set (stage) in the process necessitated a reconfiguration of the movement compositional strategies developed in *Untitled*. The compositional processes explored in *Untitled#1* and *Untitled#2* were valuable contributions to this reconfiguration, augmenting my awareness in terms of the fundamental characteristics that distinguished the two different interactive mediums: the digital (sensors), and the mechanic (the set/stage). The initial idea of the dancer as a musician was intensified, in

¹¹¹ The stage team: Ricardo Jacinto (conception); André Castro e Elysabeth Remelgado (project development); Tomás Viana, Ricardo Jacinto, Nuno Torres (construction).

comparison with the previous formats, because the sound reactivity of the stage and the non-existence of an intermediary (sensors) augmented the dancer's responsibility in the music making.

The multiplication of the performative elements called for a piece of work not exclusively centred in the movement, but somehow one that extended and transversely translated the movement premises into all aspects of the performance, e.g. the stage, the costumes, the light, the space, the image, etc. My conceptual approach was to extend and make the performance resonate a common compositional movement idea. The aim was the construction of an image that overran it and that would be capable of producing a particular experience for the audience. This relates to the previously discussed Deleuzian 'powerlessness', an independent, yet connected (irrational cut) relation between the visual and the audible. It established a non-hierarchical, non-linear relationship between the different aspects that constituted the performance.

Eye Height was developed in different performative formats (different performances and installation). Each format was directly dependent on and adapted to each performative space. Therefore, changing not only in its content (movement and sound organisation), but also in the setting, meaning, configuration (i.e. one-sided or two-sided performance), and distance in relation to the audience/stage. Although eye level was maintained throughout all performances, this height changed slightly to adapt to distances, or in the case of the installation, to create a deeper engagement of the audience with the movement.

5.1.2 FÁBRICA DA PÓLVORA RESIDENCY

As difficult as it is to divide the process into movement, sound, image, etc., as I do in the following discussion of the process, I do so in order to provide to the reader with a clear understanding of the different aspects of the research process. Even though the different aspects are singled out here, in practice they are intricate and deeply dependent on each other.

5.1.2.1 MOVEMENT/IMAGE

The first rehearsals mainly concerned the exploration between the possibilities of the movement in relation to the construction of the stage. It was necessary first to explore through movement (one dancer/one module)¹¹², in order to be able to evaluate the appropriateness of the materials and the construction design. The small dimensions of the single model were not ideal for the sophistication of the movement, but permitted an anticipation of the movement and the sound possibilities, and enabled us to adapt the construction to it. It was necessary to evaluate the ‘ease’ of the movement progression on the wooden surface, and to plan future necessities in terms of sound: on how to place the strings underneath it, and the kind of treatment (finishing) to be applied to the surface of the stage, in order to enhance the production of sound and its effect (e.g. percussion, friction, etc.)¹¹³.

¹¹² See pictures of experiments in one module: *Fábrica da Pólvora residency*/photographs-Fábrica da Pólvora stage construction (SC. 1-6)

¹¹³ See Eye height making of video: *Fábrica da Pólvora residency*: rehearsals- making of Eye Height.

The choreographic composition started when the three modules were in place. Only then was it possible to have a clear understanding of the stage topography, meaning its undulation and its implications in terms of the progression of the movement on the surface, and the consequent visual effect. I started by developing the eye height perspective; I positioned the camera at the audience's point of view and developed visually the movement towards the intended effect on the image¹¹⁴. This work, done in close collaboration with Jacinto, translates the articulation of our different backgrounds, and resulted in what I consider to be one of the most interesting and successful aspects of the *Eye Height* project: an original visual work that clearly translates conceptually the articulation of the two different areas, and reflects the contemporary aesthetic concerns related to both artistic fields.

The experience of the *Untitled* process made me recognise the need to have greater diversity in the bodies of the dancers, that is, the need to look for dancers with different physical and visual movement characteristics, whose collaboration would consequently effect a different production of sound on the surface.¹¹⁵ I looked for bodies that could express a singularity in relation to the group, in order to diversify the overall image, and to create different visual forms/contours and sizes on the surface. I invited Filipe Jacome, a very tall male dancer with a particular energy to his movement (strong and smooth at the same time). The long vectors of Jacome's limbs immediately created different visual effects, his weight also had a different sound effect on the stage. The

¹¹⁴ See picture of the eye height view: *Fábrica da Pólvora* residency-photographs: *Fábrica da Pólvora* points of view (PV.1 - 6).

¹¹⁵ This relates to the fact that in *Untitled* both Gouveia and I are very similar in our movement.

other dancer to join was Francesca Bertozzi, a very light dancer with more angular movement characteristics than me.

The stage design presents two different topographic elements, which completely change the perspective of the movement. The different topographies are organised two-by-two (opposite to each other); one gives a clear view of the moving bodies¹¹⁶, and the other generates the illusion in perspective¹¹⁷. The side views available to the audience create a graphic and an optical illusion (*trompe l'oeil*) in perspective, where the bodies' forms are not clear because of the different levels, or if the bodies are aligned or over-positioned in perspective, this might create 'monstrous bodies'. This 'monstrous' effect on the body is also the result of the exploration of non-anthropomorphic forms in the bodies, and of the specific attention given to the position of the face, for example, by hiding it or by avoiding eye contact with the audience, etc. By the time that the six modules were in place, it was possible to conduct in-depth research into the spatial distribution, the progression of the movement on the topographic characteristics of the surface, and to increase the sophistication of the optical illusions. The choreographic work was developed with the help of the video by creating three different points of view that allowed three different types of choreographic work.

¹¹⁶ See videos of the rehearsals. The side views of the stage seen in the videos are those that I used to view the movement in detail and to correct it; the audience does not have access to this sides: *Fábrica da Pólvora residency*, rehearsals: side view of the stage.

¹¹⁷ The eye height point of view. These sides are the ones used to create the visual/graphic illusions for the performance.

- Audience point of view¹¹⁸: to work on the final intended image, particularly with respect to the perception of the movement in perspective and optical illusion. A more graphic perspective.
- Lateral view: to correct and perfect the movement details and its progression (displacement) on the surface.
- Aerial view¹¹⁹: to work on the spatial distribution and progression of the movement.

The main aspects of the movement research production:

- Exploration and adaptation to the stage. Development of the efficiency of the movement findings in *Untitled*: rocking, sliding, rolling, moving by contraction and extension of the body parts, poses, non-anthropomorphic forms, and displacement of the body on the surface.
- Research into the possibilities of the progression of the movement on the structure, given its topographic characteristics and spatial design. Explore the movement using the spatial limits of the structure based on the idea of rupturing the spatial framework in order to develop a sense of risk and tension¹²⁰.
- Enhance the contact with the surface to avoid any visual detachment from the surface, and to smoothen the body contact with the topographic characteristics (undulation). Initiate the movement with the body centre so that there is less requirement for the use of the arms and legs; this also helps to lower the body and keep the contact with the surface.

¹¹⁸ Eye Height point of view.

¹¹⁹ See video of the aerial view: *Fábrica da Pólvora residency*, rehearsals: aerial view of the stage.

¹²⁰ Intensifying the idea of the movement beyond the frame.

- Explore different velocities, dynamics and rhythms in the movement progression, changing the body weight on the surface, consequently changing its percussive impact, friction, etc.
- Creating visual ensembles with the bodies or individual figures. E.g. moving alone, moving together, group postures, individual postures. This results in different visual forms/contours, in which the body's anthropomorphic form is either identified or confusing in its contours.
- An intensive exploration of the facial expression (had to be neutral). The direction of the gaze and the level of the eyes. The best position of the eyes was slightly down and directed towards the limits of the stage, in order to concentrate the attention of the audience on the spatial limits of the structure. It was also important not to allow the eyes to be closed¹²¹ or to enter into direct contact with the audience in order to enhance the focus of the audience on the relation between the movement and the structure.
- Development of a common energy (e.g. breath) between the bodies, so that the differences, and the very small details, when required, are intensified and noticeable.
- Research into the different tensions of the image; this relates to the distribution of the bodies in space and in the image layers in relation to the surface, e.g. closer/adherent (heavy), more detached (light).
- Research into the different movement characteristics in relation to the visual effect¹²², the 'compactness' of the self-referential body and the different

¹²¹ If the eyes were closed, the 'presence' of the body would either disappear or lead to a narrative of some sort.

¹²² This aspect is translated in the scores in the abstract geometric figures that correspond to the different types of movement.

relationships between the bodies. e.g. smooth and organic, angular movements, strong, staccato, fast, slow, etc.

- In relation to the overall image, an exhaustive task of avoiding narrative. For example, the fact that the dancers were now one male and two females required painstaking attention to be paid to the arising narrative connections between the bodies, proximities, distances, ensembles, facial expression, eye contact, etc.

5.1.2.2 MOVEMENT/SOUND

As previously mentioned, the movement research is deeply connected to the role of sound in the structure; there is no single movement, which does not interact with the musical composition as a 'whole'. The choreography and the music composition are developed in parallel and are unequivocally interdependent. The experience of *Untitled#2* enhanced my awareness of the necessity of a two-way relationship between the sound and the movement. Through the conscious awareness of their direct correlation, it was possible to develop strategies that avoided the emergence of hierarchical relationships and that further developed their independence. For this reason, the movement had to attend to the aesthetic objectives and strategies required from the musical composition, to the same extent that the musical composition had to take into consideration the image of the movement and its visual specificities and incorporate its subsequent sound.

The development of the stage as an instrument happened gradually, throughout the entire process¹²³. First, we explored the sound of the movement on the surface without the strings underneath it. Meaning, the explorations related to the sound potential of the surface and to the wooden box resonance¹²⁴: friction and percussive sounds were further developed with the gradual placement of the piano strings underneath the stage. Contact microphones were placed underneath the structure, close to the piano strings to augment the volume of their resonance. Some of the sounds produced by the dancers are a natural consequence of the intended image for the movement, thus the sounds produced by the body displacement on the surface that correspond to different ‘sound textures’, e.g., continuous/intermittent, heavy/light, fast/slow, sliding, stomping of the body parts, etc. These movements corresponded to particular musical textures that were covered by sounds produced by the musicians. These music textures produced live by the musicians, either enhance the sound of the movement by miming it, or silence it by masking them with contrasting textures, and/or different volumes, pitch, rhythm, dynamics, etc.

The musicians suggested other sounds to create ‘remarkable elements’ in the composition, and to further explore direct and intentional interactions between the dancers and the musicians (e.g. dialogues which are either concordant or dissonant; one-to-one, one-to-two, etc.):

¹²³ The sound potential of the stage is still being developed. Jacinto is continuously working on ways to increase the sound impact of the stage in the performance.

¹²⁴ Because of the resonance of the empty wooden box, the stage itself, without the strings, also has some potential as a source for sound extraction.

- Percussive sounds made with the body articulations, e.g. elbows, knees, heels, shoulders and hips.
- Percussive sounds made with the hands, such as tapping with the fingers, using the finger bones to percuss the surface, to smack the surface with the palm of the hand¹²⁵, smack with the fist, punch.
- Friction sounds with parts of the body, (e.g. hands, nails and fingers); the more pressure applied to the surface, the more acute the sound becomes.

Once the movement and sound lexicon was established, we started rehearsing with different improvisational movement/musical structures, working towards the public presentation. We created rules and parameters to be applied to the improvisation, common compositional scores that intensified the non-dependent, non-hierarchical, non-linear relationships between the movement and the music. We also developed an interconnected relationship between the sound and the movement, and at the same time an awareness of and efficacy with respect to the use and exact placement of dissonant relationships and specific performative ‘roles’. This related to the need to free the improvisation from purely intuitive approaches, individual habits, and/or common places that could eventually result in a caricatured relationship between the sound and the movement.

5.1.2.3 MOVEMENT/COSTUMES

The research into the costume materials, colours and design was also done in tandem with the compositional work of both the sound and the movement¹²⁶. Nogueira, would

¹²⁵ The different shape of the palm would produce a different sound, also the different attack and force applied.

¹²⁶ Different movement tests were made with different prototypes and textiles.

be present in the rehearsals, and discuss with us both the costumes' intended visual effect in relation to the image produced by the movement, as well as their capacity to underline and augment the body's sound on the surface of the stage¹²⁷. The main requirements in their design and manufacture were that they were to:

- Contribute to the creation of non-anthropomorphic figures. This was done through their irregular shapes and colour. Each dancer had a different shaped costume in order to enhance the singularity of her/his movement.
- Help in the body's contact/friction with the surface in order to enhance the sound production. This aspect resulted in a series of compromises, related to the simultaneous need for the costumes to provoke friction on the surface without disrupting the movement's fluidity in its progression.
- Develop particular details either to reveal the body shapes and surfaces (e.g. direct contact with the skin would provoke different sounds), or to cover them. This aspect relates also to the aforementioned creation of particular forms/contours on the individual body and on the ensemble.
- Enhance the sound through the use of the textiles, and create small details on the costume that could produce unexpected odd sounds. Nogueira used small details with different textiles, mostly applied to the body's articulations that produced acute frictional sounds.

¹²⁷ See costume drawings: Eye Height *Fábrica da Pólvora* residency/drawings-costume sample (1,2)

5.1.2.4 MOVEMENT/LIGHT

After several experiments with different light settings, we opted for a single projector, normally used in photography that has an incorporated flash option. The set/stage and its central importance to the image in the performance, called for careful attention to be paid to its sculptural characteristics. It was necessary to create a very subtle and detailed illumination that could heighten the stage's undulating topography, contours, limits, texture, colour, etc. The fact that the audience is placed on two opposite sides also required detailed attention to be paid to the resultant shadows of the bodies while moving. Additionally, it was also necessary to enhance the bodies' shapes, contours, etc., as crucial integrant elements of the sculptural object as a 'whole'.

The vertically oriented single projector assisted in the creation of desired visual effects; it was used to perform the following functions:

- Heighten the sculptural characteristics of the stage; having a similar illumination to that which would commonly be used in a gallery space.
- Create a homogenous and unchangeable light throughout the performance.
- Create a sense of intimacy for the performance.
- Explore the desired temperature of the image (warm) in relation to the colours of the different performative elements: stage, costumes.
- End the performance with an abrupt black out using the incorporated flash. We invited the visual artist/photographer, André Malhão to create a 'visual narrative'

for the project. The flash at the end was used to create the last instant picture of the performance¹²⁸.

The Fábrica da Pólvora residency resulted in two similar public presentations¹²⁹ where the movement and sound composition experiences were divided into different movement/sound themes. The themes corresponded to either the exclusive exploration of a single movement in continuum (durational) and its resulting textural sound (rocking, sliding), or to intermittent sounds, created through different combinations of movements (organic, percussive, etc.) that produced a wider range of sounds and consciously interacted with the live music. The line-up given to the themes, meaning, its organisation, took into consideration the intended evolution of the image during the course of the performance. Thus, the distribution in time of specific energies, dynamics, rhythms, and durations, punctuated with remarkable moments (big and small), contrasting with more placid and meditative themes that induce dream-like states in the performance.

¹²⁸ See collection of last instant pictures of the performances: *Fábrica da Pólvora residency*/photographs-final photos.

¹²⁹ The difference between the two corresponds mostly to the development of the sound potential of the stage.

Thematic line-up¹³⁰:

- Organic: presenting the structure as a landscape, with very few movements. Individual static postures (forms), or ensemble ones, creating strange contours/forms, ‘bizarre bodies’, worked through the visual topography of the stage, playing with optical illusions created by the body positions on the undulated surface. This process gradually created different dynamics in the progression of the movement on the surface, and this was always done through organic movements, in other words, smooth articular movements (slow, fast, attack, slow motion, etc.). First, the sound comes only from the displacement of the dancers’ bodies, in a very subtle way and with the prevalence of silence. The music enters gradually into the landscape and creates very subtle soundscapes that are distributed through the space. From time to time musicians and dancers interact with each other subtly and paying special attention to the prevalence of silence.
- Sliding: A single position, the body lies on the surface facing up, the bent legs enable the feet to make the body move. Visually, this image establishes a more angular and graphic position at the audience’s eye level. It’s a durational movement that keeps the pace throughout its progression. It creates paths on the surface, working mostly on the limits of the stage. The bodies either move alone or as a group placed side by side. The sound produced by the bodies on the surface is like a continuous sound of ‘moving sand’. This texture is either underlined by the musicians with similar sounds or masked with contrasting

¹³⁰ See video of the performance at Fábrica da Pólvora: *Fábrica da Pólvora residency*, performance-Eye Height performance at Fábrica da Pólvora.

textures, with different rhythms, dynamics, etc. This theme creates a sort of audible and calm visual 'numbness' in the viewer, evoking a dream-like state.

- **Rocking:** This movement corresponds to the one explored in *Untitled*, and uses a similar strategy in terms of time and sound described in the sliding. The difference being that instead of a calm feeling, it transmits a sort of anxiety through its intensive repetitive and aggressive sound and movement characteristics. Contrary to the experience of the rocking in *Untitled*, and because the undulated surface complicates the progression of the movement on the surface, the movement here gains a sense of 'struggle' between the bodies and the structure in contact. The musicians gradually introduce an acute sharp repetitive sound building to a crescendo that contributes to this disturbing experience.
- **Percussive:** This theme, explores the depth of the structure (reverberation), through the use of either strong-impact percussive sounds (palm smack) that make the strings vibrate, or smaller, sharper aggressive percussive and friction sounds that depend on hard strikes on the stage instrument. The body and the movement are 'broken' and intermittent, using the body parts and articulations, to percuss sounds on the surface (bones). The abrupt turns of the entire body also help to create abrupt sounds and visual twists. The relationship with the musicians consists of musical punctuations and dialogues between the performers, which are either underlining their movement/sound qualities or disrupting it. The musicians also mask the dislocation movement, with sounds that could smooth/interrupt the intended soundscape.

In the two following presentations, and due to space limitations, it was not possible to position the audience on two opposite sides. The Portimão Theatre performance was the first to have this two-sided setting, but the performance had originally been conceived and created with the two-sided stage configuration in mind. In the last performance of this ‘thematic line-up’ in Teatro Praga, and because of the colour of the space (white), Jacinto and I started to come up with visual and conceptual ideas for the film and its possible range of colours/temperatures.

5.1.3 FUNDIÇÃO DE OEIRAS

There is not enough of nothing in it.

John Cage

The above quote translates, to some extent, my perception of the *Eye Height* performance at this particular stage with respect to compositional strategies. The main compositional structure ‘thematic line-up’ conferred an exaggerated programmatic content and format to the performance. After several public presentations with this ‘thematic line-up’, the performers’ response in the improvisation had become too predictable. This had to do with their familiarity with the overall structure, and the discovery of optimised responses that one feels secure with as a performer¹³¹. This aspect, in my opinion, is not something that characterised this specific experience. Rather, it is something that happens frequently, when improvising with the same

¹³¹ I also felt that as a performer.

improvised structures repeatedly. The main improvisational structure, or the ‘thematic line-up’ had to be disrupted and/or sophisticated, so that the ‘indiscernible’ and the ‘unpredictable’, could again happen in the performance. I felt the need to ‘inflict’ the main structure, with consistent and yet coherent disruptions, in the sense that chaos would not take control of it. The latter is a very important aspect of the present practice; because the image is so dependent on a dynamic relationship between the sound and the movement, there is no possibility of neglecting it, or of their relation being left to ‘pure chance’. First and foremost was the task of erasing any pre-defined structures, at least partially¹³², and imposing numerous little incongruences and disturbances (parameters, rules, instructions, etc.) on the composition. If any structure was to surface, it should happen as a consequence of the actions and the negotiations required of the improvisers. This represents a different approach from the previous process. Instead of the multiplication and over-positioning of structures, the performer ends up with a set of rules and parameters that are interdependent on all the different aspects of the performance. The action corresponds to the thinking and the thinking reflects the ways in which the performer is able to negotiate, both in relation to the requirements of the performance itself and in relation to the other performers. This is a freer and yet more responsible form of improvisation. This approach nevertheless necessitated the consistent incorporation of the specificities of the movement, the sound and the image created through the previous line-ups. This introduced an incorporation of the ‘language’ of the performance and a greater awareness on the part of the dancers of their production of sound. Only then, could we be freer and more detailed in our relationship with the

¹³² The term ‘partially’ relates to the idea that some thematic elements were maintained, as they were very efficient in terms of lending the image particular qualities that I consider fundamental, i.e. specific states (meditative, dream-like, visual and audible disturbing, etc.). The movement images, i.e. themes to be kept, were the sliding and the rocking, which were no longer organised in a sequence but dependent on the dancers’ spontaneous choices, or identification of an opportunity to make use of them (this always had to be done by an encounter in the group).

music. The audible training gained throughout the working process also contributed to that.

Some examples of parameters and/or rules:

- Empty the space to make the molecular appear.
- Work on presence. This relates to the ‘states’ that the performers are in during the performance: not expressive, not tired, not restless, etc.
- Attention to the position and direction of the eyes.
- Listen and look.
- Create silences, visual and audible ones.
- Articulate your silences with the others, punctuate the silence with sounds and movements (big/very small, slow/fast, etc.).
- Create movement and sound dialogues, consonant, dissonant, harmonious, disruptive.
- Keep awareness of the consequent exterior image, in terms of spatial progression and the exterior visual effect.
- Occupy/intensify specific places on the surface (the scores created zones of intensification and possible paths)¹³³.
- If copying sounds or movements, be conscious where and when in the composition, relate them to the other performers’ actions, sounds.
- Create sharp unpredictable and remarkable sounds, pay attention to where to position them in the space and in the sound composition.
- The topography of the stage meets the body contours. See how your body shapes adapt to the surface of stage (undulation, levels, height)

¹³³ See Fundação de Oeiras, rehearsals, drawings: Fundação de Oeiras scores & drawings.

- Extend time with your movement. Allow time to disrupt the physicality of your body. Play with temporal diversity, e.g. memories of movements and sounds, etc.
- Breathing together, feel the common breathing and the constant pulsation of the different materials.
- Be efficient and economic in the use of movement and sound.

The rehearsals were always followed by a review of the audio and visual recordings¹³⁴, in order to constantly adapt the rules and parameters to the newly arisen necessities or problems. Some specific spatial occupation coordinates were given, and different moments concerning movement and sound characteristics/energies. The changes from one specific exploration to the other were not pre-determined and happened gradually and organically throughout the performance and were the result of the constant ‘negotiations’ between the performers. The Fundação de Oeiras space is very big which created a very good, visual and acoustic setting for the performance, giving the possibility of exploring the two sides of the stage and the ideal distances from it, allowing for the perfect eye height point of view.

¹³⁴ From the beginning, we were assisted both in the rehearsals as well as in the performances by a sound technician, Pedro Magalhães, a perfectionist of sound capture and spatial acoustics. For that reason we had the opportunity to listen to the sound in isolation, not just through the video, which besides having a higher quality, gave us a deeper insight into the particularities of the sound production independent of the image.

5.2 EYE HEIGHT INSTALLATION

5.2.1 A CINEMATIC PERSPECTIVE

Cinematography is a writing with images in movement and with sounds.

Dig into your sensation. Look at what there is within. Don't analyze it with words. Translate into sister images, into equivalent sounds. The clearer it is, the more your style affirms itself (style: whatever is not technique).

Robert Bresson

Untitled revealed from the start a close connection to a cinematographic image of dance, through the way the camera was intuitively positioned in the rehearsals, creating a single large and distant 'shot' of a landscape. Additionally, my enthusiasm for cinema gave me the impetus to conduct research into the implicit aesthetic concerns related to the films of my choice. The Deleuzian cinema books helped me to develop my understanding not only in relation to the particular aesthetic concepts implicit in a particular cinematographic approach to cinema (contemplative cinema), but constituted also a guiding light to the resonance of these concepts in cinema making. The filmographies¹³⁵ and testimonies of directors such as Bresson, Tarkovsky, Kiarostami, Godard, among others, were fundamental to understanding the practice itself and its particularities that go far beyond a mere conceptual perspective.

¹³⁵ See filmography in the bibliography.

5.2.2 THE EYE HEIGHT FILM

In their feedback to the public presentations, the audience often described their experience as a cinematic one. My desire to experiment with cinematographic composition, shared by my collaborator Jacinto, motivated us to attempt to create the appropriate conditions to concretise this idea. It was evident though that this would have to be done by exploring the specificities of the *Eye Height* performance and translating them into a cinematic ‘language’. Thus, this was from my perspective the way to challenge the compositional facet of the project, and produce a work of art at the intersection of dance, visual arts, sound and cinema. The work consisted mainly of adapting the performance to the technical and visual requirements that relate to the two different mediums. The *Eye Height* point of view, characterised by a considerable distance between the audience and the stage instrument, provided the experience of the image as a ‘whole’: a graphic perspective on the movement in relation to the sculptural object. The *Eye Height* film was to transfer this point of view to the film image, and to complement it with closer views of the visual object (stage and movement). It was intended to enhance its sculptural sinuosity, the topography of the space and of the dance, and the tactile sensation of the two surfaces in contact. It was fundamental to find ways of transferring a particular temporality that could extend the conceptual idea of the production of a pure optical and sound image by exploring the cinematic particulars. A visual landscape, perceived as a contemplative and meditative experience, where time is slowed down, extended, contracted, meaning, where time presents itself. For this reason, the movement and the sound indiscernibility had to be worked out in detail, due to the proximity of the camera, so that the result of their interaction could transmit a sense of playing with time. The latter relates directly to the use of the ‘travelling’ camera

technique, a very slow and continuous durational movement of the cameras. This creates the experience of ‘eternal’ circular time.

The conceptualisation of the filming was carried out in collaboration with Jacinto and the photography director Vasco Viana, who was also operating one of the cameras. The first trial was done with two cameras. One camera was fixed, giving a wider view corresponding to the *Eye Height* perspective. The other camera travelled around the structure giving a closer and detailed view of the movement and the structure (stage instrument). This experiment allowed us to put our ideas for the filming process into practice, and to gather information to improve the image composition. We concluded that one camera was not enough to provide the desired complexity in terms of creating multiple perspectives and engaging the viewer further. In the second trial we decided to use four cameras instead. One fixed camera corresponded to the eye height view, and the other three to the travelling around the structure, creating three simultaneous (synchronised) different points of view.

5.2.2.1 ASPECTS RELATED TO THE CAMERA

*The omnipresence of rhythms. Nothing is durable but what is caught up in rhythms.
Bend context to form and sense to rhythms.*

Robert Bresson

Velocity of the travelling cameras: The intended velocity of the cameras was a very slow motion that could simultaneously envelop the overall rhythm of the performance, and create contrast with the changing internal rhythms of the sound and the movement. The idea was that, if rhythms and remarkable movements were imprinted, they would have to come from the dance in order to create contrast and disrupt the placidity of the travelling camera¹³⁶. The velocity I requested from the cameraman and in particular, the dolly grip, was extremely difficult to achieve. This was firstly, because the dolly encumbered the cameras' steady pace and displacement, and secondly, because of their natural tendency to be contaminated by the velocity of the movements of the dancers, given their proximity¹³⁷. For this reason, I had to train the technicians to achieve the desired pace, going around the structure with them, so that they could get the 'feeling' and velocity of the requested movement of the camera.

Focus/framing: The appropriate focus and framing of the dance and the structure consisted of a series of compromises related to the intended detail of movement in the image, and the difficulties that are implicit in filming movement. An appropriate distance had to be found between the movement and the focus of the camera, because

¹³⁶ This relates to something that is very fashionable to use in cinema nowadays, an incessant movement of the camera that somehow erases any possibility of focusing on the movement of the characters.

¹³⁷ See photo of the rehearsal with the technicians: *Eye Height Installation*, Eye Height/film/documentation (4_02).

the dancers and the cameras were in constant movement. The possibility of changing focus (distance) from the movement whilst filming was not ideal because it disrupted the intended placidity, or the ‘calmness’ of the image. Therefore, only slight and gradual changes to the focus were possible, making necessary a compromise in the established distance: not too close because then the camera would always lose the dancers while moving, not too far because the entire space would be revealed and the sense of intimacy would be lost. This was complemented by allowing the camera to ‘travel’ along the landscape (topography of the stage), which prevented the cameraman feeling anxious about constantly having to ‘chase’ the dancers. This created a very interesting two-way relationship: either the camera would find the movement, or the movement would find the camera, resulting in a ‘smoother’ relationship between the two. The predominant focus corresponded to the dimensions of the largest body in the dance (Jacome), both in length and in height (body facing up, legs bent — the position of the sliding). The height in the focus relates to the need to maintain a sort of ‘weight’ in the image and to reinforce the kinetic sensation of the surfaces in contact (body/stage).

Colour/texture: The choice of the predominant colour of the film relates to the need to create a homogenous gathering of colour of all the different elements: stage, costumes and light. A warm and intimate ‘feeling’ towards their relationship was required, capable of smoothing its contours and of presenting a landscape with a specific ‘timeless patina’. The predominant colour was a consequence of the interplay of specific factors: the sinuosity and colour of the stage together with the body contours of the dancers, which highlighted specific shapes and colours in the costumes. Another film was also produced

in black and white that consisted of a long wide and fixed shot at eye level. This version was designed to enhance a pure graphic and cold image without depth¹³⁸.

5.2.2.2 ASPECTS RELATED TO THE MOVEMENT/SOUND

The alterations to the composition of the movement and sound strictly concerned the differences between the two mediums: performance and film. The film is shorter than the performance and it is divided into three different movement and sound explorations.

The line-up: the sequence comprises shorter extracts from the different explorations of movement and their respective sound production (sliding, rocking, percussive). Here both an idea of surface as well as of depth of the stage instrument is presented through the production of different soundscapes.

Movement: because of the close focus and distance of the camera, intensive and detailed work on the movement was crucial, calling for painstaking attention to be paid in order to ‘clean’ the movement of any extra unnecessary elements, and particular attention to be paid to facial expression and eye focus, which we trained exhaustively with the help of various types of close-ups with the camera. Detailed work was also done on the spatial distribution and progression of the movement on the surface in

¹³⁸ See black and white films: *Eye Height Installation*, *Eye Height Film*- first and second film with white background.

relation to the camera movement and velocity, akin to choreographing the camera movement¹³⁹.

Sound: sound was required for the intensive post-production task of synchronisation, firstly because of the dimensions of the space, which created different problems for its sharpness that were inadequate to the installation format and secondly, because of all the different sound recordings from the filming period: stage, instruments and cameras.

¹³⁹ Not only in relation to the overall pace of the travelling, but the necessary turns of the camera at the extremities (corners) of the stage, which always had to be adjusted to the corresponding changes on the stage topography.

5.2.3 EYE HEIGHT INSTALLATION

The eye solicited alone makes the ear impatient, the ear solicited alone makes the eye impatient. Use these impatiences. Power of the cinematographer who appeals to the two senses in a governable way. Against the tactics of speed, of noise, set tactics of slowness, of silence.

Robert Bresson

The installation consists of a triangular set made of three thick (approx. 1cm) hanging screens, made of plywood. The eye height view of the performance is kept on the exterior central projection¹⁴⁰. An immersive relationship is added to the experience by the three wide medium sequence shots¹⁴¹ around the stage, which are projected onto the three interior screens¹⁴². These three screens are placed at the height of the viewer's head (eyes). Inside this triangle, the viewer has to change her/his physical position in order to choose her/his perspective (different camera points of view). The installation display is intended to intensify the viewer's physical engagement. This is done through the proximity of the viewer to the screens and their need to change their position in order to access the different points of view. The camera's close up augments the viewer's tactual/gestural experience of the image, and contributes to enhancing the detail of the movement and its contact with the stage surface. The three screens synchronously recreate the perspective of the three cameras. The surround sound coming from the

¹⁴⁰ This screen has two projections, an interior and an exterior one.

¹⁴¹ Corresponding to each camera in the filming.

¹⁴² See installation plan in *Eye Height Installation*/Eye Height Installation: drawings- installation plan.

different speakers occupies the space and creates an immersive sound experience for the viewer. The projection is continuous and circular, dividing the themes by very short-length blackouts. The time experience changes according to the amount of time that the viewer chooses to remain in the installation space.

Another format was also developed for the installation, which concerns a more simple and affordable display. This format made the easy circulation and public presentation of the *Eye Height* cinematographic format possible. This format is a single screen projection and comprises a montage of the 4 different perspectives¹⁴³.

¹⁴³ See video of this format: *Eye height Instalation/eyeheight installation-multi screen sample- final sequence*.

5.3 EYE HEIGHT LAB

The lab corresponds to an idea due to be further developed in the future, either by experiencing the current arrangement with different collaborators (dancers and musicians), or by making the arrangement available for different compositional ideas (composers, choreographers). The first experience has already started, through the collaborations with different dancers and musicians during the process. The last performance of *Eye Height* was specifically intended to understand the possibility to change its content and/or format in order to adapt and incorporate different artistic inputs dependent on the collaborators' background or compositional strategies and characteristics. I invited Shiori Usui (voice and composer) and C Spencer Yeah (violin, voice, and composer) to the last performance. The idea to invite Yeah relates to the fact that he is an extremely experienced performer, musician and visual artist and his work empathises with *Eye Height*'s aesthetic premises. Additionally, I was also enthusiastic about experimenting with two different voices in the performance, Yeah and Usui's voices, and another string element (violin) in relation to the cello (Jacinto), as this was certain to sophisticate the acoustic/gestural relationship between the musicians and the dancers, and the sound composition. This allowed for different compositional perspectives that challenged our own improvisational strategies and responses. The latter gave me the desire to test the 'endurance' of the *Eye Height* arrangement by exposing it to further disruptions to its thematic (sound and movement) organisation. The performance comprised smaller compositional 'exercises' that experimented with a wider range of different displays of movement and sound. This altered the number of dancers on the stage, and created different movement relationships (visual, acoustic): empty stage, quartet, solo, duet. It also created a more experimental visual arrangement, especially because the substitution of the dancers on the stage was done in front of the

audience, assuming the different movement and sound experiments. The musical relationships were also extended, by giving the performers greater degrees of freedom in the musical improvisation. The different exercises focused on different possible relationships between the dancers and the musicians, and also between the musicians themselves. This experience revealed *Eye Height*'s potential for countless compositional possibilities, formats and strategies. Nonetheless, the latter should not compromise something that I consider to be the conceptual/aesthetic fundamental premises of the arrangement: a deep visual connection between the structure and the movement that is capable of heightening the potential of both 'sculptural objects' (stage and body). In other words, a non-narrative, non-hierarchical, and non-linear relationship between the sound and the movement, and ideally, an improvisation-based composition that is capable of presenting time and the image in all its complexity.

CONCLUSION

Deleuze's time-image concept could potentially be perceived as a threat to movement, because organic and kinetic body movement seem to vanish on screen to give way to a more static and intellectual cinema. Nevertheless, as a choreographer, what I see is not the 'death' of movement or its evanescence, but rather the possibility for a new perception of movement itself. That is to say, choreography is no longer exclusively perceived as the composition of the visible movements of the body, but instead a more conceptual approach to choreography is emerging. Movement is thus perceived as an intensity, a force immanent to the movements of the 'world', pure duration. Everything becomes movement, image and thought. To understand choreography as such requires new ways of thinking through composition, meaning, one needs to move towards an understanding of movement within a wider spectrum than just that of dance.

Spinoza's question, 'What can a body do?', becomes fundamental to the understanding of the role of perception both in art and in society, within the singular and collective experience. Artaud's, Deleuze's, and Nietzsche's perspectives of the body suggest that, dance, constant movement, constant becoming is where real thought is produced. As Deleuze states in *Difference and Repetition*, Nietzsche is among those philosophers who introduces to philosophy 'an overcoming of philosophy' (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 9). For Nietzsche, movement is an issue; he wants to put metaphysics in motion, in action. This does not mean creating a new representation of movement, as this would constitute a false movement, a mediation that would be again representative. It is about 'producing within the work, a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation; of substituting direct signs for mediate representations' (ibid).

Deleuze's time-image can inform movement and sound composition strategies and take their methods and techniques further, although we should not forget that we are dealing with two different realities: cinema and performance. The formal relationship is evidently different: one being the screen and the other one, live performance. Nevertheless, it is possible to transfer some aspects of composition of the time-image from one to the other.

The use of the formal aspects of the time-image and, more specifically, the focus on the composition of the sound optical image in this research, allowed for an intensive process of rethinking the studio practices within dance composition and its relation to sound and the image. It also facilitated a deeper understanding of the relation between the actual and the virtual within movement, thus allowing for the reframing of the possibilities of its coalescence, and the intensification of what one might call the potency of the movement, the sound and the image.

The research on the compositional aspects of the pure optical and sound image has given me the opportunity to find ways of presenting a 'surface' (image) which is closer to an idea of being 'empty of meaning'. The use of the Deleuzian 'irrational cut' as an inspiration and a strategy for composition, freed my choreographic work from resorting to intellectual strategies, such as text, symbolic elements, metaphor, etc., thus allowing for the production of an image beyond representation, centred instead on the production of 'affects', through an exclusive manipulation of the various materials (movement, body, image, sound). This has challenged the conditions of the act of 'seeing', creating an 'open condition' for the use of choreography, which prioritises the notions of

dynamic, rhythm, velocity, force and intensity. One can never answer the question, 'What can a body do?', as this would announce the finitude of the possibilities of the body; the same applies to choreography. Although as a choreographer one has to ask 'What can choreography do?', one cannot rest on a definitive answer, as reaching a 'final' answer to that question would represent an end to choreography itself. In order to progress in choreographic composition, one must continuously ask this question. Maintaining an 'open condition' with regards to the use of choreography, depends on acknowledging the constant becoming of its materials, which depend on its relations and on duration itself.

Throughout the present research, one thing has become evident: if one is searching for an immanence between movement and thought, one needs to perceive all of the choreographic elements (body, movement, sound, image, etc.) as being of equal importance and not as subject to any hierarchy. Therefore, the choreographic exploration consisted of an equal integration of all the elements in the composition, with a consistent confrontation/juxtaposition of the aesthetic premises. This was also fundamental for the interdisciplinary, collaborative artistic practice component of the research. Further, the fact that the choreographic composition was constituted of improvisation-based structures necessitated its continual sophistication or complexification. This was carried out in order to prevent the establishment of a stable structure that would eventually compromise the appearance of the new and the unpredictable in the improvisation. The materials, perceived as multiplicities, rather than reduced to their specific function, were instead fluidized into duration, meaning that a movement is never worked out as a 'simple movement' in space, but is instead developed simultaneously as a particular interference in the sound, the space, the time, and the image.

The term ‘disrupting structure’, which I frequently use to identify a specific strategy in the composition, reflects a particular and consistent methodological approach and the acknowledgement that the prevalence of a unique and single structure would compromise the possibility of the new material to surface in the improvisation. The continuous application of multiple and juxtaposed structures in the improvisation sophisticates the implicit relationships between the different elements and the performers, thus resulting in constant new movements and sounds that come unexpected in the choreography.

The composition works as a spectrum effect; a composition within a composition within a composition. Where the constant interchange between the actual and the virtual creates an unavoidable ‘flow’ through the continuous virtualization of movement as well as its constant actualization, a fluidity is triggered that can only correspond to a plane of immanence. This produces an indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual, as we can no longer distinguish the two. This indiscernibility, this coalescence, resonates with the Deleuzian crystalline forms, where one can no longer predict the appearance of the new forms. Their appearance becomes surprising, as these forms are in constant mutation (becoming), always in gestation. The moment of their appearance corresponds to the moment of their evanescence. These ‘mutable forms’ never manage to achieve a ‘fixed’ identifiable and stable form, or rather, they are never perceived as a representation. They are ‘pure movement’ or ‘duration’, thus when a form is attempting to stabilise itself in the visible space, inside of it a new form is already struggling to be actualized. For Deleuze this constant movement corresponds to what the author describes as constant ‘territorializations’ and ‘deterritorializations’ that happen in a specific plane, the ‘plane of composition’.

The fact that the relations between all the elements are constantly shifting in space and time precludes the emergence of stable relations to surface, or the formation of a specific meaning in the performance. This in its turn contributes to an experience where it is impossible for the audience to make a rational deduction, thus creating a feeling of ‘powerlessness’, where the image can no longer be interpreted in its fullness, but only sensed or contemplated.

The research practice carried out across different formats, *Untitled*, *Untitled#1* and *Untitled#2*, was fundamental to the development of the final performance, *Eye Height*. The exploration of multiple interdisciplinary compositional processes was crucial in order to meet the specific needs of *Eye Height*, and to develop a more complex, yet freer, choreographic approach to the project. Further, I am confident that the extensive visual materials produced throughout the practice, and in particular in *Eye Height*, constitute valuable research material to be used in the future. These materials can certainly inform and contribute to other practices, both in academic as well as in artistic contexts. The *Eye Height* research lab, which hosts artists for short and intensive residencies, is due to be continued, and we can be sure of challenging novel contributions to the project in the future. Furthermore, making the *Eye Height* set (stage instrument) available to other choreographers and composers interested in similar questions, is also a way to test its (un)foreseen potential and malleability in different performative formats.

The present research explores new ways of connecting dance and philosophy by constantly articulating them into the experimental practice. The research, analysis and understanding of the implicit Deleuzian concepts in the optical sound image have

constantly informed and contributed to the development of the movement experiments and the interdisciplinary composition. Philosophical practice thus provides methodologies for questioning, and experimenting with concepts that can be introduced into movement practices, helping choreographers and dance practitioners to develop new frameworks in choreography. Similarly, the analysis of aesthetic concepts, from a dance perspective, illuminates and reveals discrepancies between theory and practice, contributing to a deeper understanding of both areas and stimulating continual questioning and research into novel solutions. As Petra Sabisch stresses in her book *Choreographing Relations. Practical Philosophy and Contemporary Choreography* (2011), the most common type of choreographic methodological analysis¹⁴⁴ would lack an understanding of what the author identifies as the ‘heterogeneous’, the ‘singular’, that which characterises the material assemblages.

¹⁴⁴ Sabisch is referring to a phenomenological choreographic/descriptive analysis, and criticising it as being ineffective if one wants to overcome a pure visible perception of movement: ‘As an alternative, the phenomenological or movement-analytical approach tries to capture the concrete movements of a choreography. It has to be noted that these descriptions of precepts are often of great use for choreographers, at least when governed by a certain rigor in sticking to the perceived, because they allow the choreographer to sketch an image of the transformative effects of the performance. However, that which is considered a concretion in phenomenal or movement-analytical investigations of choreography often reduces the body implicitly to its visible contours and thus installs a kind of supremacy of the visible as sole epistemological instrument.’ (Sabisch, 2011, p. 30).

Through the present research, I have sought to create a conceptual choreographic apparatus, intended to rethink the possibilities of choreography and movement. The interdisciplinary relations established between theory and practice, represent the need to explore new possibilities for ‘practice as thinking’. The latter, from my perspective, has further implications to choreography than its simple use for the production of ‘dances’.

The use of interdisciplinary practice in my research asserts my belief that only through articulating different practices, strategies and processes of thought can one push the boundaries of any given area of knowledge, be it artistic or academic, further.

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- Amarcord.* 1973. [Filme] Directed by Federico Fellini. Italy, France: s.n.
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- Shirin.* 2008. [Filme] Directed by Abbas Kiarostami. Iran: s.n.
- Solaris.* 1972. [Filme] Directed by Andrei Tarkovsky. Soviet Union: s.n.
- Stalker.* 1979. [Filme] Directed by Andrei Tarkovsky. Soviet Union: s.n.
- Syndromes and a century.* 2006. [Filme] Directed by Apichatpong Weerasethakul. Thailand: s.n.
- Taste of cherry.* 1997. [Filme] Directed by Abbas Kiarostami. Iran: s.n.
- The 400 blows.* 1959. [Filme] Directed by François Truffaut. France: s.n.
- The barefoot contessa.* 1954. [Filme] Directed by Joseph L. Mankiewicz. U.S, Italy: s.n.

The end of summer. 1961. [Filme] Directed by Yasujirô Ozu. Japan : s.n.

The First Auto. 1927 . [Filme] Directed by Roy Del. Ruth. USA: s.n.

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The wind will carry us. 1999. [Filme] Directed by Abbas Kiarostami. Iran, France: s.n.

Through the Olive Trees. 1994. [Filme] Directed by Abbas Kiarostami. Iran, France :
s.n.

Umberto D.. 1952. [Filme] Directed by Vittorio De Sica. Italy: s.n.

APPENDICES

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1. PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS

1.1 ACADEMIC:

PUBLICATION:

EYE HEIGHT: Cantinho, Beatriz. 2010. A project in pictures. PLATFORM – Journal of Theatre and Performing Arts, Vol.5, n° 1, Transformations, Summer 2010.

<http://www.rhul.ac.uk/dramaandtheatre/platform/issues/vol5-no1-transformations-summer2010.aspx>.

Web site:

<http://eyeheight-project.com>

PRESENTATIONS

2012

Ethics seminar. Edinburgh College of Art, University of Edinburgh. *Changing the rhythm, slowing down time: when ethics and aesthetics entwine*. June. Edinburgh.

2011

Invited speaker at Line-Up Festival: *Can performance be taught?* University of Coimbra. October. Coimbra.

2010

*Choreographing thought: movement as an image of thought, seen through the Deleuzian
Pure Optical and Sound Image.*

Trans.form@work. University of Surrey, paper presentation: *Crystal image – beyond metaphor: analysis of movement perception in interdisciplinary artistic work*. March. Surrey.

2009

Making Sense. University of Cambridge, poster presentation: *Creating sense through interdisciplinary artistic research*. September. Cambridge.

The Film-Philosophy conference. University of Dundee, paper presentation: *A choreographic perspective on movement in cinema. An Analysis of Five* by Abbas Kiarostami. July. Dundee.

2008

The Art of Research. Research Narratives Symposium. Chelsea College of Art & Design, presentation of the practice-based work: *Untitled#1* with Vangelis Lympouridis. October. London.

Dance, Timing and Musical Gesture. University of Edinburgh, poster presentation: *Researching non-hierarchical interactive relationships within interdisciplinary improvisation*. June. Edinburgh.

Edinburgh College of Art seminars. Presentation: *Crystal image, beyond metaphor*. April. Edinburgh.

1.2 ARTISTIC

2012

Eye Height video installation. Sonorities Festival of Contemporary Music, SARC - Sonic Arts Research Centre. Queen's University Belfast. Belfast. 22–27 March.

Eye Height video installation. Carpe diem. Arte e Pesquisa. Lisbon. 21 April.

Eye Height video installation. Gallery Fernando Santos, Oporto. 10–24 March.

Eye Height video installation. Gallery Vera Cortês, Lisbon. Projection and talk. 31 March.

2011

Eye Height Installation. MNAC-Museum of Contemporary Art of Portugal, Lisbon. 11 November–11 December.

Eye Height residency and Performance with guests, C. Spencer, Yeah & Shiori Usui. Fundação de Oeiras. Lisbon. 19 November.

2010

Eye Height Performance. CCB- Cultural Centre of Belém, Lisbon. 8–9 October.

Eye Height Performance. Fundação de Oeiras, Oeiras. 25 July.

Eye Height Performance. Teatro Praga, Lisbon. 6–8 May.

Eye Height Performance. Teatro o Tempo, Portimão. 8–17 April.

*Choreographing thought: movement as an image of thought, seen through the Deleuzian
Pure Optical and Sound Image.*

Eye Height Performance. Fábrica da Pólvora, Lisbon. 29–31 January.

2009

Eye Height Performance. Fábrica da Pólvora, Lisbon. 12 December.

2008

Untitled #2. Ponto de Encontro, Almada. Lisbon. 29 November.

Untitled #1. DanceBase, Edinburgh. 27 June.

2. COLLABORATORS IN ORDER OF APPEARENCE:

Ana Gouveia: dancer

Madalena Xavier: dancer

Ricardo Jacinto: visual artist, composer, musician

Nuno Torres: composer, musician

Marlene Freitas: dancer

Shiori Usui: composer, musician

Vangelis Iympouridis: interaction design

Mike Greer: interactive designer

André Castro: designer

Elysabeth Remelgado: designer

Tomás Viana: stage construction

Vasco Viana: photography director, camera direction

Francesca Bertozi: dancer

Filipe Jacôme: dancer

Pedro Magalhães: sound engineer

*Choreographing thought: movement as an image of thought, seen through the Deleuzian
Pure Optical and Sound Image.*

Mariana Sá Nogueira: costume designer

Daniel Malhão: photographer

Meninos Exemplares: production

Luis Quirino: photographer

Alexandre Costa: light

Vasco Saltão: camera

Nuno da Silva: camera

Jose Pedro: IT consultancy and support, chief sync architect

C Spencer Yeah: composer, musician

Matilde Meireles: designer

3. VISUAL MATERIAL

- The different projects are distributed in three different discs. The DVD works as a website and all material is accessed through the file 'Index.html' found on the DVD.

3.1 UNTITLED (DISC.1)

FIRST PHASE:

- Rehearsals without musicians
- Rehearsals with musicians – S_Titulo
- Rehearsals with musicians – Untitled
- Scores / Drawings

SECOND PHASE

- AH Rehearsal Samples
- Pleasance Rehearsal Samples
- Second Phase Rehearsals – Untitled – Allison House

3.2 UNTITLED#1 (DISC1)

FIRST PHASE

- Mike Greer's digital stage concept 1, 2 and 3
- Scores / Drawings

SECOND PHASE

- Untitled#1 Performance at DanceBase
- DanceBase Residency Rehearsals Sample
- DanceBase Residency photographs
- Scores / Drawings

3.3 UNTITLED#2 (DISC1)

FIRST PHASE

- Scores / Drawings

SECOND PHASE

- Untitled#2 Second Phase rehearsal sample
- Score / Drawings

THIRD PHASE

- Untitled#2 Third Phase Performance
- Gouveia postures recognition by the sensors
- Xavier postures recognition by the sensors
- Scores / Drawings

3.4 EYE HEIGHT

FÁBRICA DA PÓLVORA RESIDENCY (DISC 2)

REAHEARSALS:

- Aerial view of the stage
- Making of Eye Height
- Eye Height Performance creation
- Portimão theatre rehearsals
- Side view of the stage
- Drawings

PERFORMANCE:

- Eye Height Performance at Fábrica da Pólvora.
- Eye height Performance at Teatro Praga

PHOTOGRAPHS:

- Final Photos
- Points of view
- Portimão Theatre
- Praga Theatre
- Sound Experiments
- Stage construction
- Strings placement

FUNDIÇÃO DE OEIRAS (DISC 3)

REAHEARSALS:

- Rehearsal samples
- Drawings

PERFORMANCE:

- Final improvisation structure

PHOTOGRAPHS

EYE HEIGHT INSTALLATION (DISC 3)

EYE HEIGHT FILM:

- Eye Height widescreen plan
- First film with white background
- Second film with white background
- Photographs

EYE HEIGHT INSTALLATION:

- Multi-screen sample final sequence
- Museum installation with multi-screen display
- Drawings

EYE HEIGHT LAB (DISC 3)

- Lab Performance excerpt
- Photograph